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Abstract 
From 2003 to 2009, the EU launched five military conflict management 
operations within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy. 
This thesis examines their success. To this end, the thesis develops a definition 
and a set of criteria for success. It applies this theoretical framework in an 
empirical case study of success in the five EU operations, which were 
undertaken in Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Chad and the Central African Republic. Having established the level 
and nature of their success, the thesis goes on to examine the conditions under 
which ESDP military conflict management operations can be successful. The 
key finding of the research is that for an operation of this nature to succeed, it 
is necessary that it secures sufficient support internally, within the EU, and 
externally, outside the EU, from domestic, regional and international actors 
involved in the conflict and its management.  
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Chapter one: Introduction 
The European Union launched its first ever military conflict management 
operation in 2003. Since then the Unions endeavors in military conflict 
management have developed rapidly both in terms of the number and nature of 
its operations, tasks and capabilities. From 2003 to 2009, the EU launched five 
military conflict management operations within the framework of its European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). These operations were intended to help 
facilitate the management of conflicts in Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo and the tri-border area between Sudan, 
Chad and the Central African Republic. This thesis is about these operations. It 
examines and explains the level and nature of their success. The purpose of this 
undertaking is to analyse the necessary conditions for success in ESDP military 
conflict management operations. In this way, the thesis seeks to add a new 
dimension to the current debate on the EUs emerging role as a military 
conflict manager in the international security arena.  
 
Military conflict management is a contentious issue. There are adamant 
arguments against it, just as there are strong and convincing arguments in its 
favour. Whether to intervene militarily to manage violent conflict is much 
debated in the scholarly literature (Bellamy, 2006; Kuperman, 2001; Mills and 
Brunner, 2003; Ramsey, 2002; Walzer, 2003). Although this is a crucial 
question, it is not the purpose of this venture. The focus of this thesis is on the 
undertaking of ESDP military conflict management operations. It evaluates the 
operations and explores the conditions under which they have been successful 
(or not). As such, the analysis is limited to the period from the launch of each 
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operation to its formal completion. The contentious nature of the subject 
matter, however, makes a sound theoretical framework for the systematic 
evaluation of success in this type of operation all the more important. The 
human tragedy of each individual conflict can easily bury a study of this nature 
in hindsight. Although thorough case-specific evaluation is important, the 
danger of looking backwards is that one fails to prepare for the challenges 
ahead. In military conflict management such failure comes at a high price. 
Therefore, this thesis takes a forward-looking perspective. Through a 
comparative analysis of the five operations undertaken to date, it seeks to 
contribute to a more theoretically grounded understanding of success in ESDP 
military conflict management operations. The thesis develops an analytical 
framework for the evaluation of success in operations of this nature. As any 
good analytical model should, it aims to describe, explain and make predictions 
regarding the subject of enquiry (Singer, 1961). That is success in ESDP 
military conflict management operations. 
 
The emergence of the ESDP and its academic scholarship 
Foreign policy cooperation among the member states of the European 
Community
1
 (EC) has officially existed since the establishment of European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970. The EPC was a loose and voluntary 
framework of consultation. Where possible, the member states were 
encouraged to take common positions in international organisations and to 
have regard for the views of the European Parliament. Although the EPC was 
formalised in the Single European Act in 1986, it was never brought fully into 
                                                 
1 The term European Community is used in the historical context before the Treaty on 
European Union entered into force on 1 November 1993. With reference to the period after 
1993, the term European Union is used (Hill and Smith, 2000, pp.153-157). 
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the institutional structures of the EC and it never became much more than an 
exchange of opinions between its member states (Jones, 2001, pp.429-461; 
Smith, 2008, pp.1-24). In response to the changing security situation at the end 
of the Cold War, the EC began to develop a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP). The Treaty on European Union, signed in Maastricht in 
December 1991, formally established the CFSP as a pillar of the EU. The 
CFSP was intended to institutionally equip the EU to manage any foreign 
policy matters concerning the security of the Union. This was specified as 
safeguarding the values, interests and integrity of the Union; promoting 
international cooperation; developing and consolidating democracy, rule of law 
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and finally, 
preserving peace and international security in accordance with the principles of 
the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter of the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (Treaty on European 
Union, 1991; Smith, 2008, pp.1-24).  
 
Despite the establishment of the CFSP the EU was wholly unprepared for the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia and the violent conflicts that followed throughout 
the 1990s (Cameron, 2006; Daalder, 1996; Dannreuter, 2004; Pentland, 2003). 
The failure to manage the break-up of Yugoslavia motivated the EU to further 
develop the CFSP and to establish the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) within it in 1999 (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006; Howorth, 2007). In 
2003, the EU explicitly stated in the European Security Strategy (ESS) that 
managing violent conflict was to be one of its key security priorities (Council 
of the EU, 2003). That same year the EU launched its first two ESDP military 
 11
conflict management operations in Macedonia
2
 and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC). Since then the Union has launched another three operations 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the Democratic Republic of Congo and, 
most recently, a joint operation in Chad and the Central African Republic 
(CAR) (Council of the EU, 2009a). An overview of all the ESDP military 
conflict management operations launched from 2003 to 2009 is provided in 
table 1.1 below. 
 
Table 1.1: ESDP military conflict management operations: 2003-2009 
Completed operations 
 
Ongoing operations 
EU Military Operation in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(EUFOR Concordia): 31 March 2003 
 15 December 2003 
 
European Union Military Operation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR 
Althea): 2 December 2004  ongoing 
EU Military Operation in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
(Operation Artemis): 12 June 2003  
1 September 2003 
 
 
EUFOR DR Congo: 12 June 2006  
30 November 2006 
 
 
EU Military Bridging Operations in 
Chad and the Central African 
Republic (EUFOR Chad/CAR):  
28 January 2008  15 March 2009 
 
 
(Council of the EU, 2009a) 
 
Scholars of the European Union have responded to the recent EU 
developments with extensive analysis of the institutional framework and policy 
processes of the CFSP and ESDP. Howorth (2007), Keukeleire and 
                                                 
2 Macedonia will be referred to by its constitutional name in this thesis.     
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MacNaughtan (2008) and Smith (2004) have made important contributions in 
this regard. There is also renewed academic interest in the role of the EU in the 
international arena. To mention but a few key contributions to this debate 
Bretherton and Vogler (2006) have examined The European Union as a Global 
Actor; Manners (2002) has investigated Normative Power Europe; Smith 
(2008) has explored European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World; 
and Whitman (2009) has considered the EUs position as a potential 21
st
 
century superpower. A reoccurring theme in the ongoing academic debate is 
whether the EU can play a part in conflict regulation beyond its own borders. 
There has been considerable scrutiny of the EUs early failures to manage the 
violent conflicts that followed the end of the Cold War in the Western Balkans 
(Cameron, 2006; Daalder, 1996; Dannreuter, 2004; Pentland, 2003). Tocci 
(2007) has looked at the EUs role in conflict resolution in its backyard and 
Kronenberger and Wouters (2004) have examined EU policy on conflict 
prevention. As ESDP military conflict management operations have been 
undertaken in the field, so have corresponding case studies examining the 
origins, mandates and implementation of these operations. By way of example, 
Operation Concordia has been evaluated by Mace (2004); Operation Artemis 
has been examined by Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace (2004); Haine and 
Giegerich (2006) have scrutinised EUFOR DR Congo; Operation Althea was 
assed by Friesendorf and Penska (2008) and Seibert (2007 and 2008) has 
undertaken a thorough investigation of EUFOR Chad/CAR.  
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The state of the ESDP debate  
The academic scholarship of the ESDP, like the policy itself, is under constant 
development. The current state of the field and the speed at which this is 
developing is both impressive and exciting. Nonetheless, the existing literature 
on ESDP military conflict management operations still leaves much to be 
desired. In particular, the theoretical understanding of these operations and the 
necessary conditions for their success is underdeveloped. Considering that 
these are still early days both for the subject of enquiry and the enquiry itself, 
this is perhaps understandable. The ESDP, after all, was only established a 
decade ago. Nevertheless, it is important to begin to develop a more 
theoretically grounded and systematic approach to the evaluation of ESDP 
military conflict management operations. This, in turn, will enable a better 
understanding of success in this realm. 
 
To date the evaluation of ESDP military conflict management operations has 
typically been undertaken on a case-by-case basis. A few recent studies have 
incorporated a regional dimension in their analyses (Cascone, 2008; Rye Olsen, 
2009; Wolff and Rodt, 2008), but there is still a divide between the scholarship 
of ESDP military conflict management operations undertaken in Europe and 
those conducted in Africa. As of yet there has been little in-depth comparative 
analysis of the success of all the operations. Giegerich (2008) touched upon the 
characteristics of the EU approach to military conflict management more 
generally, but his study focused on the ambitions and performances of member 
states rather than the overall success of the EU approach.  
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A theoretical framework for the systematic evaluation and comparison of 
success in ESDP military conflict management operations has, thus, yet to be 
developed. In the same way, the conditions under which the EU is (or is likely 
to be) successful in ESDP military conflict management operations have 
received surprisingly little academic attention. In fact, what would constitute a 
success in this realm has not yet been convincingly conceptualised. Failure to 
appropriately address these issues may lead to misunderstanding in evaluation, 
misjudgement in prescription and, in the worst case, to unintended outcomes 
and less than successful operations. Failure in military conflict management 
may have serious implications both for those who conduct the operations and 
for those who live (and die) in the conflicts they seek to manage. This is why 
systematic scrutiny of success in ESDP military conflict management is 
important  not only in theory, but also in practice.  
 
Research question and original contribution of the thesis  
This research embarks on the task of systematically scrutinising success in 
ESDP military conflict management operations. It hopes to begin to fill the gap 
identified in the ESDP literature and the wider understanding of military 
conflict management operations. In particular, the thesis seeks to contribute to 
the development of a more theoretically grounded comprehension of success in 
ESDP military conflict management operations. This key contribution of the 
project is theoretical. However, this is a problem-based piece of research in the 
sense that it hopes to help solve a real-world problem. The thesis is, thus, 
intended to add also to the empirical knowledge of ESDP military conflict 
management operations and to address policy concerns of how to achieve 
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success in such endeavours. The thesis hopes to initiate and encourage a wider 
debate on the notion of success in ESDP military conflict management. To this 
end, it discusses how to define, evaluate and achieve success in this new realm 
of the European Security and Defence Policy.  
 
The central research question of the thesis is: Under which conditions can 
an ESDP military conflict management operation be successful?  
 
As any good research question this immediately raises a number of other 
questions: What is success in ESDP military conflict management? Have the 
individual operations been successful so far? Why or why not? The thesis sets 
out to answer these questions in a systematic fashion. Firstly, it develops a 
definition of success in ESDP military conflict management operations. It goes 
on to discuss how success is best evaluated. Subsequently, it introduces a set of 
criteria according to which to evaluate success. By way of the new definition 
and criteria for success, the thesis constructs a theoretical framework for the 
evaluation of ESDP military conflict management operations. It uses this 
framework to examine success in the five ESDP military conflict management 
operations launched from 2003 to 2009. Based on these findings the thesis goes 
on to examine the conditions under which operations have succeeded in the 
past and to predict when such operations are likely to succeed in the future.  
 
The original contributions of this thesis to the theoretical knowledge and 
empirical understanding of the ESDP is the definition of success in 
military conflict management operations; the theoretical framework for its 
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evaluation; the comparative evaluation itself and the identification and 
analysis of the conditions for success in this realm. This is an important 
contribution not only to the study of the ESDP, but also to the 
understanding of military conflict management more generally.  
 
Aims and objectives 
The thesis has five main objectives:  
 
(1) to conceptualise success in military conflict management operations; 
(2) to develop a theoretical framework for the evaluation of success in 
military conflict management operations; 
(3) to conduct a comparative case study of success in ESDP military 
conflict management operations applying the theoretical definition and 
evaluation framework for success;  
(4) to identify and explain the conditions for success in this realm;  
(5) to discuss what this means for ESDP military conflict management in 
the future and the study of military conflict management more widely.  
 
Methodology, terminology and the analytical approach 
To achieve its aims and answer the central research question this study adopts a 
qualitative research methodology. The following section explains the 
methodology and the analytical approach in further detail, but first it is useful 
to clarify a few conceptual issues. In order to evaluate success in ESDP 
military conflict management operations, it is important first to determine what 
in this context is meant by the terms conflict and conflict management. 
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 Conceptualising conflict 
In its most general form the term conflict refers to a situation in which opposed 
parties pursue incompatible goals. As such conflict is a common feature in any 
society. It is not necessarily negative, nor is conflict management a given 
positive. It is impossible and undesirable to manage all types of conflict. 
However, some conflicts turn violent and become dangerous both for 
belligerents involved in the violence and for innocent bystanders affected by its 
consequences. When conflicts turn violent, third-party intervention is often 
considered and at times deemed appropriate. Sometimes external actors 
intervene militarily to manage the violent aspect of the conflict. This is the case 
in ESDP military conflict management operations. The term conflict in the 
conceptual discussion of ESDP military conflict management operations, 
therefore, refers to the type of conflict that has turned violent. Violent conflict 
can range from a low-level violent campaign of sustained guerrilla insurgency 
to all-out civil war (Brown, 2006; Gleditsch et al, 2002; Ramsbotham, 
Woodhouse & Miall, 2005, pp.3-31). The Uppsala Conflict Data Programme in 
cooperation with the International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) has 
defined armed conflict as a contested incompatibility that concerns government 
and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at 
least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths 
per year (Gleditsch et al, 2002).  
 
The terms violent conflict and armed conflict are often used interchangeably. 
However, conceptually they have different meanings. By definition, armed 
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conflict is a type of violent conflict. The term violent conflict also includes 
unarmed violent acts and one-sided violence such as ethnic cleaning and 
genocide against unarmed civilians (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2005, 
pp.3-31). The term violent conflict, rather than armed conflict, is more 
appropriate here, as this includes all violent aspects of conflict rather than just 
armed conflict. This reflects the reality in which ESDP military conflict 
management operations can be deployed and is particularly relevant because it 
is the violent aspect of the conflict as a whole that such an operation seeks to 
help manage. Although the focus here is on violent conflict, rather than armed 
conflict, the threshold of 25 battle-related deaths per year is helpful to 
distinguish between (a) sporadic violent incidents such as violent protests and 
riots and (b) sustained violent conflict. It is sustained violent conflict that is the 
focus of military conflict management operations. The Uppsala/PRIO 
definition above is, thus, expanded here to include one-sided violence, 
unarmed violence and confrontations between more than two primary parties. 
This is done to include all aspects of violent conflict in the definition and to 
reflect the empirical reality in which ESDP military conflict management 
operations can be deployed.  
 
Violent conflict is defined as a contested incompatibility that concerns 
government and/or territory where the use of violence between belligerent 
parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year. 
 
For the analytical purpose of this thesis is useful to clarify two key issues with 
regard to the dynamics of violent conflict: (1) why a conflict becomes violent 
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in the first place and (2) how the violent aspect of a conflict may develop 
further, and the conflict, in turn, may become more violent. The purpose of this 
section is not to engage in an in-depth discussion of the causes and 
consequences of violent conflict, but rather to highlight two aspects of conflict 
studies, which are particularly relevant to this research. It is important to take 
these two issues into account in order to understand the purpose of conflict 
management and to determine what constitutes and conditions success in ESDP 
military conflict management operations.    
 
So why do conflicts turn violent? The reason why some conflicts turn violent 
can be explained through a two-stage process of permissive conditions and 
proximate causes. Permissive conditions are underlying factors that make a 
conflict prone to violence. Proximate causes are catalytic factors that trigger a 
violence-prone conflict situation to turn violent. In other words, permissive 
conditions make violence possible, and proximate causes make violence 
happen. Permissive conditions and proximate causes are both necessary, but 
neither are sufficient to make a conflict violent (Brown, 1996, pp.1-31 & 
pp.571-601; Cordell & Wolff, forthcoming). Figure 1.2 illustrates this point. 
 
Figure 1.2: Why conflicts turn violent 
 Permissive conditions + Proximate causes             Violent 
 
A variety of different permissive conditions and proximate causes can make 
conflicts violent. Brown (1996, pp. 1-31 & 571-601) synthesised the literature 
on the causes of conflict and identified four categories of permissive conditions 
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and proximate causes of internal conflict; namely, (1) structural, (2) political, 
(3) socio-economic and (4) cultural factors. Conditions within each of these 
categories, either individually or in combination, can cause the outbreak of a 
violent conflict. Table 1.3 below illustrates the four categories and highlights 
key permissive conditions and proximate causes of violent conflict within each 
of the categories.  
 
Table 1.3: Permissive conditions and proximate causes of violent conflict 
 Permissive conditions Proximate causes  
Structural factors  
 
Weak states; Intra-state 
security concerns; Ethnic 
geography 
Collapsing states; 
Changing military 
balances; Changing 
demographic patterns 
Political factors  
 
Discriminatory political 
institutions; Exclusionary 
national ideologies; Inter-
group politics; Elite 
politics 
Political transition; 
Increasingly influential 
exclusionary ideologies; 
Growing inter-group 
competition; Intensifying 
leadership struggles 
Socio-economic 
factors  
 
Economic problems; 
Discriminatory economic 
systems; Economic 
development and 
modernisation 
Mounting economic 
problems; Growing 
economic inequalities; 
Fast-paced development 
and modernisation  
Cultural factors  
 
Cultural discrimination; 
Divisive group histories 
and perceptions 
Intensifying patterns of 
cultural discrimination; 
Ethnic bashing and 
propagandising 
(Brown, 1996, pp.1-31) 
 
Brown (1996) argued that violent conflicts can be either internally or 
externally-driven, and that they can be triggered either by elite or mass-level 
actions. Elite-level actors and actions are usually the catalysts that turn 
potentially volatile situations into violent confrontations (Brown, 1996, p.23). 
By way of example, the violent conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
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internally-driven and elite-triggered (Brown, 1996, p.582). Browns study 
focused on the conditions of conflict, whereas this thesis concentrates on the 
conditions of conflict management. However, the thesis supports Blaineys 
(1988) argument that the reasons why conflicts start must be related to why 
they eventually end. This is not to say that the reasons are the same, but that 
they are related. This suggests that it is important to understand the causes of 
violent conflict in order to appropriately define what would constitute and 
condition success in its management. Conflict and conflict management are 
intrinsically linked phenomena. The next section examines the specific 
dynamics of violence that military conflict management operations are 
intended to manage.   
 
The second conceptual issue, which is important in evaluating military conflict 
management operations, is to recognise that violence is not a constant state or 
stage of conflict. Once a conflict has turned violent, the violence may develop 
in a variety of different ways. Conflicts do not necessarily develop in a linear 
and logical fashion and may move back and forth between different stages of 
violence and non-violence. If, however, a conflict becomes more violent, this 
research has identified four different processes by which this may take place; 
namely, through (1) continuation, (2) diffusion, (3) escalation and (4) 
intensification of violence. Continuation refers to the process in which the 
violent aspect of a conflict continues over time. Diffusion describes the 
scenario when violent conflict in one geographic area directly or indirectly 
generates violent conflict in another area. Diffusion can take place either within 
the original conflict country or beyond international borders. Escalation occurs 
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when new external actors become involved in an already existing conflict 
within its confined geographic borders. Such external actors may be 
neighbouring states, ethnic kin, Diaspora or others that become directly 
involved in the conflict (Gelditsch, 2007; Lobell & Mauceri, 2004, pp.1-10). 
Intensification refers the process by which the violence itself increases. It 
includes both an increase in the number and nature of violent incidents. 
Although these are four analytically distinct phenomena; continuation, 
diffusion, escalation and intensification may occur simultaneously. A violent 
conflict can also take a less violent turn and the violent aspect of the conflict 
may in effect diminish. This is the development that conflict management 
seeks to bring about. Conflict management by definition aims to prevent the 
continuation, diffusion, escalation and intensification of violent conflict. The 
next section will explain this in further detail. 
 
Conceptualising conflict management 
In the conflict regulation literature the term conflict management has been used 
as a generic term to cover a whole gamut of positive conflict handling 
(Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2005, pp.3-31, p.29). As such, it is a 
disputed concept. In particular, it is much debated what, if anything, 
distinguishes conflict management from conflict prevention and conflict 
settlement. For the analytical purpose of this thesis, it is useful to separate the 
three concepts and to discuss the notion of success specifically with regard to 
conflict management. This will facilitate a more accurate evaluation of success 
in ESDP military conflict management operations.  
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Conflict management is defined as an action, which seeks to manage the 
violent aspect of a conflict by addressing its proximate causes. 
 
The following section will explain how conflict management is different, yet 
related, to these two other types on conflict regulation. Conceptually, this thesis 
argues, conflict management differs from conflict prevention and conflict 
settlement in four key areas; namely, in terms of its target, time frame, focus 
and main objective. The difference between the three concepts, as they are 
defined in this thesis, is illustrated in table 1.4 below. 
 
Table 1.4: Conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict settlement 
 Conflict prevention Conflict management Conflict settlement 
Target Pre-violent conflict Violent conflict   Post-violent conflict 
Time frame Longer term  Shorter term  Longer term 
Focus Permissive conditions Proximate causes Permissive conditions  
Objective Prevent violence  Manage violence Prevent renewed violence
 
In this thesis the term conflict management will refer exclusively to actions that 
seek to address the proximate causes that turn a conflict violent. The main 
objective of conflict management is to manage the violent aspect of a conflict. 
That is to prevent a continuation, diffusion, escalation and intensification of 
violence. Therefore, by definition, conflict management is limited to the 
timeframe in which a conflict is violent or at risk of turning more violent in the 
relative short term. Conflict prevention, despite a lack of consensus in the 
literature, will here be confined to actions seeking to address the underlying 
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permissive causes of a conflict to prevent it from turning violent in the first 
place. Finally, conflict settlement refers to efforts to address the underlying 
causes and consequences of conflict in the post-violent phase. The objective of 
conflict settlement is to prevent another violent conflict (Ackermann, 2003; 
Cordell & Wolff, forthcoming; Lund, 2002; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & 
Miall, 2005).  
 
Although conceptually distinct, there is a close relationship between these three 
types of conflict regulation. Even though different phases of conflict in theory 
require different types of conflict regulation, different conflict phases can often 
not easily be separated in practice. Conflict prevention, conflict management 
and conflict settlement efforts often overlap and intertwine. Conflict 
management links to aspects of conflict prevention in that it seeks to prevent 
more violence. This is why it is sometimes referred to as a type of conflict 
prevention. Conflict management is also linked to conflict settlement, as the 
management of violence facilitates conflict settlement. Vice versa, a temporary 
aspect of acute settlement of certain aspects of the conflict is often necessary to 
help manage the violence. Finally, conflict settlement is linked to conflict 
prevention, because it seeks to prevent a new violent conflict. In the longer 
term, conflict settlement can become conflict prevention. This thesis argues 
that the relationship between the three types of conflict regulation is better 
understood as a cyclical process than a stage-by-stage development. This is 
illustrated in diagram 1.5 below.  
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Diagram 1.5: Conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict settlement 
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When examining success in ESDP military conflict management operations, 
however, it is important to recall that despite the close links between the three 
concepts, the primary purposes of conflict management, conflict settlement and 
conflict prevention are distinct. The main objective of conflict management is 
to prevent a continuation, diffusion, escalation and intensification of the violent 
conflict. 
 
There are two different types of conflict management: (1) military conflict 
management and (2) civilian conflict management. This thesis focuses on 
military conflict management. It is important to acknowledge that military and 
civilian aspects of conflict management sometimes overlap. As Moskos, 
Williams and Segal (2000, p.2) have argued, there is an increased inter-
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penetrability of civilian and military spheres in the post-modern military and in 
particular in multipurpose operations such as conflict management operations. 
Schnabel and Ehrhart (2005) illustrated this phenomenon in their description of 
the post-modern soldier: 
 
The post-modern soldier is not only a fighter, but also a peacekeeper, 
policeman, diplomat, social worker and Peace Corps worker (Schnabel and 
Ehrhart, 2005, p.3) 
 
Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between (a) soldiers conducting 
some civilian tasks as part of a military conflict management operation and (b) 
civilian conflict management initiatives. Hybrid missions, which encompass 
both civilian and military components, bridge the gap between the two, but 
these are a different breed from military conflict management operations, 
which are the focus of this thesis. 
  
Conflict management can be undertaken by a variety of actors, internal and 
external to the conflict. This thesis focuses on conflict management undertaken 
by the EU in violent conflicts beyond the Unions borders. It is important to 
stress that the EU engages in a variety of different conflict management efforts. 
However, since 2003, the EU has launched ESDP military operations to help 
facilitate the management of violent conflicts. These operations are the subject 
of this enquiry. Before turning to the question of how to define success in these 
operations, it is important to stress that success here means the success of an 
ESDP military conflict management operation and not the success of the wider 
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EU approach to the country or conflict in question. This distinction is often 
fudged in the literature. It is an important distinction to make, however, 
because an ESDP military conflict management operation is usually only one 
aspect of a wider EU approach to the regulation of a conflict. The success of a 
specific ESDP military conflict management operation in a given conflict is, 
thus, different from the success of the wider EU effort in the same conflict. The 
next chapter will discuss the notion of success in greater detail, but first the 
next section will explain the selected methodology for this research.  
 
The case study method: strengths and weaknesses 
This research assesses the empirical validity of four hypotheses deduced from 
the literature on the ESDP and existing theories of international peacekeeping, 
military intervention, conflict and its management. The thesis will return to the 
issue of why and how these particular theories are relevant for the study of the 
conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. 
Suffice here to say that this is a theory-testing piece of research. There are 
three basic ways of testing theory: experimentation, observation using large-n 
analysis and case study (Van Evera, 1997, pp. 49-88). A case study is 
conducted here, because this is the most appropriate method for this particular 
research puzzle. Experimental or counter-factual approaches would introduce 
unnecessary levels of uncertainty into the analysis, and the limited number of 
cases (ESDP military conflict management operations) available does not merit 
a large n-study. Therefore, this research applies the case study method. It 
conducts a comparative case study of the five ESDP military conflict 
management operations undertaken from 2003 to 2009. In a field dominated by 
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single-case studies typically confined to one country or region, the comparative 
case study approach offers a different perspective on ESDP military conflict 
management operations. The study includes five operations, some of which are 
particularly understudied and none of which have been studied in this way 
(comparatively examined specifically with regard to the necessary conditions 
for success). As such it is not just the analytical focus of this thesis that is 
original, but also the selected approach applied to the research topic. The thesis 
establishes a theoretical link between the cases and suggests that studying them 
comparatively can contribute to conflict management theory more generally. 
The selected methodology will, thus, allow the thesis to link the study of ESDP 
military conflict management operations to the wider scholarship of violent 
conflict and its management. This too is new to the ESDP literature. 
 
Case selection 
The basic unit of analysis is the ESDP military conflict management operation.  
 
ESDP military conflict management operations are defined as military 
operations launched under the auspices of the European Union, within the 
framework of the ESDP, undertaken by EU troops on the ground in order 
to facilitate the management of the violent aspects of a conflict.  
 
According to this definition three case selection criteria can be identified:  
 
(1) The case must be an ESDP operation.  
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An ESDP operation is an operation, which is launched by the EU within the 
framework of the ESDP. Such operations can be deployed through three types 
of Headquarters (HQ) and operational planning; namely, through the EU cell at 
NATOs Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE); through the 
national HQ of a member state; or through the Civil/Military Cell of the EU 
Military Staff (EUMS) (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006, pp. 202-207). It is 
important to stress here that ESDP structures allow operations to be led by a 
single member state through the Framework Nation Concept
3
 or to use NATO 
assets or capabilities through the Berlin Plus arrangements.
4
 Such operations 
are still ESDP operations.   
 
(2) The case must be a military operation.  
 
A military operation is an operation where soldiers are deployed in the field 
primarily for a military purpose. This thesis focuses on military operations and 
does not include civilian or hybrid missions. It is useful to clarify the difference 
between an operation and a mission in military terminology. Much of the 
ESDP literature fails to appreciate the difference between the two and refers to 
ESDP military conflict management operations as missions. An interviewee 
explained the difference between a military operation and a military mission, as 
it is defined by the British Army, in the following way: 
 
                                                 
3 The EU Framework Nation Concept was adopted on 24 July 2002. It allows for the national 
HQ of a member state to be multi-nationalised for the purpose and duration of an ESDP 
military operation (Ulriksen, Gourlay, Mace, 2004). 
4 An exchange of letters between High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, and NATO 
Secretary General, Lord George Robertson, in March 2003, concluded the so-called Berlin Plus 
arrangements for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management. 
It allows the EU to make use of NATO assets and capabilities in such operations (NATO, 
2006).  
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A mission, in military parlance, tends to be something quite small and specific. 
For example, a fairly junior army rank would be given a ‘mission’ for him and 
his men to ‘take a line of trenches’ or ‘assault a position’. The phrase 
‘mission’ is very common, as all Commanders when they give their juniors 
tasks always call these them ‘missions’ – ‘Your mission is to…’ Missions are 
very much at the tactical level that is involving the use of just a few soldiers. 
Above the tactical level are the operational and strategic levels. An ‘operation’ 
would mean the ‘Bosnian operation’ or the ‘Kosovo operation’. These would 
be big things. So when soldiers talk about ‘the operational level’ they are 
talking about what they will do on an operation that fits in with the strategy set 
by government. ‘Strategy’ in the military sense is only ever set by politicians - 
with the advice, maybe, of some very senior generals.  So the government 
would say, as a ‘strategic goal’ that Bosnia must be ‘stabilised’. It would then 
be up to the military commanders on the ground to develop an ‘operational 
plan’ that could attain this ‘strategic goal’. (…) Confusion starts with 
American use of the word ‘mission’: ‘My mission is to bring peace to 
Bosnia…’ You also get the phrase ‘mission creep’. This is almost slang use of 
the word ‘mission’ (Interview, former British army officer, 12/03/2009).  
 
(3) The case must be a conflict management operation. 
 
A conflict management operation is an operation launched to facilitate the 
management of a violent conflict. In EU jargon these operations are referred to 
as military crisis management operations, but this is again inaccurate use of 
military terminology. As a representative from the British Army put it: 
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 Crisis, in the military understanding of the word, is a natural catastrophe or 
something of that sort, not a conflict (Interview, former British army officer, 
12/03/2009).    
 
These operations are deployed to facilitate the management of conflicts, but 
they are not necessarily launched in immediate crisis situations. Therefore, they 
will be referred to as conflict management operations. This thesis seeks to 
evaluate the EUs success as a military conflict manager, thus, it evaluates 
ESDP operations from a conflict perspective only. The analysis does not 
include EU responses to natural disasters or non-conflict crisis operations. 
Because the thesis focuses on military conflict management, it does also not 
include operations such as EU NAVFOR Somalia
5
 or the EU support to the 
African Union Mission in Darfur (AMIS)
6
. Although these are conflict-related 
operations, they do not meet the above criteria and are not strictly speaking 
ESDP military conflict management operations.  
 
Five operations meet all three case selection criteria: Operation Concordia 
(Macedonia), Operation Artemis (DRC), Operation Althea (BiH), 
Operation EUFOR DR Congo (DRC) and Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR 
(Chad/CAR).  
 
                                                 
5 EU NAVFOR Somalia is an EU military operation intended to contribute to the deterrence, 
prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia 
(Council of the European Union, 2009a). 
6 AMIS is an EU civilian-military action to support the African Union (AU)s enhanced 
Mission to Sudan/Darfur (Council of the European Union, 2009a).  
 32
All five operations have been included in this analysis. In this way, the case 
study reflects and examines the entire spectrum of ESDP military conflict 
management operations, which have been undertaken so far. Including the 
whole range of cases is important, because it allows the research to compare 
and contrast success in all the operations to date and to examine the conditions 
for success in ESDP military conflict management operations more generally. 
It is important to stress that these cases are not randomly selected, however. 
These are the cases that the EU has chosen to engage in.  
 
Including all five cases also means that the study incorporates data both from 
the operations launched in Europe and in Africa (the only two continents where 
the EU has so far undertaken ESDP military conflict management operations), 
which helps bridge the existing divide between the scholarship of ESDP 
military conflict management operations in Europe and in Africa. Moreover, 
this case selection allows for a comparison of operations launched during the 
most violent phase of a conflict (DRC and Chad/CAR) and in the aftermath of 
the most violent phase of a conflict (Macedonia and BiH). It also includes all 
the different types of ESDP military conflict management operations 
conducted to date. Each one of these operations has introduced a new aspect to 
ESDP military conflict management. The empirical analysis will explain this in 
further detail, but it is important to underline that the widest possible case 
selection allows the study to examine the development of ESDP military 
conflict management over time.  
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Selected timeframe 
The analytical focus of this thesis is on the undertaking of ESDP military 
conflict management operations in the field. The analysis will focus on the 
period in which the operations are actively deployed. That is the period from 
the EU launches an operation until the operation is officially completed. It does 
not include the policy process in which the decision to launch the operation is 
taken, as this is not the primary focus of this enquiry. Each individual case is 
confined to the period in which troops were deployed in the operational theatre.  
 
The selected timeframe for the analysis is the period from 1 March 2003 to 
31 March 2009.  
 
2003 was a watershed year for the ESDP for three key reasons. Firstly, the 
ESDP became operational, and the Union launched its first two military 
conflict management operations in 2003. Secondly, this was the year that the 
EU and NATO agreed on the Berlin Plus arrangements, which allow the EU to 
make use of NATO assets and capabilities in operations of this nature. Thirdly, 
the EU published the European Security Strategy in 2003, which identified 
conflict management as one of the Unions key security priorities (Howorth, 
2007). March 2003 is an appropriate starting point for the analysis, because this 
is when the ESDP became operational and the Union launched its first military 
conflict management operation, Concordia (Macedonia).  
 
March 2009 is a logical end-point to the analysis, because the Unions most 
recent ESDP military conflict management operation, EUFOR Chad/CAR, was 
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completed in March 2009. Because the analysis concentrates on the period in 
which troops are deployed in the field, it is not necessary to include the policy 
process in which an operation is evaluated internally within the EU directly in 
the timeframe.  
 
The selected timeframe allows for the evaluation of the four completed 
operations and a provisional assessment of Operation Althea in BiH, which is 
still ongoing. For data gathering purposes the selected timeframe was useful, 
because it allowed for a period of reflection within and outside the EU after the 
most recent operation was concluded. A final round of interviews was 
conducted in this period, so as to include these reflections in the overall 
analysis. Although six years is a limited timeframe, it is possible to trace 
significant developments within the ESDP in this period. Considering the rapid 
development of the ESDP, this is a particularly significant period of time, in 
which much has changed. It is important to recognise this in order to 
understand why it is important to undertake this research at this point in time. 
As one interviewee put it:  
 
The problem with the academic literature is that it is so far behind. And the 
academics do not even seem to realise it. In ESDP terms five years is a long 
time. The ESDP now is not what it was in 2003 and the Petersburg tasks are 
ancient! (Interview, national representative to the EU, 09/06/2009) 
 
Including all five operations in the empirical analysis and examining these over 
the whole six year period available means that the thesis avoids selection bias. 
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Moreover, by including all the cases and the whole timeframe available, the 
study maximises its empirical scope. The analysis is able to assess the effect of 
variations on the independent variables (conditions for success) on the 
dependent variable (success) across the time and space available. This allows 
the research to carefully consider outside influences. Including all five cases 
rather than relying on a single case study allows for a systematic cross-time 
and -space analysis (including all the time and space available) of the evolving 
ESDP military approach to the management of violent conflict. The analysis 
can then comparatively examine the conditions, which according to the 
existing theory are expected to condition success in ESDP military conflict 
management operations. The comparative approach, thus, facilitates a more 
nuanced assessment of how variations on the independent variables, presented 
in the research hypotheses, affect the dependent variable in the five cases. The 
empirical relevance of the hypotheses presented in the theoretical part of the 
thesis will, thus, be tested in a series of different contexts at the different levels 
of the analysis. 
 
Structured focused comparison: strengths and weaknesses 
Rather than a case-by-case or chronological account of the cases, this thesis 
takes a so-called structured focused comparative approach to the case study 
(Howard, 2008). This means that the comparative analysis of the cases is 
systematically focused and structured around the research problem rather than 
around the individual cases. The benefit of this approach is that it allows for a 
more focused analysis of the causal link between the dependent variable 
(success) and different independent variables (conditions for success). The 
 36
weakness of this approach is obvious. Because there are more cases, the 
description of each individual case is less detailed, however, as this study only 
includes five cases this potential weakness is limited. Some limitation in terms 
of the detailed account of each case is acceptable, as this is not the primary 
focus of the analysis. In addition, each case has already been described by at 
least one single-case study in the existing literature. This potential weakness, 
therefore, does not limit the original contribution of this thesis to the literature 
or the broader understanding the ESDP. The strength of the selected approach 
is that it allows for a comparative investigation of the conditions under which 
ESDP military conflict management operations can be successful. This strength 
is crucial, as it is these conditions and their relationship with the dependent 
variable (success) rather than a description of the operations themselves that is 
the focus of the analysis. A thematic comparison is more appropriate than a 
case-by-case account to answer to the research question at hand and to help fill 
the theoretical and empirical gaps in the existing knowledge and understanding 
of the ESDP (Howard, 2008, pp.1-21).  
 
Due to the very recent nature of the phenomenon under investigation, the 
empirical analysis can only cover a limited number of cases and a relatively 
short timeframe. This naturally causes analytical limitations. It is simply too 
early to analyze the long-term success of any of the individual operations or 
indeed the long-term impact of the ESDP approach to military conflict 
management. However, the relatively short-term goals of conflict management 
(as opposed to conflict prevention and conflict settlement) make a short-term 
evaluation of success in this realm an important subject of enquiry. Moreover, 
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an in-depth evaluation of short-term success is a necessary first step for a (later 
stage) long-term assessment. A longer-term evaluation of success in ESDP 
military conflict management is a logical and important follow-up to this 
research, but because it is still too early for such an undertaking, the analytical 
focus of this thesis is on the short-term success of ESDP military conflict 
management operations only. Hardly any work has been done on the conditions 
for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. This thesis 
posits that exactly because the EU is new to military conflict management 
operations, it is important to start taking stock of its success even at this early 
stage. 
 
Primary and secondary data: problems and solutions 
The primary data for this research was collected using a three-pronged 
approach. The three different vehicles of the primary data collection were (1) 
document analysis, (2) participant observation and (3) semi-structured 
interviews. The primary data was complemented by a wide selection of 
secondary sources. At the initial stages of this research, the relevant literature 
was carefully reviewed. In particular, the existing literature in EU studies, 
conflict studies and international security studies was consulted. The thesis 
brings together different aspects of these three bodies of literature. From EU 
studies the analysis is informed in particular by the literature on the CFSP, the 
ESDP and the military conflict management operations undertaken by the EU 
to date. The most important sources were outlined in the state of the ESDP 
debate section above. From conflict studies the thesis draws on the literature on 
the causes, consequences and dynamics of violent conflict and on the study of 
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conflict regulation. The most important sources for the analysis from this 
literature were outlined in the above sections, which conceptualised conflict 
and conflict management. Finally, from international security studies the thesis 
is inspired by the academic scholarship of military intervention, peacekeeping, 
international ethics and Just War theory. The most significant pieces of this 
literature, which have informed the thesis, are discussed in chapter two. A 
more detailed review of the literature with reference to the specific theories that 
have been used will be undertaken throughout the thesis, and especially, in the 
two theoretical chapters.  
 
The literature review was focused around the research question: Under which 
conditions can an ESDP military conflict management operation be successful? 
As the existing scholarship of the European Union does not engage with this 
issue from a theoretical perspective, the research hypotheses for this research 
project were deduced primarily from existing theories on the conditions for 
success in international peacekeeping, military intervention and conflict 
management. The thesis will, thus, test the relevance of these existing theories 
to the study of ESDP military conflict management operations. The deduction 
of the hypotheses, the relevant theory and background literature is examined in 
further detail later in the thesis.  
 
With regard to the secondary sources it is important to mention that the ESDP 
literature, like the ESDP itself, has expanded greatly throughout the course of 
this research project. Therefore, it has been crucial to review the literature on a 
regular basis throughout the last three years and to keep up to date with the 
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newest developments in the literature on the ESDP as well as in its practice. To 
this end, academic journals were regularly reviewed; and, to ensure that the 
most recent developments were accounted for in the analysis, media reports, 
press statements and independent commentary were used to complement the 
secondary academic sources. Current political debates on military intervention 
and international conflict management have also informed the analysis. Official 
documents and reports on foreign, security and defence matters issued by the 
EU and other international, national or sub-national, governmental and non-
governmental institutions and organisations acting as or observing international 
military conflict managers were also critically assessed.  
 
To complement the initial document analysis and in order to get a more in-
depth understanding of the research problem, the researcher spent a year 
conducting primary research and participant observation in the Western 
Balkans. In this period the researcher worked for the Office of the European 
Union Special Representative, the High Representative for Peace 
Implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Royal Danish Embassy. 
Whilst working in Sarajevo, the researcher conducted a first round of 
interviews in the region. These interviews were semi-structured around the 
research problem and intended to increase the researchers general 
understanding of military conflict management, the ESDP and the wider EU 
approach towards the Western Balkans. These early stages of primary data 
gathering helped to develop the research question and the structure of the rest 
of the research project.  
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The security situations in the DRC, CAR and Chad were very unstable 
throughout the period during which this research was undertaken. In particular, 
the conditions in the areas where the ESDP military conflict management 
operations were deployed were precarious. Therefore, the researcher was not 
able to undertake a similar period of participant observation in Africa. The 
multi-pronged research methodology was adopted to limit the negative effect 
that this could have had on the analysis. In order to limit regional (or other) 
bias, the researcher undertook an extensive process of primary document 
analysis throughout the project; conducted 41 semi-structured interviews; and 
undertook a number of additional informal meetings and phone and email 
conversations regarding the research topic. 
 
Interviews were conducted with representatives from EU member states and 
institutions as well as with people from the other main international actors 
involved at different levels and in different ways in conflict regulation in the 
countries in question (primarily UN, NATO and OSCE). Interviewees were 
selected from both HQ and field offices to highlight possible inconsistencies 
and differences of opinions. Representatives from both donor and host 
countries were consulted to investigate potential actor- and target-specific 
perspectives. The interviewees were selected from a range of different personal 
and professional backgrounds (nationalities, ethnicities and professional levels 
within the respective organisations). Further interviews were conducted with 
representatives from key bilateral actors involved in the conflicts and 
operations in question. Interviews were also held with representatives from EU 
member states that had opted out of some or all of the operations. Finally, 
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regional experts and security specialist were consulted, including observers and 
scholars of the ESDP, military conflict management and third party 
intervention.  
 
Some of the individuals approached were reluctant to agree to formal 
interviews. In these cases, informal meetings were held instead to help develop 
the researchers understanding of the subject matter. Likewise, key 
interviewees were interviewed on several occasions and in different capacities. 
In this way, the researcher entered into a dialogue about the research problem 
with certain interviewees. This gave the researcher both access and deeper 
insight into otherwise confidential information as a relationship of trust was 
established. It often seemed to facilitate trust and access to information that the 
researcher had work experience in the field herself. Another tool used to 
overcome the initial barriers of confidentiality of information was the promise 
of anonymity to all interviewees.  
 
The interviews were conducted in stages, in order to immerse the researcher in 
the empirical setting of ESDP military conflict management at different stages 
of her own understanding of the research problem as well as at different stages 
of the conflicts and operations at the centre of the analysis. At each stage the 
interviews were more structured and focused. The researcher conducted two 
main rounds of interviews in the Western Balkans and two main rounds of 
interviews in Brussels. Each round of interviews was conducted at strategically 
important times such as around the time of the transition of Operation Althea 
(BiH) and the conclusion of EUFOR Chad/CAR. In addition to these four 
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rounds, a series of phone interviews and email conversations were conducted 
at the final stages of the research to avoid limited or outdated research results 
(as too often is the case). This also allowed the research to include an end-of-
operation assessment of the EUFOR Chad/CAR operation despite the operation 
being withdrawn as the research itself was being concluded. Because the data 
collection was undertaken in stages, preliminary research findings could feed 
back into the next round of primary research, allowing the researcher to test the 
empirical relevance of the preliminary research results and allowing for a more 
in-depth analysis of the conditions under which ESDP military conflict 
management operations can be successful.  
 
Three key issues posed difficulties in the primary research for this project: (1) 
accessibility, (2) confidentiality of information and (3) the contentious nature 
of the subject of the enquiry. Firstly, in terms of accessibility the volatile 
security situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad and the Central 
African Republic meant that it was neither safe nor practically possible for the 
researcher to go to the areas in which EU troops have been deployed. 
Participant observation was simply not an option. Likewise, because many 
potential interviewees were deployed in the field (here or elsewhere), it was 
often difficult to arrange interviews. Here phone interviews and informal email 
conversations were used as an alternative. The researcher also interviewed a 
number of retired military personnel to make sure that the analysis also 
considered the perspective of soldiers on the ground. Secondly, issues 
concerning confidentiality of information, lack of transparency and the absence 
of security clearance presented a potential problem for the research. Especially 
 43
because, as highlighted by Hadden (2009), the full range of information and 
internal EU reviews, which would be useful for a detailed assessment of these 
types of operations, are not made available by the European Union. The recent 
nature of the operations, and in the case of EUFOR Chad/CAR and Operation 
Althea, the ongoing deployments at the time, made it particularly difficult to 
access some information. The interviews were a useful way to get around this 
problem. Finally, the political motivations of some of the sources that are 
available (EU end-of-operation statements, for example) due to the highly 
political nature of the research topic presented a potential problem of bias. 
These three issues were identified from the beginning as potentially limitations 
to the project and, as illustrated above, carefully considered in the development 
of the methodology, which incorporated a mix of qualitative methods and a 
vast variety of sources. This allowed the researcher to limit the potential 
negative effect of these challenges on the analysis. In addition to combining 
different methods of data gathering, the researcher made an extra effort to 
establish a rapport with interviewees and contacts in the field. When sources 
were reluctant to comment on the record, informal conversations allowed the 
researcher access to data and commentary. The developing trust between 
interviewer and interviewees facilitated a greater insight into the subject 
matter, although this information was not to be quoted directly in the thesis. 
Overall, the selected methodology allowed for a thorough investigation of the 
different opinions of key actors and observers engaged, directly or indirectly, 
in ESDP military conflict management operations.  
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Thesis structure 
This chapter has introduced the empirical, conceptual and methodological 
backbone of the thesis. It has explained the rationale behind the research 
question and outlined the original contributions that this thesis aims to make. It 
has clarified key terminology and set the boundaries of the project in terms of 
the cases and timeframe, which will be examined in the analysis. As such, this 
chapter has set the stage for the rest of the thesis. The nature of the research 
question necessitates a prior examination of success in ESDP military conflict 
management operations before the conditions for such a success can be 
identified and analyzed. Therefore, the rest of the thesis will be structured into 
two parts. The first part focuses on the notion of success in ESDP military 
conflict management operations. It theoretically defines and empirically 
evaluates success. To this end, the first part of the thesis develops and applies a 
theoretical framework for the evaluation of success in this realm. The second 
part of the thesis focuses on the conditions for success. It theoretically and 
empirically explains success. To this end, the second part of the thesis deduces 
a set of research hypotheses from the existing ESDP literature and theories of 
international peacekeeping, military intervention and conflict management, and 
tests the empirical relevance of these theories with regard to the conditions for 
success in ESDP military conflict management operations. Each of the two 
parts of the thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter in each part 
develops the theoretical framework for the empirical analysis, which is 
conducted in the two subsequent chapters in each part.  
 
 45
This final section will provide a brief road map of the rest of the thesis. Chapter 
two discusses how to define and evaluate success. It develops a definition and 
an evaluation framework for success, which incorporates both an internal-EU 
specific perspective and an external conflict-specific perspective on success. 
This chapter provides the theoretical framework for chapters three and four, 
which evaluate success from an internal and an external perspective, 
respectively. Chapter five develops the theoretical starting point for the second 
part of the thesis, which seeks to explain success. This chapter deduces four 
research hypotheses and develops a levels-of-analysis framework for the 
subsequent analysis of the internal and external conditions for success in 
chapters six and seven. Chapter eight sums up the key findings of each chapter 
and examines what the analysis reveals about the conditions for success in 
ESDP military conflict management operations. Finally, it explains how this is 
relevant to the academic scholarship of the ESDP and the study of conflict 
management more generally.    
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Chapter two: Defining and evaluating success  
Chapter one explained how the European Security and Defence Policy has 
been subject to extensive scholarship in the first ten years of its existence. 
Individual ESDP military conflict management operations have also recently 
enjoyed increasing levels of academic attention. Nevertheless, a theoretically 
grounded understanding of how to define and evaluate success in these 
operations has yet to be developed. That is what this chapter sets out to do. 
This is an important endeavour, because in order to achieve success it is useful 
to know what it is, and to accurately evaluate success a sound understanding of 
what constitutes success is crucial. The purpose of this undertaking is to 
advance the study of the ESDP, but it also adds a new dimension to ongoing 
scholarly debates regarding military intervention, conflict management and 
international peacekeeping.  
 
The conceptual discussion of success in the ESDP literature is limited at best. It 
is assumed that success is obvious. One knows it when one sees it. Why then is 
it so difficult to define? Because this conceptual issue has so far been neglected 
in the scholarship of the EU, this chapter takes its starting point in the literature 
on international peacekeeping. Recognising that there are significant 
differences between UN peacekeeping operations and ESDP military conflict 
management operations, this chapter seeks to investigate whether, and if so 
what, peacekeeping theory might contribute to a conceptual discussion of 
success in ESDP military conflict management operations. The peacekeeping 
literature is a suitable starting point for this discussion, because it is the most 
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closely related area of study, which has explicitly discussed the notion of 
success.  
 
A review of the peacekeeping literature, however, reveals a similar deficiency. 
Although there have been different attempts to define success in peacekeeping, 
there is still no consensus on what constitutes a success in this realm (Diehl, 
1994; Druckman et al, 1997; Howard, 2008; Pushkina, 2006). Peacekeeping 
scholars disagree on the definition of success, because they do not agree on the 
purpose of peacekeeping. A shared framework of analysis and standards for 
evaluation, thus, remain outstanding (Bures, 2007). This chapter also looks to 
the literature on conflict management, military intervention and foreign policy 
analysis, but neither of these bodies of literature provides a suitable framework, 
which could be directly applied in the evaluation of success in ESDP military 
conflict management operations (Baldwin, 2000; Freedman, 2006; Haas, 2006; 
Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005; Ross and Rothman, 1999). 
 
This gap in the literature means that a theoretical framework for the systematic 
evaluation of success in ESDP military conflict management operations does 
not yet exist. This chapter sets out to construct such a framework. It applies 
different perspectives from the literature and discusses how best to define and 
evaluate success in ESDP military conflict management operations. The 
chapter develops a definition of success, which incorporates both internal EU-
specific and external conflict-specific perspectives on success. Subsequently, it 
introduces four evaluation criteria for success: (1) internal goal attainment, (2) 
internal appropriateness, (3) external goal attainment and (4) external 
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appropriateness. Together the definition and four criteria make up the 
components of a new theoretical framework for the evaluation of success in 
ESDP military conflict management operations.  
 
Discussing success 
In order to evaluate success in ESDP military conflict management operations, 
what is meant by the term success must first be defined. Generally speaking 
success means to reach a favourable or desired outcome. The question in this 
context is: favourable and desired according to whom or indeed what? This 
issue is at the very heart of evaluating these operations, yet it is hardly 
discussed in the ESDP literature. The scholarly practice varies considerably 
with regard to its definitions of success, which are implicit rather than explicit 
in the literature. The notion of success itself has not been subject of much in-
depth debate in the study of ESDP military conflict management operations. 
Therefore, this chapter is theoretically grounded in conflict studies and 
international security studies. It takes into account scholarly perspectives from 
the existing literature on international peacekeeping, conflict management, 
military intervention and foreign policy analysis. This is justified, because the 
problem of which perspective to adopt when defining success is not confined to 
the evaluation of ESDP military conflict management operations. In the 
peacekeeping literature and in foreign policy analysis, for example, scholars 
such as Pushkina (2006) and Baldwin (2000) have highlighted disputes 
concerning whether to evaluate success from the perspective of the policy 
actor, the target or according to theoretically defined standards or principles. 
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This same problem exists implicitly in the emerging scholarship of ESDP 
military conflict management operations. 
   
In practice a narrow understanding of success reflecting the interests and 
intentions of the policy actor is often applied. Success is understood as 
mandate fulfilment (Diehl, 1994, pp.33-61). This perception of success and 
perspective on its evaluation is common with regard military operations more 
generally (Interview, retired Major General from the British Army, 
04/11/2008; Interview, national defence representative to the EU, 09/06/2009). 
It has also been adopted by the EU with regard to its ESDP military conflict 
management operations, where the Council evaluates success according to its 
own operational aims and objectives (Interview, representative from EU 
institution, 06/05/2009).  
 
Howard (2008, p.7) has outlined a popular argument in favour of mandate 
implementation as a suitable criterion for success in the case of the UN:  
 
Success in mandate implementation is the most relevant and equitable standard 
to which the UN can be held, even if we might wish at times that standards set 
by the often hard-won, negotiated accords and Security Council resolutions 
were higher. 
 
Although a mandate may include considerations on behalf of the target, the 
corresponding definition of success is ultimately internal, in the sense that the 
success criteria are decided upon by the intervener. In other words, the success 
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criteria directly reflect internally defined goals. This narrow definition of 
success as defined by the intervener itself will be referred to as internal 
success. According to this definition, whether an operation is a success is 
ultimately assessed according to whether it has reached its stated objectives. 
This logic advocates that the EU should be judged on its own merits alone and 
that whether an ESDP military conflict management operation is a success 
depends on whether it fulfils its mandate.  
 
The internal definition of success is problematic for three key reasons. Firstly, 
it suggests that an operation is successful, when its outcome is compatible with 
the intentions and interests of the intervener (EU), disregarding that these do 
not necessarily reflect the needs of the target (the conflict) or indeed the overall 
purpose of the operation (conflict management). Secondly, assessing the 
operation solely according to whether it has met its stated objectives is risky, as 
this logic suggests that success can be ensured by a vague mandate or 
operational objectives aiming to do very little (or nothing at all). This 
definition of success on its own would mean that an ESDP military conflict 
management operation could be declared successful, even if the conflict 
situation it leaves behind is less secure than it was when the operation was 
launched, as long as the operation has fulfilled its specific mandate, however 
narrow this may be. It is useful to draw a comparison to medical practice: 
would it be right to declare an operation a success, even if after the operation 
the patient was still dieing? This thesis argues that it would not. The absence of 
outright failure does not necessarily equal success. Finally, the narrow 
definition of success does not sufficiently evaluate the means by which the 
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intervener attempts to reach its goals. It simply suggests that the operation is a 
success, if its implementation went according to plan, without evaluating the 
plan itself. To carry on the medical analogy, one could then declare a success, 
if a patients toe stops hurting, even if this was achieved by amputating the 
whole leg.  
 
It is important to recall that a fundamental premise to the legitimate use of 
force, according to Just War theory, is that one must: 
 
Consider most carefully and honestly whether the good we can reasonably 
expect to achieve is large enough – and probable enough – to outweigh the 
inescapable harm in loss of lives, damage and disruption (…) It cannot be right 
for a (…) leader, responsible for the good of all the people, to undertake – or 
prolong armed conflict, with all the loss of life or other harm that entails, if 
there is no reasonable likelihood that this would achieve a better outcome for 
the people than would result from rejecting or ending combat and simply doing 
whatever is possible by other means (Guthrie and Quinlan, 2007, pp.20-21 and 
p.31)  
 
To ensure that this principle is reflected in the definition of success, this 
chapter, in agreement Baldwin (2000) and Pushkina (2006), rejects the actor-
specific definition of success based exclusively on the internal goals and 
intentions of the intervener alone. This is not, for the three reasons outlined 
above, an appropriate stand-alone definition of success. Internal success does 
not necessarily constitute an overall success in an ESDP military conflict 
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management operation. This chapter will, however, argue that internal success 
is an important part of a broader definition of success.  
 
The alternative practice to assessing an intervener on its own merits (internal 
criteria) is to define success according to the perceived interests of the target or 
a set of theoretical standards or principles (Baldwin, 2000). With regard to 
peacekeeping the interests of the target are often associated with what 
Fetherston and Johansen (Druckman et al, 1997) have referred to as higher 
values of world peace, justice and the reduction of human suffering. This 
suggests that success should be defined according to standards determined 
externally to the intervening actor (external criteria). But again  it is disputed 
what these external criteria should be. To give but a few examples of the 
external criteria for success presented in the peacekeeping literature: Stedman 
and Downs (2002, p.50) argue that a successful operation must end violence 
and leave behind a self-sustaining cease-fire. Diehl (1994, pp. 33-61) similarly 
suggests that success is when the armed conflict is limited and when the 
operation facilitates conflict resolution. Howard (2009, p.7) evaluates the 
legacy of a peacekeeping operation after its departure incorporating aspects of 
maximalist standards of institution-building and positive peace, but does not 
go so far as to say that all missions that do not result in just, stable market 
economies are failures. She fails, however, to clarify to what exact extent 
positive peace characteristics such as human rights; economic fairness and 
opportunity; democratisation and environmental sustainability are included 
even in her own definition of success. She concludes simply that they must to 
some extent be taken into account. This is not to single out Howards definition 
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as insufficient, but rather to illustrate general difficulty and inconsistency in 
defining success in this realm.  
 
The conceptual problem of defining success causes further problems in the 
evaluation of success. Depending on which perspective one applies, the 
evaluation of success may vary greatly. Where the internal definition arguably 
asks too little for an operation to be a success, the external perspective often 
defines success according to an ideal state of peace. This reflects a 
misconception of the purpose of these operations, which often causes scholars 
to allocate the forces too much responsibility  accrediting or blaming the 
intervener for developments in which it is neither the only nor the decisive 
actor (Johansen, 1994). The external criteria for success, which are applied in 
the peacekeeping literature, make it, by definition, all but impossible for these 
operations to succeed. This problem is mirrored in the ESDP literature. This 
chapter argues that the definition of success in ESDP military conflict 
management operations should not expect EU forces to resolve conflicts. This 
is normatively unfair, analytically unsound and academically unproductive. It 
is important that the definition of success reflects the theoretical purpose of 
conflict management and the reality that the outcome of a conflict is dependent 
on the actions of belligerent parties and other actors, which may be engaged in 
the conflict and its regulation (Johansen, 1994). Therefore, this thesis also 
rejects definitions of success, which are based solely on external criteria. 
Instead the definition of success must take into account aspects of both internal 
and external perspectives on success, so as to reflect the interests of the 
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intervener (EU), the target (the conflict) and the theoretical purpose of these 
operations (conflict management).  
 
The following develops a theoretical framework for the systematic evaluation 
of success in ESDP military conflict management operations. This framework 
seeks to enable an evaluation of success taking into account actor, target and 
theoretical perspectives on success. This is based on the argument above, 
which suggests that it is important to include both internal and external aspects 
in the examination of success. The internal perspective will evaluate whether 
an operation was implemented well, its mandate was fulfilled and its goals 
achieved in a timely, efficient and cost-effective manner. The external 
perspective will assess the operation with regard to the theoretical purpose of 
conflict management; namely, to manage the violent aspect of a conflict. That 
is to prevent (a) continuation, (b) diffusion, (c) escalation and (d) 
intensification of violence. The external perspective will also include an 
assessment of the way in which the operation sought to enforce this purpose 
(Baldwin, 2000; Pushkina, 2006; Ross & Rothman, 1999).  
 
Internal success is defined according to the narrow definition above; namely, 
according to whether an operation is successful from the point of view of the 
intervener (EU). External success, on the other hand, indicates a favourable 
overall outcome on the conflict situation in question, which takes into account 
the interest of the intervener (the EU), and the target (the conflict) as well as 
the overall purpose of military conflict management operations. Each of these 
categories can be divided into two key success criteria, the first of which 
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evaluates whether the operation achieved its purpose (goal attainment) and the 
second of which examines the way in which the operation sought to achieve 
this purpose (appropriateness). Examining success within each of these 
categories will allow for a more nuanced analysis of the level and nature of 
success in each operation.  
 
Internal success 
Although not a sufficient criterion for success in its own right, the assessment 
of whether an operation has been internally successful from the point of view 
of the EU is an important part of its overall evaluation. Two key criteria for 
internal success can be deduced from the theory and practice of foreign policy 
analysis. These criteria seek to determine (a) whether the main objective of the 
policy was successfully obtained and (b) whether the way in which it was 
obtained can be classified as successful (Baldwin, 2000). These two internal 
criteria for success will in the following be applied to the evaluation of ESDP 
military conflict management operations. The internal success criteria will be 
referred to as (a) internal goal attainment and (b) internal appropriateness.  
 
Internal goal attainment  
Military operations are goal orientated in nature and at the military-strategic 
level success is thought of in terms of fulfilling operational goals. Military 
operations are traditionally evaluated according to the extent to which they 
achieved these goals (Interview, retired Major General from the British Army, 
04/11/2008). An ESDP military conflict management operation must in the 
same way first of all be evaluated according whether it achieved the task it set 
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out to do. To this end, the first criterion for internal success is internal goal 
attainment.  
 
It is important to acknowledge that there may be a significant difference 
between the military-strategic and the political-strategic goals of an ESDP 
military conflict management operation. Chapter three, which examines the 
internal success of these operations, discusses various examples of this 
difference. In terms of their internal goal attainment, the operations will 
primarily be evaluated from a military-strategic perspective, as the focus is on 
their successful undertaking in the field.  
 
Operations pursue multiple goals and goal attainment is often a matter of 
degree. This could complicate the process of determining success in internal 
goal attainment. However, because not all operational goals are equally 
important to the EU, evaluating their achievement evenly would be misleading. 
It is, therefore, important to rank the operational objectives according to the 
main goals of the operation and then evaluate whether the operation 
successfully obtained its overall operational purpose. Although this would not 
be a sufficient evaluation on its own, it is necessary criterion for overall 
success in ESDP military conflict management operations (Baldwin, 2000; 
Pushkina, 2006; Ross & Rothman, 1999). Success in internal goal attainment is 
best evaluated according to whether an operation fulfilled its mandate. In 
effect, the indicators of success in internal goal attainment are outlined in the 
key objectives specified in the mandate for each individual operation. 
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Internal appropriateness  
Not only whether an operation achieved its goals, but also how it achieved 
these goals, is crucial for its overall internal success. This thesis suggests that it 
is necessary to complement the internal goal attainment criterion with an 
internal appropriateness criterion. This criterion examines whether the way in 
which an operation was implemented was appropriate from an internal 
perspective. Internal appropriateness assesses whether the operational purpose 
was implemented well on the ground. The timeliness, efficiency and cost-
effectiveness of an operation are the key indicators of success in internal 
appropriateness.  
 
Timeliness refers to the deployment of the force. In order for the operation to 
be able to implement its mandate in an appropriate manner, it is essential that 
the force is deployed according to schedule. This includes not only the first set 
of boots on the ground and the time it takes to reach Initial Operating 
Capability (IOC), but also the time it takes to reach Full Operating Capability 
(FCO). Likewise, the efficiency by which the operation fulfils its operational 
goals is important. A successful operation should implement its mandate as 
quickly and efficiently as possible without compromising its effect (Diehl, 
1994, p.33-61; Interview, retired Major General from the British Army, 
04/11/2008).  
 
Finally, from an internal perspective it is important that the costs of an 
operation do not outweigh its benefits for the EU. Evaluating any policy based 
on its achievements without taking into account its cost is, as Baldwin (2000) 
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has suggested with regard to foreign policy analysis, like assessing a business 
solely in terms of its sales disregarding its expenses. Costs are an important 
part of evaluating internal appropriateness. In the internal evaluation of success 
in ESDP military conflict management operations, costs for the EU are not so 
much financial as they are political. This is because the financial costs of these 
operations are overwhelmingly borne by the contributing member states, 
whereas the internal success of the operation is evaluated from the perspective 
of the EU as a whole. Cost-effectiveness is, thus, examined with regard to the 
political aspect of internal appropriateness. For the EU, as a newborn military 
actor, battle-related fatalities among its soldiers represent an inappropriate cost. 
Failure itself, it is often argued, is another unacceptable cost for the EU at this 
early stage of its military career. As it was put in one interview: The EU will 
not launch an operation, if it is not sure that it will succeed (Interview, 
representative from ESDP military conflict management operation, 
17/02/2009). One might be tempted to criticise this focus on achieving internal 
success; however, it is important to recall that the reasonable prospect of 
success is a fundamental premise of legitimate use of force according to Just 
War theory (Guthrie and Quinlan, 2007, pp.31-32). Table 2.1 illustrates the two 
internal criteria for success.  
 
Table 2.1: Internal success criteria  
Success criteria Successful Not successful 
Internal  
goal attainment 
Mandated successfully 
achieved according to the 
key operational objectives 
Mandate not successfully 
achieved according to the key 
operational objectives 
Internal 
appropriateness 
Timely, efficient and 
effective implementation of 
the mandate  
Not a timely, efficient or 
effective implementation of the 
mandate  
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External success 
In order to evaluate whether an ESDP military conflict management operation 
is successful overall the theoretical framework must also reflect the interests of 
the target and the purpose of conflict management. In addition to implementing 
its mandate well a successful operation must help manage the violent aspect of 
the conflict through an appropriate use of force. The external evaluation of 
success must, thus, first assess whether an operation contributed to the 
management of the conflict, and then it must assess whether the use of force 
was appropriate. In this way, the analysis will be able to evaluate whether the 
operation was beneficial to the conflict as well as to the EU. To this end, it is 
important to complement the internal criteria for success with an equivalent set 
of external criteria. Two external criteria for success: (1) external goal 
attainment and (2) external appropriateness are deduced from the existing 
literature on conflict management (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005; 
Ross and Rothman, 1999; Reagan, 1996), international peacekeeping (Howard, 
2008; Johansen, 1994; Diehl, 1994) and Just War theory (Evans, 2005; Guthrie 
& Quinlan, 2007; Ramsey, 2001; Walzer, 2006).  
 
External goal attainment 
It is necessary to have a criterion for external goal attainment complementing 
the requirement for internal goal attainment. From an external perspective goal 
attainment does not reflect the purpose of an operation from the perspective of 
the EU (internal goal attainment), but rather the overall purpose of military 
conflict management. The external goal attainment criterion assesses whether 
an ESDP military conflict management operation has successfully contributed 
 60
to the military management of the violent aspect of the conflict. That is, by 
definition, to prevent the continuation, diffusion, escalation and intensification 
of the violence. To fulfil the external goal attainment criteria an ESDP military 
conflict management operation must help manage the conflict successfully. 
This might seem an obvious criterion for success, but it is all too often 
bypassed or misinterpreted when operations of this nature are evaluated. 
Successful goal attainment overall is, thus, not achieved by an operation which 
simply fulfils its mandate. However, it is also not necessary for the successful 
goal attainment of an operation of this nature that the underlying conflict is 
settled (Johansen, 1994; Reagan, 1996). Naturally, the peaceful settlement of a 
conflict is desirable, and as Diehl (1994, p.40) has argued in the case of UN 
peacekeeping operations: 
 
The ideal peacekeeping operation is one that is able to prevent or deter 
fighting during its brief deployment in the course of which the disputants reach 
an agreement and no longer need an interposition force. 
 
But it is crucial to distinguish between an ideal scenario and a successful 
operation. ESDP military conflict management operations are always part of a 
wider international (and EU) effort to regulate a conflict. It is important that the 
external goal attainment criterion reflects this. Therefore, it is argued that an 
ESDP military conflict management operation is successful in terms of its 
external goal attainment when it fulfils its military conflict management role 
within the wider effort to regulate the conflict. Military conflict management 
operations (like peacekeeping operations) are sometimes undertaken in the 
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hope that they might bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict (Diehl, 
1994, p.3). However, conflict management must not be confused with conflict 
settlement. It is important to remember that there is a significant difference 
between successful conflict management (management of the violent aspect of 
the conflict) and successful conflict settlement (peaceful settlement of the 
underlying conflict). This distinction is not well recognised neither in the 
peacekeeping theory nor in the ESDP literature, but it is imperative in order not 
to confuse the responsibilities of international soldiers with those of the 
belligerent parties to the conflict. In the end, it is the adversaries, not the 
intervener, who must settle the conflict (Johansen, 1994; Wolff, 2006). The 
primary purpose of a military conflict management operation is to manage the 
violence. The external goal attainment criterion is developed here to help 
evaluate whether an ESDP military conflict management operation is 
successful in this regard in the specific conflict context in which it engages. 
The indicators of success in external goal attainment are, therefore, whether 
there is a continuation, diffusion, escalation or intensification of violence. 
  
External appropriateness  
The final criterion for success is one which has been neglected in the study of 
ESDP military conflict management operations  as it often is also in the wider 
literature on conflict management and international peacekeeping. That is the 
issue of external appropriateness. Appropriateness, in this thesis, assesses the 
manner in which an operation has sought to achieve its goals. Unlike internal 
appropriateness, which evaluates operational success according to an internal 
set of indicators, external appropriateness evaluates the implementation of the 
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operation according to a set of standards external to the EU. The purpose of 
this criterion is to evaluate whether a specific ESDP military conflict 
management operation in the pursuit of its goals did more harm than good to 
the conflict in question. This criterion is deduced from Just War theory, which, 
as Guthrie and Quinlan (2007) have argued, sets as a fundamental condition for 
the successful undertaking of a military operation that it does more good than 
harm. 
 
One might question the application of Just War theory with regard to the 
evaluation of external appropriateness in ESDP military conflict management 
operations. After all, as one interviewee put it: The EU does not fight wars 
(Interview, national representative to the EU, 09/06/2009). Just War theory, 
however, provides a moral framework and a set of governing principles for the 
just application of force. Even if the EU does not fight wars in the traditional 
sense, ESDP operations are military operations mandated and equipped to use 
force. In some instances, EU soldiers have been involved in armed 
confrontations and people were killed as a direct result. Is important that the 
evaluation framework scrutinises the appropriateness of the use (or non-use) of 
force. Furthermore, this evaluation framework is intended to be applicable also 
in future cases, which makes it crucial to include this criterion, as these 
operations too are likely to be mandated and equipped to apply force. In the 
case of humanitarian intervention Walzer (2002, p.28) argued that:  
 
The same rules apply here as in war generally: non-combatants are immune 
from direct attack and have to be protected as far as possible from ‘collateral 
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damage’; soldiers have to accept risks to themselves in order to avoid 
imposing risks on the civilian population.        
 
This argument is equally valid with regard to ESDP military conflict 
management operations. If an actor engages in military confrontations, for 
whatever purpose, it is important to scrutinise such actions according to the 
principles governing the legitimate use of force provided in Just War theory. 
Military conflict management operations must be subject to the same 
limitations to the just use of force as other military operations. As Evans (2005, 
pp.204) asks:  
 
We may wonder anyway what, morally speaking, actually hangs on the 
definitional issue (of war). Should we not wish morally to justify any resort to 
any form of violence?(…) It would seem odd to claim that, for example, 
violence should be used proportionately and as a last resort only in war and 
not similarly in any other circumstances. 
 
Just War theory is traditionally divided into two categories: jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello. The first category addresses justice of war. It establishes a set of 
principles regarding the justified reasons for launching military operations 
mandated to use force. The second category concerns justice in war. It 
discusses the legitimate use of force once a military operation is underway 
(Walzer, 2006, pp. 21-33). More recently, a third category of jus post bellum 
addressing justice after war has also been added to the tradition (Evans, 2005, 
pp. 1-21). Because this research is focused on the successful undertaking of 
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ESDP military conflict management operations, the thesis concentrates its 
analysis on the period in which operations are active in the field. That is from 
the point at which the EU decides to launch an operation until the operation is 
officially completed. The external appropriateness criterion, thus, assesses the 
appropriateness of the operation and the use of force in the field. It does not 
scrutinise the decision to launch the operation, nor does it evaluate EU efforts 
in the field after the ESDP military conflict management operation is 
concluded. Although these are important issues they are not the focus of this 
enquiry. The external appropriateness criterion, therefore, concentrates on the 
aspect of Just War theory, which deals with the application of force once an 
operation is underway. That is the justice of war also called jus in bello 
(Walzer, 2006, pp. 21-33).  
 
Two key principles condition jus in bello and govern the appropriate 
application of force in military operations. These are (1) the principle of 
discrimination and (2) the principle of proportionality. Discrimination draws a 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants. This principle asserts 
that it is never justified deliberately to directly attack non-combatant civilians 
(Ramsey, 2002, pp.141-147; Walzer, 2006, pp.34-47, 138-159). Proportionality 
asserts that the application of force must always be proportional (Bellamy, 
2006, pp.199-228; Walzer, pp.127-137). The principle of proportionality 
asserts that the good that the application of force is expected to deliver must be 
seen in relation to the harm that it is expected to cause. To fulfil the criterion 
for success the good must always outweigh the bad. The harm that an operation 
causes must be evaluated in relation to the lives and well-being of (a) innocent 
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people
7
, (b) ones own military personnel and (c) the adversary. Linked to this 
is the principle of military necessity (sometimes seen as a separate principle), 
which condemns the illegitimate use of more force than necessary (Guthrie & 
Quinlan, 2007, pp.1-49, Walzer, pp.144-151). The indicators of external 
appropriateness are, thus, discrimination and proportionality in the use of force 
during an ESDP military conflict management operation. Table 2.2 illustrates 
the external criteria for success in ESDP military conflict management 
operations.  
 
Table 2.2: External criteria for success 
Success criteria Successful Not successful 
External goal 
attainment 
Continuation, diffusion, 
escalation and intensification 
of violence is prevented 
Continuation, diffusion, 
escalation or intensification 
of violence is not prevented 
 
External 
appropriateness 
The use of force in the 
operation was appropriate 
according to the principles of 
discrimination and 
proportionality 
The use of force in the 
operation was not 
appropriate according to the 
principles of discrimination 
and proportionality 
 
 
Four criteria have now been identified for an ESDP military conflict 
management operation to be classified as an overall success. These criteria may 
overlap in practice. Internal goal attainment, for example, overlaps with 
external goal attainment in the cases selected for this study in so far as all five 
operations are mandated to manage at least parts of the violent conflict. 
Likewise, it is part of both the internal and external appropriateness criteria that 
EU troops to not loose their lives unnecessarily. Such overlaps do not 
                                                 
7 The term innocent is defined here according to its Latin origin not involved in harming us or 
helping to harm us (Guthrie & Quinlan, 2007, p.14).   
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constitute a problem for the theoretical framework because what is important is 
that the evaluation always considers all four criteria. An operation is only a 
success, if all four criteria have been met. Figure 2.3 illustrates this.  
 
Figure 2.3: Success in ESDP military conflict management 
 
 
 
 
SUCCESS 
 
Internal goal 
attainment:  
Mandate 
successfully 
completed 
Internal 
appropriateness: 
Timely, 
efficient and 
cost-effective 
External goal 
attainment: 
No 
continuation, 
diffusion, 
External 
appropriateness: 
Discrimination 
and 
proportionality 
 
According to the four success criteria:  
 
An operation is a success when its purpose has been achieved and 
implemented in an appropriate manner from both an internal and an 
external perspective. 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluating success  
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As illustrated above, success is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. In practice it 
is often a matter of degree. Operations that do not constitute an overall success 
may still have positive aspects to them, just as operations that are successful 
overall may have negative side-effects. It is crucial that a theoretical 
framework applied to evaluate success is able to reflect this reality. The 
evaluation framework developed in this chapter is particularly useful for 
identifying mixed results within operations and comparing different degrees of 
success across several operations. It facilitates an analysis, which appreciates 
the multi-dimensional nature not only of success, but also of the operations 
themselves and the violent conflicts that they seek to help manage. Through the 
application of this framework, the thesis hopes to facilitate a more nuanced 
understanding and evaluation of success in ESDP military conflict 
management operations. 
 
It is crucial that the extent to which the success criteria are met is evaluated 
rather than measured. Evaluation should also never be a simple box-ticking 
exercise. It must be based on thorough investigation, careful consideration and 
sound empirical analysis. It is too simplistic to categorise operational outcomes 
into a dichotomous evaluation framework of success and failure. The 
evaluation must also include an assessment of the way in which the outcomes 
were achieved. It is important to remember that an absence of outright failure 
does not necessarily equal success. A quantitative assessment, for example, of 
the extent to which operational goals were achieved (operation X has been 35% 
successful in achieving goals Y and Z) without relating this to the way in 
which these objectives were achieved and taking into consideration the wider 
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context in which the operation occurred would leave out crucial aspects of the 
evaluation. There is no shared standard of value (like profit in business) that 
allows different levels of success to be quantitatively measured and compared 
in an empirically viable way (Baldwin, 2000). Consequently, this thesis does 
not advocate a quantitative analysis of whether or to what extent operations 
have been successful. Instead it advocates a qualitative assessment of the 
multiple objectives and achievements of each operation taking into account 
their relevance to the EU, to the dynamics of the violent conflict and to 
theoretical and empirical purpose of military conflict management. This allows 
for an in-depth assessment of whether a specific operation has been internally 
and externally successful in terms of its goal achievement. This must then be 
complemented with an evaluation of the internal and external appropriateness 
of the implementation of the operation. This thesis advocates a qualitative 
approach to the evaluation of success in ESDP military conflict management 
operations, because this will allow for a careful consideration not only (a) of 
what an operation achieved but also (b) of how it achieved it. This approach is 
particularly suitable for comparing the success of operations in a number of 
different contexts. It also allows for a further analysis of if and why an 
operation is (likely to be) successful in a given context. Acknowledging the 
dangers of simplification in any theoretical framework this chapter suggests 
that the evaluation of success should be done according to each of the success 
criteria (an operation may be successful in internal goal attainment, but not 
successful in external appropriateness). This will allow for a more nuanced 
approach to the further study of the conditions under which a specific operation 
is (or is likely to be) successful.  
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 Methodological challenges and solutions to evaluating success 
Evaluating success in ESDP military conflict management operations presents 
scholars with a number of methodological challenges. Firstly, a violent conflict 
is not a constant. Its dynamics change over time and the domestic context 
within a conflict-country may change while an ESDP operation is underway. In 
response to developments on the ground the operation may change its 
approach, its goals and its implementation plan during the deployment. 
Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, undertook a mid-
mission transition. However, this is not necessarily the case. The EU may 
choose not to change the nature of its operation despite significant changes in 
the conflict context as was the case in EUFOR Chad/CAR. Secondly, the EU 
itself might change during the deployment, for example, through enlargement, 
institutional reform, developing capabilities and changing security priorities. 
Thirdly, the regional and the international contexts in which a conflict occurs 
and the operation takes place constantly change. The change in the contextual 
conditions of the operation may, in turn, affect its success. Moving targets and 
so-called mission creep present a potential challenge to the evaluation of 
success in ESDP military conflict management operations, as both the conflict 
and attempts to regulate it may change throughout an EU force deployment. 
This is especially relevant in cases of longer term operations. It is crucial that 
this is acknowledged and taken into account in the evaluation of success rather 
than assumed constant.  
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In view of these methodological challenges the structured and focused 
comparative case study approach (described in chapter one) has been selected. 
Based on a combined methodology of qualitative data gathering and 
thematically structured comparative data analysis, this research ensures that the 
success of the operations is assessed according to each of the above criteria and 
examined in as great depth as possible. Through primary data collection by 
means of participant observation and several rounds of interviews, the 
researcher could double-check research findings for each specific case and 
compare findings across different operations. In this way, the theoretical 
framework developed above and the selected methodology and analytical 
approach together limit this potential weakness and ensures an in-depth 
assessment of changing circumstances on the ground, in the region, within the 
EU and in the international security arena, whilst also paying close attention to 
how the operation might have changed its means in order to meet certain ends.  
 
The second challenge to the evaluation of success in conflict management is 
how to assess the impact of an operation on a conflict situation. An ESDP 
military conflict management operation never represents an isolated change in 
a conflict environment and EU soldiers have so far never been the only 
external actors involved in the regulation of a conflict. This could potentially 
exacerbate the methodological challenges of evaluating success in such 
operations and determining a causal relationship between the actions of a 
specific operation and conflict dynamics on the ground. This is particularly 
relevant with regard to ESDP military conflict management operations, 
because (a) they are always part of a wider international and EU effort to 
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regulate a conflict; and (b) they set out to prevent a certain development from 
taking place (continuation, diffusion, escalation and intensification of 
violence). It is, therefore, difficult not only to identify what - if anything - did 
happen as a result of the operation, but also what did not happen as a result of 
the operation (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2005; Reagan, 1996). The 
uncertainty of what might have been is an unavoidable limitation in the study 
of any conflict regulation effort (and indeed many other areas of causal 
analysis). It is important to acknowledge this potential problem and avoid any 
possible limitations it might cause in the analysis.  
 
The empirical evaluation of success in ESDP military conflict management 
operations will in the following adopt a retrospective perspective. By adopting 
a retrospective perspective it is possible to make a comparison of each 
operations intended purpose and its actual achievements (both internal and 
external). With regard to external goal attainment it is important to convey an 
extra word of caution. The analysis will not distinguish violence directly 
attributable to the operational shortcomings of an ESDP military conflict 
management operation from that resulting from other actors involved in the 
conflict and its regulation. This approach is justifiable for two key reasons. 
Firstly, it is near impossible to accurately assign responsibility for such a 
specific conflict dynamic to a single actor involved in a wider conflict 
regulation effort. As argued in chapter one, conflict dynamics are usually not a 
reaction to one specific action, but a product of both proximate causes and 
permissive conditions. Assuming that an ESDP conflict management operation 
alone can succeed or fail to manage a given conflict is both theoretically and 
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empirically unsound. Secondly, it is the overall dynamic of the violent conflict, 
which reflects whether the operation has played a successful role in the wider 
conflict regulation effort. As Diehl argues (1994, p.34):  
 
 A smoothly operating peacekeeping operation is little better than a poorly 
organised one, if the respective protagonists renew warfare (…) The outcome 
is the most important barometer of success, as the causes of success and failure 
will be many.  
 
In this quote Diehl touches upon an important aspect of the evaluation of 
success, which is all too often misunderstood. It is crucial to recognise that the 
intervener (here the EU) is not necessarily to blame, if its operation is not a 
success in terms of its external goal attainment. As argued above the intervener 
should not be blamed for the actions of belligerent parties or other actors 
involved in the conflict or its regulation, however, this does not mean that these 
actors do not affect the success of the EUs operation. To make a final 
comparison to the medical example: if a patient dies, the operation is not a 
success, but this does not necessarily mean that the doctor is to blame. The 
absence of success does not equal failure. This is why it is important to 
carefully consider the conditions for success, which is what this thesis seeks to 
do. Part one will evaluate the success of the operations and part two will go on 
to examine the conditions for success, only some of which are expected to be 
attributable to the EU.   
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It is necessary to stress that although an ESDP military conflict management 
operation does not necessarily hold the full responsibility of the success or 
failure of the regulation of the conflict as a whole, it is intended to play part in 
its management. It is important, therefore, to examine the extent to which the 
operation played this part well and, thus, helped to prevent more violence 
(external goal attainment). It is imperative to evaluate each operations 
achievements in its role within the wider approach to managing the conflict. To 
this end, the retrospective approach is useful. With the exception of EUFOR 
Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, all the operations evaluated in this thesis 
have been completed. A mid-mission assessment of Althea is included, because 
this is the Unions longest and largest operation, and as such it would be a 
greater loss to the analysis to leave it out than to include it. The research takes 
into account, however, that the findings for this operation can only be 
provisional.  
 
Analysing the end-result of the operations (with the exception of Althea) from 
a retrospective perspective allows the analysis to apply both the internal and 
external criteria for success when evaluating whether an operation has been 
successful. This will also allow for a thorough investigation of the role that the 
ESDP military conflict management operation played in the wider international 
effort to manage each conflict. Together these methodological considerations, 
the definition and the criteria for success make up the theoretical framework 
for the following two chapters to undertake an in-depth evaluation of success in 
ESDP military conflict management operations (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & 
Miall, 2005; Ross & Rothman, 1999).  
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 Conclusion and key findings  
This chapter developed a definition and four corresponding criteria for success 
in ESDP military conflict management operations. According to the definition 
an operation is a success when its purpose has been achieved in an appropriate 
manner from both an internal and external perspective. The four criteria for 
success are: (1) internal goal attainment, (2) internal appropriateness, (3) 
external goal attainment and (4) external appropriateness. Together these allow 
for an assessment of success, which takes into account the EU, the conflict and 
the purpose of conflict management. The internal criteria for success address 
whether the operation was successfully undertaken, whether its mandate was 
completed and its goals were achieved in a timely, efficient and cost-effective 
manner. The external criteria for success allow for an evaluation of whether the 
operation helped to manage the violent aspect of the conflict in an appropriate 
manner. The next part of the thesis will apply this theoretical framework to the 
empirical case study of success in ESDP military conflict management 
operations from 2003 to 2009. This will permit a systematic evaluation not 
only of success, but also of the evaluation framework itself. Chapter three will 
evaluate internal success and examine internal goal attainment and 
appropriateness in the five cases. Chapter four will subsequently go on to 
evaluate their external success and comparatively assess their external goal 
attainment and appropriateness. 
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Chapter three: Evaluating internal success  
In order to examine the conditions under which ESDP military conflict 
management operations are successful, one must first determine to what extent 
these operations have been successful. That is what this first empirical part of 
the thesis sets out to do. Success will be evaluated according to the definition 
developed in chapter two, which contends that an operation is successful, if its 
purpose has been achieved and appropriately implemented from both an 
internal and external perspective. The evaluation of success will be structured 
around the four success criteria developed in chapter two: (1) internal goal 
attainment, (2) internal appropriateness, (3) external goal attainment and (4) 
external appropriateness. Internal goal attainment evaluates the achievements 
of the operations from an EU-specific perspective. Internal appropriateness 
assesses the implementation of the operations with regard to their internal 
timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness. External goal attainment assesses 
the contribution that each operation made to the overall management of the 
violent conflict; that is to prevent the continuation, diffusion, escalation and 
intensification of violence. Finally, external appropriateness evaluates the 
implementation of each operation according to the Just War principles 
governing the appropriate use of force; namely, discrimination and 
proportionality. In this way, success will be evaluated from both an internal 
perspective and an external perspective. This chapter will focus on internal 
success and the next chapter will assess external success.  
 
This chapter evaluates the internal success of each of the five operations. It first 
explains the conflict context in which each operation engaged. It then evaluates 
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each operations success in terms of its internal goal attainment and internal 
appropriateness. Finally, it compares the internal success of all five operations 
and sums up the key findings with regard to the overall internal success of 
ESDP military conflict management from 2003 to 2009. The subsequent 
chapter compares and contrasts these findings with the external success of 
these same operations. The purpose of this part of the thesis is to examine the 
level and nature of success in these operations in order to facilitate a 
subsequent analysis of the conditions for success in the next part of the thesis.  
 
Operation Concordia in Macedonia  
The EUs first ESDP military conflict management operation was launched in 
Macedonia in March 2003. Since its independence in 1991, Macedonia has had 
difficult bilateral relations with many of its neighbours. Greece has insisted that 
the countrys name demonstrates territorial aspirations to Aegean Macedonia in 
Greece. Bulgaria has refused to recognise Macedonian identity as anything but 
western Bulgarian. Likewise, the wars following the break-up of Yugoslavia 
plagued the Western Balkan region throughout the 1990s, and although 
Macedonia herself was not at war, the violence threatened stability here too. In 
particular, there was much concern within Macedonia that the conflict in 
neighbouring Kosovo might destabilise Macedonia either through a large 
influx of refugees or by way of a perceived aspiration for a greater Albania or 
a greater Kosovo seeking to include parts of the territory and population of 
Macedonia (Glenny, 2001; ICG, 2005a).
8
  
                                                 
8 The fear that an exodus of refugees from Kosovo would flee into Macedonia rang true during 
the NATO campaign in 1999, when displacements from the neighbouring province had a 
destabilising effect on the domestic situation in Macedonia (and Montenegro and Albania). 
However, the perceived threat of a greater Albania or a greater Kosovo to Macedonias 
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The greatest challenge to Macedonias stability, however, would prove to be a 
growing animosity between ethnic Albanian and ethnic Macedonian parts of its 
own population. The ethnic Albanian minority, which made up 25 per cent of 
the population, had suffered discrimination under the Communist authorities in 
the 1970s and 1980s, and following the countrys independence, ethnic 
Albanians remained under-represented in state institutions throughout the 
1990s (Glenny, 2001; ICG, 2005a). Many ethnic Albanians feared that the 
discrimination against them was becoming embedded in the structures of the 
new Macedonian state. Ethnic Albanian communities expressed particular 
dissatisfaction with the unequal ethnic representation in the police and with the 
fact that Albanian was not recognised as an official language. Many ethnic 
Macedonians suspected that the ethnic Albanian community had a separatist 
agenda (Mace 2004).   
 
To prevent a destabilisation of Macedonia the UN had deployed the United 
Nations Preventative Deployment Force in the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (UNPREDEP) in December 1992.
 
UNPREDEP had contributed 
significantly to conflict prevention in Macedonia by the time it came to an end 
in February 1999 (Ladzik, 2006; Mace, 2004; Sokalski, 2006). Albanian and 
Macedonian political elites had also worked hard to bridge the division 
between the two ethnic communities despite the fact that this was not always 
popular with their constituents. Consequently, Macedonia remained peaceful 
throughout the 1990s, despite sustained ethnic tensions in the country. 
Nevertheless, in 1999, when UNPREDEP withdrew and significant numbers of 
                                                                                                                                 
territorial integrity was undermined when Kosovo declared its independence within its existing 
borders in February 2008 (Glenny, 2001; ICG, 2008e). 
 78
refugees spilled over from the conflict in neighbouring Kosovo, ethnic tensions 
rose in Macedonia. In January 2001, the conflict became violent as the ethnic 
Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) and Macedonian state forces 
clashed in Tetovo. The violence undermined the Macedonian government and 
caused popular protests in the capital, Skopje. Hostilities increased and the 
violence led to population displacements (Mace, 2004). Observers at the time 
feared that a fully-fledged civil war might break out in Macedonia and affect 
the security of all the countrys neighbours (Albania, Serbia-Montenegro (then 
including Kosovo), Bulgaria and Greece). Ultimately, it was feared that this 
could destabilise the entire southern Balkan region (Glenny, 2001). The EU 
and NATO (with support from the USA) pushed hard for a negotiated 
settlement for the Macedonian conflict. A Framework Agreement was reached 
in Ohrid in August 2001.
9
 The Ohrid agreement ended the violent aspect of the 
conflict and NATO forces were deployed to keep the peace in the country 
(Mace, 2004; Yusufi, 2005).
10
  
 
                                                 
9 The Ohrid Agreement recognised the unitary character of the Macedonian state, while 
affirming that the countrys multi-ethnic character had to be reflected in public life. De-
centralisation was identified as the key to peace and the agreement introduced measures on 
local self-governance and equal representation. The agreement paved the way for an amnesty 
for disbanded NLA fighters; the roll-out of Macedonian police and the November 2001 
constitution recognising Albanian as an official state language (Framework Agreement, 2001; 
ICG, 2005a). 
10 NATO had military peacekeepers in Macedonia from August 2001 until March 2003. 
Operation Essential Harvest deployed 4,600 NATO troops to collect and destroy weapons 
handed over by armed groups as they disbanded after the crisis. Operation Amber Fox roughly 
comprised 800 personnel to contribute to the protection of the international monitors 
overseeing the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. Operation Allied Harmony, consisting 
of 400 troops, continued to support the monitors and advised the government on how to take 
ownership of security throughout the country. NATO also had a significant presence in form of 
KFOR Rear, which would later be identified as a theatre reserve, which EU Operation 
Concordia could call on in extremis. After Operation Allied Harmony was completed, NATO 
kept a small representation in the country to assist the continuation of the disarmament process 
(Mace 2004; Robertson, 2003).  
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In January 2003, the Macedonian authorities invited the EU to take over 
NATOs responsibilities in the country. The Council expressed the Unions 
readiness to conduct such an operation. On 31 March 2003, as NATO 
terminated its deployment the EU launched its first ever ESDP military conflict 
management operation. The operation, code-named Concordia, was authorised 
by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1371 (2001). The 
EU-NATO Berlin Plus arrangements, which were completed just two weeks 
before the launch of Operation Concordia, allowed the EU to make use of 
NATO assets in the operation. Concordias Operational Headquarters were set 
up at NATOs Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) in 
Belgium. Admiral R. Feist, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, 
was appointed EU Operations Commander and Brigadier-General P. Maral 
became the first EU Force Commander.
11
 France was the framework nation for 
the operation. Concordia comprised 350 soldiers from 13 of the 15 EU member 
states at the time (all except Ireland and Denmark) and from 13 additional 
countries. It was initially mandated for six months, but upon request from the 
Macedonian president, it was extended until 15 December 2003
12
 (Council 
Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP 27/1/2003; Council of the EU, 2009a). 
 
The mandated purpose of Concordia was to further contribute to a stable, 
secure environment to allow the Macedonian government to implement the 
Ohrid Framework Agreement. The operational objectives of the operation were 
                                                 
11 Major General Luis Nelson Ferreira dos Santos took over as EU Force Commander on 1 
October 2003.  
12 On the 21 July 2003, the Council agreed to extend the operation under the previous terms 
until 15 December 2003. At this point Eurofor took over the framework responsibilities from 
France. When Concordia was terminated the EU launched a civilian police mission, Proxima, 
to support the development of the police service in Macedonia (Council decision 
2003/563/CFSP).  
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vague. The UNSCR 1371 (2001) responsibilities, which the EU operation took 
over from the NATO deployment in Macedonia, endorsed three main 
objectives: (1) to support the implementation of the Framework Agreement; (2) 
to contribute to the security of its observers; and (3) to contribute to a safe and 
secure environment for its implementation. Mattelaer (2008, pp.29-30) has 
explained how a Safe and Secure Environment (SASE) mandate is perceived 
amongst military personnel as the fuzziest mission one can receive.  
 
Nevertheless, the absence of violent conflict throughout the deployment, 
demonstrates a great improvement in the security situation in Macedonia since 
2001, when the country was widely perceived to be at the brink of civil war. 
There were some minor incidents of civil unrest in northern Macedonia in 
September 2003, in which EUFOR supported the Macedonian security forces 
in defusing the situation (Howorth, 2007, pp. 231-241), but a fully fledged civil 
war never materialised. Although fully implementing the final aspects of the 
Framework Agreement remains a political challenge for the country, the 
security environment in which it is attempting to do so is now stable. The main 
threat to stability is no longer armed conflict but criminality (Howorth, 2007, 
pp. 232; Solana, 2003c).  
 
In terms of its internal goal attainment Operation Concordia was a success. Its 
mandated purpose to further contribute to a stable and secure environment in 
which the Macedonian government could implement the Framework 
Agreement was successfully achieved. EUFOR has contributed to its 
implementation as well as successfully protected its observers (Augustin, 
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2005). A break-down of the positive assessment of the operations internal goal 
attainment according to the indicators articulated in the three operational 
objectives is illustrated in table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 Internal goal attainment: Operation Concordia 
Key objectives Success Partial success Failure 
To support the 
implementation 
of the Framework 
Agreement 
 
X 
 
 
  
To contribute to 
the security of its 
observers 
 
X 
 
 
  
To contribute to a 
safe and secure 
environment 
 
X 
 
 
  
 
A broad consensus in the academic literature has highlighted Concordia as a 
military success and, thus, supported this positive assessment of the 
Concordias internal goal attainment (Cascone, 2008; Ladzik, 2006; Mace, 
2004). The ICG (2005a, p.49) explained how:  
 
(Concordia) helped build confidence, demonstrating continued international 
interest in Macedonia and persuading the ethnic Albanians to remain engaged 
politically. 
 
With regard to the implementation of the operation twenty-two field liaison 
teams made up the tactical force in the former crisis area. These teams were 
each assigned to one of three multinational sectors (Swedish, Portuguese and 
French). Two heavy platoons (French and Italian) acted as light teams (in 
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pairs) and as a general reserve for the entire area of operations. Operational 
tasks included mobile patrols; armed deterrence; information-gathering; 
confidence-building; emergency evacuation of monitors; advising and 
coordinating border security (Augustin, 2005; ICG, 2005a, p.48-49). Concordia 
experienced a number of problems in its implementation. A senior western 
diplomat remembers one episode in particular: 
 
In 2003, the Macedonian government bungled a raid on some ethnic Albanian 
criminals up in the Skopska Crna Gora Mountains north of Skopje bordering 
Kosovo/Serbia and nearly provoked a wider war. Austrian military intelligence 
officers, attached to EUFOR, were actually embedded with the small criminal 
group - kidnapping, small terrorist acts, unconnected to any larger group - and 
were feeding disinformation about the extent of the Government armed 
operations, for example, reporting that ‘there are stacks of dead unarmed 
civilians, everything is on fire’, which caused COMEUFOR to make a public, 
unsubstantiated claim of excessive government force. The truth was that two 
young members of the criminal gang had been killed while trying to get to a 
machinegun bunker. They were wearing sort of uniforms and were armed. The 
fires were the result of the criminal gang's firing mortars into the dry brush 
around the village where they were hiding. Senior NATO Ambassadors had to 
intervene to correct the information; get COMEUFOR to retract his statement 
and prevent the ethnic Albanian party, DUI, from leaving the governing 
coalition and resuming hostilities that had stopped in 2001 (Interview, senior 
western diplomat, 17/07/2009). 
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The claim that EU officers were engaged in a criminal group has not 
previously been mentioned in the academic literature, however, as it was 
confirmed by a senior western diplomat based in Skopje at the time, it is 
important to include it in the evaluation of the operations internal 
appropriateness. Moreover, it is clear from this incident that the EU Force 
Commander had inadequate intelligence, at least on this occasion, to make an 
appropriate judgement (and public statement). Other practical problems in the 
implementation of the operation concerned security clearance for non-NATO 
EU member states; political turf battles between NATO and the EU in HQ; and 
disagreements regarding how long Concordias command arrangements should 
stay in place after the operation to perform remaining tasks like drafting 
lessons learnt reports and returning and selling assets. These problems were 
resolved on a case-by-case basis, but they had a negative effect on the 
operations efficiency. Politically, there were also differences of opinion 
between member states about the place of NATOs regional command in 
Naples, Allied Force South Europe, in Concordias chain of command, but this 
was a political dispute rather than a problem affecting the implementation of 
the operation as such (ISIS, 2003; Mace, 2004).  
 
The fact that the operation was a military-strategic success overall, however, 
contributed to its internal political-strategic success, because it demonstrated 
that the EU was now capable of conducting a small-scale ESDP military 
conflict management operation. It also illustrated that the Berlin Plus 
arrangements with NATO worked relatively well in practice. As such it set a 
precedent, however small, for subsequent ESDP Operations Artemis and 
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Althea. Moreover, Concordia added to the EUs so-called comprehensive 
approach to Macedonia and to the Unions political leadership (supported by 
the US) of the international efforts in the country. Finally, it added a new 
military dimension to EUs role in the Western Balkans (Cascone, 2008; 
Dobbins et al, 2008; Mace, 2004). It was a politically effective operation for 
the EU at a comparatively low political cost. A break-down of Concordias 
success in terms of its internal appropriateness is provided in table. 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 Internal appropriateness: Operation Concordia 
Indicators Success Partial success Failure 
 
Timeliness 
 
X 
 
  
 
Efficiency 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
Effectiveness 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
Concordia achieved the task set out to do in a timely manner, but it was only 
partially successful in its efficiency, as the operation experienced a number of 
minor practical problems and the involvement of EUFOR officers in organised 
crime raises serious questions not only about the appropriateness of these 
officers behaviour, but also about the intelligence based upon which 
Concordia was operating. Overall, the operation was, therefore, successful in 
its internal goal attainment, but only partially successful in its internal 
appropriateness.  
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Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
In June 2003, the Council launched its second ESDP military conflict 
management operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This 
operation was deployed in a much more challenging security environment than 
Operation Concordia had been. Since the mid-1990s, the DRC has been 
engulfed in a myriad of different conflicts intertwined. At the sub-state level 
there were local conflicts for power and resources. These conflicts, which were 
particularly fierce in the east of the country, often assumed a significant ethnic 
dimension. At the state level belligerent parties struggled for control of the 
state apparatus after the fall of President Mobutu Sese Seko, and at the regional 
level the DRC was directly affected by the diffusion of instabilities in Rwanda, 
Uganda, Burundi and Angola. Vice versa, the instabilities in the DRC affected 
and included much of central and southern Africa. Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, 
Angola, Sudan, Namibia and Zimbabwe were all, albeit at different levels, 
involved in the conflict within the DRCs territorial borders. Rwanda and 
Uganda, in particular, have been directly engaged in the fighting (Prunier, 
2009; Tull, 2009).  
 
The Lusaka ceasefire agreement, signed in July 1999, made way for the 
authorisation of the United Nations Organisation Mission in DRC 
(MONUC).
13
 The Lusaka peace process stalled when DRC President Laurent 
Kabila was murdered in 2001. His son and successor, Joseph Kabila, later 
resumed the negotiations, which eventually resulted in the withdrawal of 
                                                 
13 MONUC was initially established as a small military liaison team in 1999. It has since 
become one of the biggest and most expensive UN operations ever deployed. It is now a 
multidimensional peacekeeping mission with a broad mandate. With 18,434 uniformed 
personnel deployed in 2008, MONUC has become the centrepiece of the international efforts 
to regulate the conflict in the DRC (UN, 2009b; Tull, 2009). 
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23,000 Rwandan soldiers and most of the 10,000 Ugandan soldiers in the DRC 
in late 2002. Proxy militias supported by the two governments remained active 
in the country. In December 2002, the belligerent parties and opposed political 
groupings signed the Sun City peace agreement. This ushered in a transitional 
government in June 2003, in which President Kabila would share power with 
four vice-presidents including former rebel leaders Jean Pierre Bemba and 
Azarias Ruberwa. The war officially ended in 2004, but the violence continued 
and the security situation in the provinces of Ituri, North and South Kivu and 
Katanga remained volatile (ICG, 2008d; Prunier, 2009; Tull, 2009).  
 
It was the violence in the Ituri region in northeastern DRC that became the 
focus of Operation Artemis, the first of two ESDP military conflict 
management operations in the DRC. In May 2003, a major crisis occurred in 
Bunia (capital of Ituri). Ethnic militias were fighting for control of the city after 
the withdrawal of the Ugandan soldiers. The Ituri crisis escalated with the 
recapture of the city by the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), to which the 
DRC government reacted by stationing Congolese armed forces (RCD) in Beni 
to dislodge the UPC from Bunia. The crisis undermined the Sun City 
Agreement and the RCD offensive risked re-engaging Uganda and Rwanda in 
the DRC conflict. The violence intensified and the humanitarian crisis was 
severe. Ituri and its people were once again left in turmoil. MONUC was not 
able to secure the situation and 400 civilians were massacred despite the 
presence of the peacekeepers. The UN called for urgent help from the 
international community to manage the Ituri crisis (Solana, 18/07/2003; Tull, 
2009).  
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 The EU, on French initiative, responded positively to the UN request. On 12 
June 2003, the Union agreed to deploy its first ESDP military conflict 
management operation in Africa. The operation, code-named Artemis, was to 
be conducted in accordance the EU Joint Action adopted on 5 June 2003. The 
operation was designed as a stop-gap measure to fill the security vacuum in 
Bunia, while MONUC prepared reinforcements. The Artemis mandate was set 
out in UNSCR 1484 (2003). France acted as framework nation and the 
Operation Headquarters were located at the Centre de Planification et de 
Conduite des Opérations (CPCO) in Paris. Major General Neveux was 
appointed EU Operations Commander and Brigadier General Thonier became 
EU Force Commander. At its peak the operation comprised 2,200 troops. The 
Operation officially ended when it handed over its responsibilities to the 
reinforced UN force on 1 September 2003 (Council Joint Action 
2003/423/CFSP 5/6/2003; Howorth, 2007, pp.231-241). 
 
The mandated purpose of Operation Artemis was to contribute to the 
stabilisation of the security conditions and the humanitarian situation in Bunia 
pending MONUC reinforcements. The operation had three key objectives: (1) 
to ensure the protection of displaced persons in the refugee camps in Bunia 
and, if the situation so required, to contribute to the safety of the civilian 
population, UN personnel and humanitarian agencies in the town; (2) to ensure 
the protection of the airport; and (3) to give impetus to the overall peace 
process in the DRC and the wider Great Lakes region (Ulriksen et el. 2004; 
Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP 5/6/2003). Artemis had clear parameters 
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of size, duration and responsibilities. The operation was mandated for less than 
three months and its area of operations was confined to Bunia town and the 15 
km surrounding it (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, pp.174-198).  
 
In terms of achieving this operational purpose the operation was successful. 
The EU force prohibited the open bearing of arms in Bunia and established 
checkpoints to the entrances to the city. It secured the airport and the refugee 
camps in its area of operations. Several militia groups were successfully 
contained, some were disarmed and the EU force also disrupted the supply 
chains of some groups. Overall, the security situation in Bunia quickly 
improved. An important element of the operation was its presence and show-
of-force missions carried out by ground forces patrolling throughout Bunia and 
the regular French Mirage over-flights. This allowed humanitarian 
organisations to travel to places outside the town that they had previously not 
been able to reach. It allowed a daily influx of 1,000-1,500 refugees into the 
city. Artemis also made it possible for the Interim Administration in Ituri to 
resume some of its activities. The operation re-established basic order in Bunia 
and filled the security gap until the UN reinforcements arrived. The improved 
situation in Bunia had a positive effect on the peace process in the DRC and 
the wider Great Lakes region. The operation stopped the situation from 
spiralling further out of control, as it was otherwise feared that it would. The 
next chapter will return to the external goal achievement of the operation, but 
as far as its internal goal to contribute to the stabilisation of the security 
conditions and the humanitarian situation in Bunia, the operation was 
undeniably a success (Gegout 2005; ICG Europe Report, 2005b, pp.46-49; 
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Ulriksen et al. 2004). Table 3.3 gives a breakdown of this assessment 
according to the indicators for Artemis internal goal attainment. 
 
Table 3.3 Internal goal attainment: Operation Artemis 
Key objectives Success Partial success Failure 
To ensure the 
protection of 
displaced persons 
in the refugee 
camps in Bunia 
 
X 
 
 
  
To ensure the 
protection of the 
airport 
 
X 
 
  
To give impetus 
to the overall 
peace process in 
the DRC and the 
wider Great 
Lakes region 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of its implementation the operation was timely in the deployment of 
its troops. The EU reacted very quickly to the UN request and EU soldiers 
were on the ground, 6,500 km from Brussels, within seven days of the decision 
taken by the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The rapid force 
projection was an internal achievement for the EU, despite the fact that much 
of the planning had been undertaken by France before the EU had officially 
agreed to undertake the operation (ICG, 2005b, pp.46-49; Howorth, 2007, 
pp.231-241; Ulriksen et al, 2004). It is important not to underestimate the 
significant logistical challenges that Artemis did overcome. The local 
infrastructure was inadequate even for the relatively light EU force and the 
operation demonstrated a general EU shortage in strategic-lift capacity. 
Artemis was able to make up for this through a concerted effort by its 
engineers and access to the necessary assets through charter arrangements and 
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strategic lift support from Canada and Brazil. Had the operation required a 
heavier deployment of armoured units, combat support could have become a 
serious problem, complicating transports arrangements and requiring 
significant improvements to the local infrastructure. Further operational 
constrains could have been caused by inadequate communications systems 
between HQ and field staff and the lack of an adequate strategic reserve 
(Giegerich 2008; Homan 2007; Ulriksen et al, 2004). These issues illustrated 
potential challenges to future, more ambitious, ESDP military conflict 
management operations, but for its internally defined purpose Artemis was able 
to efficiently overcome these problems on a case-by-case basis. In effect, these 
issues did not hinder the operations efficiency in the implementation of its 
mandate.  
 
During the operation EU forces went into combat together for the first time. 
When they were challenged militarily the Artemis troops proved willing and 
able to engage in combat and demonstrated a clear superiority over local 
opponents (Giegerich, 2008, p.24). Artemis ground forces were repeatedly 
caught up in fire-fights with local militia factions, but confrontations were 
localised and of short duration. The EU operation sustained no loss of life, but 
Artemis forces killed more than 20 local militiamen during the deployment 
(Gegout 2004; Giegerich 2008). This to some extent disarmed doubts regarding 
the EUs will and ability to use force. 
 
Artemis was both an important military-strategic and political-strategic 
achievement for the EU. It was the Unions first operation beyond the 
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European continent. The operation was undertaken in a much more demanding 
theatre of operations than Concordia, and it was autonomously undertaken by 
the EU without support from NATO (and the US). As Ulriksen, Gourlay and 
Mace (2004, p.521) put it: Artemis was a successful test of the political 
apparatus of the ESDP. Artemis demonstrated that the Union could now 
successfully undertake military conflict management operations (a) on a 
significant scale, (b) on its own and (c) outside of Europe. In addition, it 
bridged the political divide on security and defence policy matters within the 
EU at the time and added a military dimension to the Unions engagement in 
Africa (Hadden, 2009, pp.1-21; Homan 2007; Ulriksen et al, 2004). In the 
words of the ICG (2005b, pp.47):  
 
For the EU Artemis was a golden opportunity to gain credibility for its security 
and defence initiatives (…) politically it was a success even before the force 
arrived. 
 
These achievements all illustrate Artemis internal cost-effectiveness. But in 
this regard it is important to mention that Swedish Artemis officers made 
formal complaints about torture-like methods used in a French-led 
interrogation during the operation (Deutsche Welle, 2008). The French 
investigation into the case concluded that these allegations were 
unsubstantiated. However, the Swedish military concluded that this was in fact 
a case of clear misconduct. An independent investigation conducted by the 
Swedish National Television supported this assessment and concluded that a 
civilian had indeed been tortured. The next chapter will return to this incident 
 
and examine it in further detail according to the external appropriateness 
criterion. It is important here in so far as it limits Artemis internal 
appropriateness, because the allegations among soldiers and between member 
states were potentially politically damaging for the Union; and, therefore, 
limited the operations otherwise stellar internal success. Table 3.4 illustrates 
Artemis internal appropriateness.    
 
Table 3.4 Internal appropriateness: Operation Concordia 
 Success Partial success Failure 
 
Timeliness 
 
X 
 
  
 
Efficiency 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effectiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
The violent conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) started in April 1992. 
Over the next three and a half years the war, which was fought mainly between 
factions of ethnic Serbs, Croats and Muslims claimed at least 97,207 lives 
(Research and Documentation Centre Sarajevo, 2007).
14
 The civilian 
population on all three sides of the conflict suffered tremendously. Human 
                                                 
14 In 2007, an independent study conducted by the Research and Documentation Centre 
Sarajevo funded mainly by the Norwegian government concluded that at least 97,207 people 
were killed during the war in BiH. 65 per cent of the dead were Bosnian Muslims, 25 per cent 
were ethnic Serbs and more than 8 per cent were ethnic Croats. Mirsad Tokaca, who led the 
project, estimated that the total number of dead, which is significantly lower than previous 
estimates of around 250,000 deaths, could rise due to still ongoing research, but with a 
maximum of another 10,000 dead. The death toll refers to deaths directly related to military 
activities and does not include indirect causes of death during war such as death due to 
starvation, lack of medication or suicide, nor does it include people who died at an earlier age 
than would normally be expected during peacetime (Research and Documentation Centre 
Sarajevo, 2007). 
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rights abuses and ethnic cleansing were widespread. By the end of the war 
more than half of the population had been killed, expelled or fled their homes. 
The violent conflict ended when Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, Yugoslav 
President Slobodan Miloeviü and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegoviü, 
representing Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) 
respectively agreed to a settlement forced through by the US in Dayton, Ohio, 
in November 1995 (Chandler, 2000; Glenny, 2001; Silber and Little, 1996). 
  
The Dayton Agreement, officially named the General Framework Agreement 
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP)
15
, was signed in Paris on 14 
December 1995. The agreement and the constitutional structures it put in place 
ended the war in the BiH at the time, but have since been criticised for not 
ensuring a sustainable peace in the country (Chandler, 2000). The GFAP 
authorised an international High Representative (HR) to facilitate, mobilise and 
coordinate the civilian aspects of the peace implementation process in the 
country.
16
 The UN endorsed the establishment of a multinational 
Implementation Force (IFOR) to undertake the military aspects of the conflict 
management. It was understood that NATO would establish the force and 
                                                 
15 The GFAP envisaged BiH as one unified state made up of two separate entities: the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. The two entities were of roughly 
equal size and their population together made up the countrys three constituent peoples: 
ethnic Croats and Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) living mainly in the Federation and Bosnian 
Serbs living mainly in Republika Srpska. The GFAP included provisions on the military 
aspects of the peace settlement; regional stabilisation; the inter-entity boundary line; elections; 
constitutional arrangements; arbitration; human rights; refugees and displaced persons; the 
commission to preserve national monuments; BiH public corporations; civilian implementation 
and the International Police Task Force (GFAP, 1995).  
16 The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was established an ad hoc international 
institution responsible for overseeing the implementation of civilian aspects of the GFAP. The 
Peace Implementation Council (PIC), the international body guiding the peace process in BiH, 
oversees the OHRs work. On 13 March 2009, the PIC appointed Austrian diplomat Valentin 
Inzko the 7th High Representative in the country. On 30 June 2009, the PIC confirmed that the 
OHR would remain in place until its objectives and conditions for closure are met. In the 
intervening period the OHR is working towards transition into an EU civilian mission. At 
present the HR is also the EU Special Representative (EUSR) to BiH (OHR, 2009). 
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assume authority transferred from the existing UN Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) in the country. IFOR was mandated to implement the military 
aspects of the GFAP. After the September 1996 elections, a smaller NATO 
Stabilisation Force (SFOR) replaced IFOR. NATO had troops in BiH from 
December 1995 until SFOR transferred its responsibilities to the EU in 
December 2004 (NATO, 2005).
17
 
 
When NATO decided to withdraw SFOR in 2004, UNSCR 1551 (2004) 
endorsed the launch an ESDP military conflict management operation in its 
place. On 12 July 2004, the Council of the EU officially decided to launch 
Operation Althea. The idea that the EU might take over from NATO in BiH 
was first aired at the European Council in Copenhagen in 2002. However, the 
handover was not officially agreed until the Berlin Plus arrangements between 
NATO and the EU were in place and had been successfully tested in Operation 
Concordia (Cascone, 2008; ICG, 2005b, pp.49-51). On 2 December 2004, the 
EU force took over the official responsibilities from NATO. Althea is the 
largest and longest running ESDP military conflict management operation. As 
the operation was launched under the Berlin Plus, Operation Headquarters 
were located at SHAPE and Admiral R. Feist was appointed EU Operations 
Commander. Major General David Leakey became the first EU Force 
Commander in BiH.
18
 28 countries have contributed to the operation, 22 of 
which are not EU member states. The EU initially deployed 7,000 troops to the 
                                                 
17When SFOR withdrew in 2004 a small NATO HQ remained in Sarajevo to provide assistance 
to local authorities on defence reform; counter-terrorism; detention of persons indicted for war 
crimes; and intelligence-sharing with the EU (NATO, 2004).  
18 Admiral Feist was replaced by General Sir John Reith in 2004. Major General Leakey was 
later replaced by Major General Gian Marco Chiarini (2005), Major General Ignacio Martin 
Villalain (2007) and Major General Stefano Castagnotto (2008) (Council of the EU, 2009b).   
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country under a Chapter VII mandate. The force was reduced to 2,200 troops 
(backed by over-the horizon reserves) in 2007. The operation is still ongoing 
and an end-date has not officially been decided upon (Council of the EU, 
2009b; Howorth, 2007).  
 
The operational purpose of EUFOR Althea is to provide a military presence in 
order to contribute to the safe and secure environment in BiH. As such it is 
mandated (1) to deny conditions for a resumption of violence; (2) to manage 
any residual military aspect of the GFAP; and (3) thereby to allow all EU and 
international community actors to carry out their responsibilities in the country. 
The operation is explicitly framed as part of the EUs so-called comprehensive 
approach towards BiH, which also comprises political, economic, commercial, 
cultural and policing instruments intended to support the countrys journey 
towards further European integration and eventual EU membership. This 
process is framed within the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). In 
the short term Althea hoped to ensure a smooth transition from SFOR and to 
maintain a secure environment for the implementation of the GFAP (Annexes 
1-A and 2). In the medium term it was intended to help the European 
integration process, assist BiH in reaching a Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement (SAA) with the EU and move closer towards eventual EU 
membership. In the long term Althea, as part of the wider EU approach, hoped 
to help create a stable and viable multi-ethnic BiH at peace with its neighbours 
(Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP 12/07/2004; Council of the EU, 2009b; 
Howorth, 2007).  
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In October 2006, the Council changed Althea's mandate from a military 
conflict management mandate to a military policing mandate. EUFORs 
presence in BiH was subsequently reduced to some 2,200 troops (backed by 
over-the horizon reserves) in 2007. Altheas operational focus remains the 
maintenance of a safe and secure environment in the country, ensuring 
compliance with the GFAP and supporting the HR/EUSR. Other operational 
tasks include collecting small arms and ammunition; deterring and controlling 
illicit trafficking; assisting local authorities in mine clearance and control of the 
lower airspace; border controls and support to the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) through the detention of Persons 
Indicted for War Crimes (PIWCs). The Operation Commander is currently 
preparing Altheas future evolution into a non-executive, capacity-building 
operation corresponding to the needs of the Bosnian army (Solana, 2009b). An 
official decision on the transition is outstanding. The operation and its future 
are subject to regular review (Council of the EU, 2009b).  
 
As the operation is still ongoing it is too early to undertake a conclusive 
evaluation of its success, but some preliminary observations can be made. Most 
importantly, Althea has successfully maintained a safe and secure environment 
in the country throughout its deployment. As one interviewee put it:  
 
EUFOR's Althea took over from NATO and continued a completely successful 
operation designed to reassure all the parties to the civil war, including strong 
support for capturing war criminals and other Rule of Law efforts (Senior 
western diplomat, 17/07/2009). 
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 In terms of its internal goal attainment Althea achieved a relatively smooth 
transition from SFOR in the short term. The operations transition in 2007 was 
another indicator of its preliminary success in internal goal attainment and of 
the improved security situation in the country. With regard to the medium term 
political objectives BiH signed an SAA with the EU in 2007, but its further 
integration process towards eventual EU membership has stalled. The long 
term political objective of regional stabilisation and cooperation has also only 
been partly achieved so far. The security situation in the Western Balkans is 
stable, but political dynamics remain challenging. This was illustrated by the 
political ramifications of Kosovos declaration of independence, which caused 
the political leadership in Republika Srpska in BiH to call for a referendum on 
their independence (ICG 2008e and 2009e; Howorth, 2007). Whether the 
political objectives of the operation and the wider EU approach to BiH and the 
Western Balkan region succeed remains to be seen, but from a military-
strategic perspective Operation Althea has so far been successful in terms of its 
internal goal attainment and its mandated purpose to provide a military 
presence in order to contribute to the safe and secure environment in BiH. It 
has so far successfully denied conditions for a resumption of violence, 
managed the military aspect of the GFAP and allowed the EU and other 
international actors to carry out their responsibilities in the country. This is 
illustrated in table 3.5 below. 
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Table 3.5 Internal goal attainment: Operation Althea 
Key objectives Success Partial success Failure 
To deny 
conditions for a 
resumption of 
violence 
 
X 
 
 
  
To manage 
military aspects 
of the GFAP  
 
X 
 
  
To allow all EU 
and international 
community actors 
to carry out their 
responsibilities in 
the country 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of its implementation Althea has so far been timely, efficient and cost-
effective. This was helped initially by the fact that the EU operation was taking 
over responsibilities from the existing SFOR operation in BiH. At the time of 
its departure SFOR was a largely European undertaking. SFOR personnel came 
from 27 countries, 16 of which were EU member states. Many of the former 
NATO troops remained in the country under the new EU banner. Much of the 
initial EUFOR mandate and operation plan also reflected previous SFOR 
commitments. The handover and successful implementation of the operation 
was further facilitated by the Berlin Plus arrangements between NATO and the 
EU and their joint experience in Operation Concordia (ICG, 2005b, pp.49-51). 
The setting up of Althea and the transfer of responsibilities was planned by the 
two organisations in cooperation. Detailed planning and preparation helped 
them avoid misunderstandings and overlap at the practical level and facilitated 
an internally successful implementation of Althea so far. Although there have 
been political disagreements between the two organisations, these have been 
resolved and did not significantly affect the positive achievements and 
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implementation of the EUFOR operation (Cascone, 2008). The successful 
reconfiguration and downscaling of Althea in 2007 is another testament to the 
timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the implementation process 
(Friesendorf and Penska, 2008).  
EUFOR has had a mixed record of cooperation with other EU agencies in BiH. 
At the beginning of its mandate Althea undertook a number of high-profile 
anti-organised crime operations, through the Integrated Police Unit, which 
caused friction with the EU Police Mission (EUPM) already deployed in the 
country. This caused disagreements between the EUFOR and EUPM 
leadership, but it did not cause any severe problems for the implementation of 
EUFORs mandate. In its second term EUFOR downscaled this engagement 
and the initial frictions with EUPM were overcome (Friesendorf & Penska, 
2008). Likewise, EUFORs relationship with the OHR/EUSR has varied over 
time and between different Heads of Missions (HoM), but never to the extent 
that this seriously affected the internal success of Operation Althea (Interviews, 
Representatives from the OHR, 30/06/2006).  
EUFOR was challenged militarily on one occasion. In early 2006, Italian 
Caribinieri under EUFOR command attempted to arrest Dragomir Abazovic, 
who was indicted by the Sarajevo Canton Court for war crimes committed in 
Rogatica. The EU force was fired upon, as they approached the house where 
Abazovic was staying. They returned fire and Abazovics wife was killed and 
his son was critically wounded in the shoot out. Both of them had fired shots 
against the EU soldiers (Bassuener and Ferhatovic, 2008). A senior western 
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diplomat based in Sarajevo at the time described the situation in the following 
way: 
This was a botched Carabinieri raid to capture a person for whom there was a 
domestic war crimes warrant, which had expired. One local person was killed 
and several wounded in an unfortunate shoot out - literally the only time any 
NATO or EUFOR soldiers came under fire in Bosnia or had reason to use their 
weapons. It was pretty messy - and unnecessary - if the proper coordination 
had been conducted in advance (Interview, senior western diplomat, 
17/07/2009). 
 
It has been argued that this incident clipped General Chiarini's wings from the 
beginning of his mandate (he had only been in command of EUFOR for two 
weeks at the time) and further reduced Altheas appetite for operational activity 
(Bassuener and Ferhatovic, 2008). However, despite this unfortunate incident, 
the operation has been a preliminary success both in terms of its internal goal 
attainment and its internal appropriateness (Cascone, 2008). From a political-
strategic perspective Operation Althea added a military aspect to the EUs 
comprehensive approach to BiH. The OHR/EUSR has repeatedly stressed that 
EUFOR adds in a significant way to the Union's political engagement and 
assistance programmes in the country, which are all intended to help the 
European integration progress (Council of the EU, 2007; OHR, 2009). Althea 
also helped refine the ESDP and the structures and procedures for Berlin Plus 
operations (Cascone, 2008). It allowed the EU to test and prove its military 
capabilities in a larger and more ambitious operation (Howorth, 2007). Overall, 
this analysis supports Howorths (2007, p.238) assessment that: Althea appears 
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to have carried out its mission with efficiency, adaptability and success. This is 
illustrated in table 3.6 below.  
Table 3.6 Internal appropriateness: Operation Althea 
 Success Partial success Failure 
 
Timeliness 
 
X 
 
  
 
Efficiency 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effectiveness 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
EUFOR DR CONGO 
On 12 June 2006 the EU launched its second military operation in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. This operation, codenamed EUFOR DR 
Congo, was deployed to support the UN mission in the country, MONUC, 
during the period encompassing the DRC elections in July 2006. The mandate 
was set out in UNSCR 1671 (2006), which authorised the temporary EU 
deployment. The EU Joint Action of 27 April 2006 appointed Operations 
Commander Lieutenant General Karlheinz Viereck and Force Commander 
Major General Christian Damay. Germany was the framework nation and 
Operations Headquarters were located at the Armed Forces Operation 
Command in Potsdam. The operation was invited by the UN, officially 
welcomed by the DRC authorities and to be conducted autonomously by the 
EU in close coordination and cooperation with both the DRC authorities and 
MONUC. EUFOR DR Congo deployed some 400 military personnel in an 
advance element to Kinshasa and an additional battalion-sized over-the-horizon 
force (1,200 soldiers) was deployed on stand-by in neighbouring Gabon. At 
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peak strength in mid-August 2006 EUFOR DR Congo had 2,466 troops in the 
field, but a maximum of 1,000 were deployed in the DRC at any one time. 22 
member states participated in the operation with two-thirds of the troops 
coming from France and Germany. The operation was concluded on 30 
November 2006 (Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP 27/4/2006; Council of 
the EU, 2006a). 
 
The operational purpose of EUFOR DR Congo was to support MONUC during 
the elections. To this end its mandate singled out four key objectives: (1) 
support MONUC in its efforts to stabilise the security situation in its area of 
deployment (Kinshasa), in case MONUC faced difficulties in this regard within 
its existing mandate; (2) contribute to the protection of civilians under 
imminent threat of physical violence without prejudice to the responsibilities of 
the DRC government; (3) contribute to the protection of Kinshasa airport and 
(4) execute limited operations to extract individuals in danger (Council of the 
EU, 2006a). 
 
In terms of its internal goal attainment the operation was a success. The 
elections went relatively smoothly and both rounds of the ballots were held in a 
generally peaceful and orderly manner. Although some violent incidents 
occurred in Kinshasa, these did not have a significant negative impact on the 
outcome of the election process or indeed the internal goal achievement of the 
EUFOR operation. Both national and international election observers 
confirmed that the organisation and the conduct of the elections under the aegis 
of the Independent Electoral Committee went well. Observers question the 
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extent to which this can be attributed to the EUs military operation (Gegout 
2007; Giegerich 2008; Howorth, 2007, pp. 231-241). But in terms of its 
contribution to MONUCs efforts to manage the security situation in Kinshasa; 
to the protection of civilians under imminent threat; to the protection of 
Kinshasa airport and to execute limited operations to extract individuals in 
danger the operation succeeded. When fighting broke out between supporters 
of the two presidential candidates in Kinshasa in August 2006 EUFOR 
reinforced the existing MONUC efforts and helped separate the fighting 
factions and re-establish order. It also helped recover diplomats trapped by the 
violence and mediated between the belligerent parties. EUFOR airlifted 
weapons out of areas occupied by groups of demobilised soldiers and EU 
soldiers participated in humanitarian initiatives and helped rebuild schools, 
hospitals and roads (Gegout 2007; Giegerich 2008).  
 
Table 3.7 Internal goal attainment: EUFOR DR Congo 
Key objectives Success Partial success Failure 
To support 
MONUC in 
stabilising the 
security situation 
in Kinshasa 
 
X 
 
 
  
To contribute to 
the protection of 
civilians under 
imminent threat  
 
X 
  
To contribute to 
the protection of 
Kinshasa airport 
 
X 
 
 
 
To execute 
limited operations 
to extract 
individuals in 
danger 
 
X 
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With regard to its deployment the operation experienced some initial problems. 
As the EU did not have its own permanent planning and control capacities, the 
EU-level operational planning could not start until operational headquarters 
had been designated. No EU member state was keen to adopt the framework 
responsibilities for this operation. The force generation for EUFOR DR Congo 
was also a slow and cumbersome process. In effect the deployment was 
continuously delayed (Giegerich 2008). It took the EU almost three months to 
respond affirmatively to the UNs request for it to undertake the operation and 
six months until the force was operational in the field. This was a significant 
difference from the EUs quick response in the Artemis operation three years 
earlier.
19
 The delay was partly due to UK and German reluctance towards the 
operation and their hesitance to deploy troops. The UK ruled out participation, 
given its military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Germany was 
eventually convinced on the condition that only 100 of its 780 troops would be 
deployed in Kinshasa, while the rest would remain as part of the reserve in 
Gabon (Howorth, 2007, pp. 231-241).  
 
Once it was deployed the implementation of the operation was conducted 
efficiently. When tensions arose in Kinshasa EUFOR successfully brought in 
reinforcements. Observers agree that militarily the operation was a success, 
although they do suggest that this has at least in part been due to the limitations 
                                                 
19 In a letter dated 27 December 2005 the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 
Operations invited the EU to consider deploying a military force to the DRC to assist MONUC 
during the elections. On 23 March 2006 the Council approved an option paper for possible EU 
support to MONUC, and on 25 April 2006 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1671 
(2006), authorising the temporary deployment of an EU force (Council of the EU, 2009f). 
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of its mandated scope in time, space and function (Gegout 2007; Giegerich 
2008; Howorth, 2007, pp. 231-241).  
 
It is important, however, not to underestimate the importance of the operation 
from an internal EU perspective.  As Dobbins (2008, pp.23-24) explains: 
 
The country has been a major focus for Europe and a proving ground for an 
evolving European policy. The EU has conducted two military operations in 
the DRC and has spent more money on state-building in the DRC than 
anywhere else outside of Europe (as a portion of EU military spending, not as 
a measure of bilateral spending). Europe’s experience in the DRC in turn had 
a major influence on the evolution of the ESDP, encouraging the developments 
of EU battle groups and the introduction of new mechanisms for common 
funding of joint operations while highlighting some of the problems inherent in 
coordinating nation-building within the EU itself.   
 
Politically EUFOR DRC was an achievement for the EU. It confirmed the 
Unions capacity for autonomous military action outside of Europe and it 
demonstrated again that the Union could serve as a partner for the UN in 
potentially difficult situations (Hadden, 2009; Rye Olsen, 2009). It also added 
another piece to the puzzle in the EUs emerging comprehensive approach to 
the DRC (Dobbins, 2008). The operation was an internal success overall. Its 
only real failure was in terms of its timeliness. This is illustrated in table 3.8 
below.  
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Table 3.8 Internal appropriateness: EUFOR DR Congo 
 Success Partial success Failure 
 
Timeliness 
 
 
 
  
X 
 
Efficiency 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effectiveness 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of its internal goal attainment the operation was a significant success 
for the Union. Due to the difficult EU decision-making and force generation 
processes, however, which caused delays and operational constraints to the 
operation, EUFOR DR Congo was only a partial success with regard to its 
internal appropriateness. 
 
EUFOR CHAD/CAR 
The EUs most recent military conflict management operation, EUFOR 
CHAD/CAR, was launched in January 2008. EUSR for Sudan, Torben Brylle 
(2008), has explained the conflict context in which the operation was deployed:  
 
EUFOR was launched as part of an EU comprehensive regional approach to 
the serious regional ramifications of the conflict in Darfur and the deep 
humanitarian crisis that this conflict has created, spilling over, as it is, into 
eastern Chad and also into the border areas between the two countries and the 
Central African Republic. Destabilising, as it was, an already volatile region 
characterised by an already huge number of internally displaced people and 
refugees. The latest figures from the Secretary General’s report talk about a 
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number of refugees in the order of 280,000 people and 180,000 internally 
displaced people. And beyond that of course there is a negative impact on the 
local population as well.  
 
In order to understand the complexities of the EUFOR Chad/CAR operation it 
is important to take a closer look at the context in which it was launched. 
Although it is a common trend, describing the security situation in this region 
simply as a spill over of the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan to Chad and 
the Central African Republic is a precarious simplification. As explained in 
chapter one, diffusion and escalation are conflict dynamics attributable to 
identifiable actors and actions. It is not simply an unconscious or un-
controllable spill over process. It is important to recognise the complex conflict 
formation, which exists in the tri-border region of Sudan, Chad and CAR. 
Within each of the three countries there is a multitude of separate, although 
closely interlinked, conflicts. The alarming security situation in the region is a 
consequence of sub-state, state, regional and international conflict dynamics. 
This thesis does not aim to describe the intricate details of the complex 
dynamics of these conflicts, but it is important for the purpose of this analysis 
to stress that both Chad and CAR were experiencing domestic conflicts of their 
own, before the Darfur conflict erupted in Sudan in 2003 (Berg, 2008).  
 
In Chad President Deby supported by his Patriotic Salvation Movement, the 
Zaghawa military clan and the French government has monopolised state 
power since 1990. The authoritarian regime, which is characterised by 
corruption, clientelism, clan favouritism and repression of its opposition, has 
 108
caused an increase in social, political and ethnic tensions in the country and 
brought about a state of constant armed rebellion. In 2006 and 2008 rebel 
offensives brought Chad to the brink of all out civil war. The instability in the 
country, which experienced no less than three failed coup attempts from 2005-
2008 culminating in the 2006 and 2008 rebel attacks on the capital, has three 
key causes: (1) the large-scale, systematic embezzlement of state revenues 
(incl. oil revenues) triggering an unprecedented social crisis; (2) the 
radicalisation of opposition within the inner ruling circles over the succession 
to President Deby and (3) the close links between the Zaghawa (Debys ethnic 
group) leadership in Chad and the Darfur rebels. Chad is allegedly providing 
the Sudanese rebels with weapons and sanctuary to sustain their struggle in 
Sudan. In return Darfur rebels are reported to have helped the Chad army turn 
back the Chadian rebel offensives against President Deby in 2006 and 2008. 
Meanwhile armed Chadian opposition groups have aided the Sudanese 
government in the Darfur conflict, resulting in what since 2003 has developed 
into a proxy war between Sudan and Chad (Berg, 2008; Flint and de Waal, 
2008; ICG, 2008b and 2008c).  
 
Despite a tense political climate and sporadic clashes in the region eastern 
Chad was relatively stable until 2003, but since then the humanitarian and 
security situation has deteriorated to an unprecedented low. Ongoing internal 
tensions in Chad and the conflict in neighbouring Darfur have together caused 
large-scale internal displacement in the region and the massive influx of 
Sudanese refugees has intensified local struggles for resources.
20
 Both the 
                                                 
20 In 2004 alone 200,000 refugees fled from the escalating crisis in Darfur to refugee camps in 
eastern Chad (ICG, 2008c). 
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Chad government and the rebels have armed their supporters, leading to 
intensification in inter-ethnic violence and higher levels of criminality and 
banditry, making the humanitarian situation on the ground ever more difficult. 
The belligerent parties exploit the situation to perpetuate themselves (ICG, 
2009b; Oxfam, 2008). The refugee camps on the border between Chad and 
Sudan are fuelling tensions between the two countries. Sudan has repeatedly 
attacked the camps, and the camps, which are increasingly militarised, have 
become deeply entangled in the conflict in the tri-border region between 
Sudan, Chad and CAR. The weakest of the three countries, CAR, is caught in 
the middle of the conflict between Sudan and Chad. It has a national interest in 
normalising relations with the Sudanese leadership, but it cannot afford to 
upset its bilateral relations with the Chad government, who support and protect 
the CAR leadership against aggressive domestic opposition (Berg, 2008; ICG, 
2008b).  
 
When CAR President Bozize came to power in a coup in 2003 he was 
supported militarily by Chadian President Deby. This support was decisive not 
only to Bozizes success in taking over the state apparatus. It also ensures the 
present-day survival of the CAR regime and the personal security of the 
President, who is guarded by members of the Chadian security services. Until 
2005 Chad also had troops deployed on the border between the two countries 
in an attempt to halt the activity of Chad and CAR rebel groups in the area. 
When the Chadian soldiers were withdrawn due to an increased pressure on 
their own capital, the CAR authorities were considerably weakened in the fight 
against the rebellion in the north east challenging the government in Bangui. 
 110
The rebellion was supported by the Sudanese government. Therefore President 
Bozize now seeks to normalise CARs relations with Sudan as much as 
possible without jeopardising its Chadian support. However Chad needs CARs 
support to balance Khartoums opposition to its military presence in and access 
to CAR territory in the fight against the Chadian rebel movements, which are 
supported by Sudan and hiding in CAR. It is in Chads interest that the CAR 
military stays weak, so that Chad can legitimately deploy it troops on CAR 
territory. In this way Chad can sustain the CAR regimes dependency on 
Chadian military support and prevent a Khartoum/Bangui alliance from 
developing. Chad and Sudan therefore shared, albeit for different reasons, their 
opposition to an international military presence in eastern Chad (ICG, 2008b; 
Mattelaer, 2008).       
 
The regional dimension to the crisis in CAR has thus developed in recent years, 
but like in Chad, the origins of the CAR crisis were domestic. Since its first 
free elections in 1993 manipulated communal divisions have caused the 
outbreak of violent conflict both at the sub-state and the state level in the 
country. A series of mutinies and rebellions left CAR in a state of permanent 
crisis. President Bozize, as President Patasse before him, has provoked a 
continuous rebellion by sustaining widespread army and militia brutality with 
disastrous humanitarian consequences against any opposition. Hundreds of 
civilians have been killed and thousands of homes burned. In a report 
published just weeks before the EUFOR Thad/CAR deployment, the ICG 
(2007a, p.1) stated that: 
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The Central African Republic is if anything worse than a failed state: it has 
become virtually a phantom state lacking any meaningful institutional 
capacity.  
 
Despite the domestic problems in Chad and CAR, the EUFOR Chad/CAR 
operation was focused on, and limited to, alleviating the direct consequences of 
the Darfur crisis on the security situation in eastern Chad and north eastern 
CAR. In a Joint Action adopted on 15 October 2007 the Council decided to 
launch the operation. Lieutenant General Patrick Nash was appointed 
Operation Commander and Brigadier General Jean-Philippe Ganascia became 
the Force Commander. Operational Headquarters were located at Mont 
Valérien. The operation was authorised by UNSCR 1778 (2007) and launched 
on 28 January 2008. The mandate authorised an operation of one years 
duration from the date upon which it reached Initial Operating Capability 
(IOC). It reached IOC in March and Full Operating Capability (FOC) in 
September 2008. The fully deployed force involved approximately 3,400 
troops from 25 European states, 19 of which have personnel present on the 
ground. The deployment comprises Rear Headquarters at NDjamena, Force 
Headquarters at Abeche and three multinational battalions stationed in the 
eastern parts of Chad at Iriba (north), Forchana (centre) and Goz Beïda (south), 
with a detachment at Birao (CAR) (Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP 
15/10/2007; Council of the EU, 2009g). 
 
EUFOR Chad/CAR was a bridging operation intended to support the civilian 
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad 
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(MINURCAT), while the UN prepared a military component to MINURCAT. 
EUFOR Chad/CAR was as such one component of a wider integrated 
international plan to handle the regional ramifications of the Darfur conflict. 
The operation was also just one aspect of a broader EUs comprehensive 
approach towards the region. The mandated purpose of the EUFOR operation 
was to contribute to the improvement of security in eastern Chad and north 
eastern CAR. EUFOR Chad/CAR had three key objectives: (1) protect 
civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons; (2) facilitate 
delivery of humanitarian aid and free movement of humanitarian personnel by 
helping to improve security in the area of operations and (3) contribute to 
protecting UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, whilst also 
ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its own staff (Council of the 
EU, 2009g; Hadden, 2009, pp.5-21). 
There were minor initial delays to the deployment of the EUFOR Chad/CAR 
entry force due to resource shortfalls and to instabilities in the Chadian capital 
at the time of the scheduled deployment (Earley, 2008; Ehrhart, 2008). Once 
the boots were on the ground the EUFOR CHAD/CAR force was the largest, 
most multinational military operation that the Union has so far launched in 
Africa. It was undertaken in a vast, remote and inhospitable area of operations 
and its deployment alone represented an unprecedented logistical challenge for 
the EU. The construction of the operational infrastructure from brown-field 
sites to finished camps involved a massive building effort. EUFOR completed 
six camps of up to 2000 people capacity and undertook major work on 
Ndjamena and Abeche airports to facilitate the deployment and the 
sustainability of the operation. Assembling the force and deploying it was an 
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equally great challenge for the Union. In terms of its logistics the operation 
required nine major sea moves; 1,500 containers; 540 strategic flights; 150 
convoys of over 2000 km and 365 aviation flights (Council of the EU, 2009g; 
Nash, 2008). This is important for this analysis, because considering the 
delicate security situation, the vast area of operations, the logistical 
circumstances on the ground and the Unions relative inexperience in the field, 
this deployment represented a great challenge, and upon its completion, a great 
achievement for the EU. Once the bases had been constructed, the airports 
developed and the troops and equipment had arrived safely in the field, 
operational tasks included reconnaissance operations and long range patrols to 
familiarise troops with security conditions on the ground; humanitarian tasks 
and the establishment of a robust military presence in order to deter the 
persecution of refugees and IDPs in the area of operations (Earley, 2008). The 
operation temporarily alleviated aspects of the humanitarian crisis and civilians 
in its area of operations felt safer as a result (Oxfam, 2008).  
 
The EUFOR presence, its regular patrolling and targeted operations had a 
significant deterrence effect, which helped increase the security in its areas of 
operations throughout the operation. Mattelaer (2008, p.27) has explained this 
deterrence effect in the following way: 
 
(EUFOR) was provided by the UN Security Council with a Chapter VII 
mandate and correspondingly robust rules of engagement. Together with the 
mandate (…) the firepower of EUFOR’s modern weapons systems functions as 
a guarantee that the situation will not escalate into violence – simply because 
 114
it is clear who will win the battle. Events on the ground seem to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of the threat. On one particular occasion, for example, a 
EUFOR patrol cornered an armed group that had stolen humanitarian aid 
supplies. Rather than risking confrontation, the goods were returned by the 
robbers with complementary apologies. On the ground the deterrence relies on 
the simple presence of EUFOR.  
 
In this way EUFOR helped to protect civilians and facilitate the delivery of 
humanitarian aid in the time and space that the EU troops were operating. 
EUFORs achievements in this regard, although limited, were successful from 
an internal goal achievement perspective. In terms of its objectives to protect 
the UN presence and to ensure the security and freedom of movement also of 
its own EUFOR staff, the operation was also successful. However due to 
significant delays in the deployment of the UN components of the 
MINURCAT mission, it took months before EUFOR could provide the UN 
with protection let alone assistance, as the UN was simply not there. 
Nevertheless by the time EUFOR left, neither MINURCAT nor the EU had 
sustained any loss of life in eastern Chad or north-eastern CAR despite regular 
attacks on international actors in the region (Ehrhart, 2008; Oxfam, 2008; Pop, 
2009). Overall the operation was thus successful in its internal goal attainment. 
This is illustrated in table 3.9 below.  
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Table 3.9 Internal goal attainment: EUFOR Chad/CAR 
 Success Partial success Failure 
To protect 
civilians in 
danger, 
particularly 
refugees and 
displaced persons 
 
X 
 
  
To facilitate 
delivery of 
humanitarian aid 
and free 
movement of 
humanitarian 
personnel by 
helping to 
improve security 
in the area of 
operations 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
To contribute to 
protecting UN 
personnel, 
facilities, 
installations and 
equipment  
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of its implementation EUFOR Chad/CAR has a mixed record. The 
initial delays to the deployment hindered a timely execution of the mission 
mandate in the first half of operation. EUFOR Chad RCA was launched on 28 
January 2008. It reached Initial Operating Capability on 15 March 2008, but it 
did not reach Full Operating Capability until halfway through its mandate on 
15 September 2008. The operation, which was initially intended to total 4,000 
troops, had significant problems in acquiring the necessary troops and 
equipment from the EU member states. France, which was the main instigator 
of the operation, eventually announced that it would fill the gaps and supply 
the outstanding troops and logistical requirements.  
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Once the necessary capabilities (troops and equipment) were made available 
and the force was fully deployed, EUFOR Chad/CAR was both efficient and 
effective in achieving its objectives in the field. From a political-strategic 
perspective the operation had significant added value for the EU. It enhanced 
the operational experience of the ESDP and it was another autonomous 
operation in Africa conducted without the help or support of NATO or the US. 
As such it enhanced the Unions role as a military actor in international conflict 
management. Rye Olsen (2009) has argued that some member states saw the 
operation as an opportunity to increase the EUs image as an ethical and 
humanitarian actor willing and able to do something about Darfur. Finally it 
increased the EUs involvement and influence not only in the region, but also 
in Africa (Mattelaer, 2008; Rye Olsen, 2009). This all added to the internal 
value of the operational achievements to EU and supports the overall 
assessment that the operation constituted a success in terms of its internal goal 
attainment and its internal cost-effectiveness. With regard to the internal 
appropriateness of the operations implementation, however, it was only 
partially successful due to the delays in the deployment and the limited 
capability of the operation in the field during the first half of the mandate. 
Furthermore the internal appropriateness of the operation was compromised 
when two EUFOR Chad/CAR soldiers accidentally crossed into Sudanese 
territory and came under fire. One was killed and the other wounded (BBC, 
2008; EUFOR Chad/CAR, 2008a; Pineau, 2008). As a whole therefore the 
operation was only a partial internal success.  
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Table 3.10 Internal appropriateness: EUFOR Chad/CAR 
 Success Partial success Failure 
 
Timeliness 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
Efficiency 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
Effectiveness 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion and key findings 
This chapter examined the internal success of the five ESDP military conflict 
management operations undertaken between March 2003 and March 2009. In 
each case, the chapter gave a short overview of the context in which the 
operation was launched. It introduced the operational purpose and identified 
the key operational objectives of each operation. The chapter then evaluated 
the internal success of each operation according to the definition and criteria 
for internal success (internal goal attainment and internal appropriateness), 
which were developed in chapter two of the thesis. The research findings with 
regard to each operation are illustrated in table 3.11 below.  
 
Table 3.11: Internal success in ESDP military conflict management operations 
 Internal goal 
attainment 
Internal 
appropriateness 
Operation Concordia Success Partial success 
Operation Artemis Success Partial success 
Operation Althea Preliminary success Preliminary success 
EUFOR DR Congo Success Partial success 
EUFOR Chad/CAR Success Partial success 
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The chapter can conclude that from an internal EU perspective the five 
operations have been relatively successful. There were no overall failures. The 
operations all successfully completed their mandated purpose and achieved 
their main operational objectives (internal goal attainment). The partial 
successes in the internal appropriateness of the operations were mainly due to 
initial difficulties in force generation and decision-making at the political level 
in the EU, which in turn caused delayed deployments and some operational 
constraints in the field. In Operations Concordia and Artemis there were 
isolated incidents of misconduct by individual soldiers. But overall the 
operations have been more successful than not from an internal EU 
perspective.  
 
In conclusion, ESDP military conflict management has been a relative internal 
success so far. With regard to the emerging ESDP approach to military conflict 
management this chapter also illustrated how the five operations each had an 
added political-strategic value for the Union. In terms of the development of 
the ESDP each operation presented a new challenge and upon its achievement 
a success for the Union. The chapter found that all five cases have enhanced 
the Unions operational experience in terms of the military ESDP, providing it 
with important lessons for the future. Furthermore the operations have been a 
vehicle for the EU to prove that it is now capable of conducting operations both 
in cooperation with NATO and with the UN; within the Berlin Plus or 
autonomously through Europeanised national headquarters. The operations 
have all helped enhance the Unions role, although this is still limited, both as a 
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military actor and a conflict manager in the international security arena. This is 
illustrated in table 3.12 below. 
 
Table 3.12: New challenges in ESDP military conflict management operations 
Operation New challenge 
Operation Concordia, Macedonia 
31 March 2003-15 December 2003 
First EU military operation; first test 
of the military aspects of the ESDP; 
first test of Berlin Plus; first take over 
from a NATO operation 
Operation Artemis, DRC 
12 June 2003  1 September 2003 
First operation outside Europe; first 
mid-crisis deployment; first 
autonomous operation; first bridging 
operation in support of a UN mission 
EUFOR Althea, BiH 
2 December 2004  ongoing 
 
Largest operation, longest operation 
EUFOR DR Congo  
12 June 2006-30 November 2006 
 
First test of the Rapid Reaction 
Capability used to launch operation 
EUFOR Chad/CAR 
28 January 2008  15 March 2009 
Biggest logistical challenge; first 
operation launched in several 
countries 
  
 
The operations contributed to the Unions comprehensive approach towards the 
conflicts, countries and regions in question. The ESDP operations increased not 
only the Unions engagement, but also its influence beyond its borders. The 
successful internal goal attainment of the five ESDP military conflict 
management operations has thus had an added political and strategic value for 
the Union in addition to the tactical achievements and operational importance 
of this internal success. In terms of internal appropriateness the internal success 
was not quite as stellar, although overall the Union performed relatively well 
here too. Part two of the thesis will investigate the conditions, which enabled 
(and at times limited) this internal success, but first the next chapter will take a 
closer look at the external success of these operations. 
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Chapter four: Evaluating the external success  
The previous chapter evaluated the internal success of ESDP military conflict 
management operations from March 2003 and March 2009. It concluded that 
from an internal EU perspective the five operations have been relatively 
successful. The operations all successfully achieved their mandated purpose 
and core objectives (internal goal attainment), although in terms of their 
implementation most operations were only partially successful (internal 
appropriateness). In order to assess the overall success of these operations this 
thesis contends that the evaluation must include also an assessment of their 
external success. That is what this chapter sets out to do. According to the 
theoretical framework developed in chapter two the evaluation of external 
success must reflect the overall purpose of this kind of operation (to manage 
the violent aspect of the conflict) and include a judgement on the way in which 
this purpose was enforced. To this end, the thesis developed two criteria for 
external success: (1) external goal attainment and (2) external appropriateness. 
The following evaluation of external success in ESDP military conflict 
management operations is structured around these two criteria.  
 
The external goal attainment criterion assesses whether each operation 
successfully helped to manage the violent aspect of the conflict. Its success can 
be evaluated according to whether (a) continuation, (b) diffusion, (c) escalation 
and (d) intensification of the violent conflict were prevented. Table 4.1 
illustrates these four indicators for success in external goal attainment. 
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Table 4.1: Success in external goal attainment  
Success 
criteria 
Success Not success 
External goal 
attainment 
Continuation, diffusion, 
escalation and intensification 
of violence is prevented 
Continuation, diffusion, 
escalation or intensification 
of violence is not prevented 
 
 
Due to the limited timeframe in which ESDP military conflict management 
operations have been undertaken so far, this thesis focuses on the short-term 
success of these operations. The evaluation of external goal attainment is 
focused on an assessment of the conflict situation in the period in which each 
operation was deployed. In order to assess the contribution of each operation to 
the management of the conflict as a whole the external goal attainment is 
contextualised in the wider international and EU effort in the country. This 
assessment takes into account the status of each of the conflicts at the end of 
the timeframe examined in this thesis; namely, March 2009. In this way, the 
chapter can assess the contribution of the operation to the wider EU approach 
and the broader international effort to manage the conflict in question. This is 
important because none of the ESDP military conflict management operations 
have so far been an isolated attempt at managing a conflict. They have all been 
part of a wider EU and international effort to manage (and ultimately settle) 
these conflicts. It is important not to evaluate these operations as if they 
occurred in a vacuum. The evaluation must reflect the reality and evaluate each 
operation in the light of this wider context. Therefore, the external goal 
attainment criterion examines to what extent each operation made a successful 
contribution to these wider efforts. 
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The external appropriateness criterion evaluates each operation according to 
the Just War principles governing the appropriate use of force; namely, 
discrimination and proportionality. It assesses, in the cases where the EU 
troops used force, whether this was done in an appropriate manner. The 
external appropriateness evaluates (a) whether the operation did more good 
than harm (proportionality) and (b) whether in its application of force the 
operation distinguished between combatants and non-combatants 
(discrimination). The table below sums up the two key aspects of external 
appropriateness. 
 
Table 4.2: Success in external appropriateness 
Success criteria Successful Not successful 
External 
appropriateness 
The use of force in the 
operation was appropriate 
according to the principles 
of proportionality and 
discrimination  
The use of force in the 
operation was not 
appropriate according to the 
principles of proportionality 
and discrimination 
 
 
In this chapter the operations are assessed region by region rather than in a 
chronological order. This is done to incorporate the regional dimension of the 
conflicts and their management into the evaluation. All the conflicts, in which 
the EU has so far undertaken ESDP military conflict management operations, 
have been part of wider regional conflict formations. The conflicts in 
Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were both part of the dissolution process 
of the former Yugoslavia, which engulfed the Western Balkan region in a 
decade of inter-linked violent conflicts from 1991 to 2001. The conflicts in the 
DRC are at the heart of a wider conflict context in the Great Lakes region of 
Africa, and the conflict in the tri-border area between Sudan, Chad and CAR is 
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at the centre of a regional conflict formation in central Africa (Berg, 2008; 
Glenny, 2001; Prunier, 2009; Flint & de Waal, 2008). This is not to ignore or 
down-play the sub-state and state-level conflicts in these countries, but simply 
to take into account that each of these conflicts have a regional dimension, 
which in turn has been mirrored in the regional approach that the EU and the 
wider international community has increasingly taken towards their 
management. A regionally structured assessment of the operations will allow 
the analysis to examine this regional dimension.  
 
The chapter contextualises each operation with regard to the status of the 
conflict in question in March 2009. It evaluates the external goal attainment 
according to the continuation, diffusion, escalation and intensification of 
violence (indicators of success in external goal attainment). This is 
complimented by an assessment of the extent to which the implementation of 
the operation was proportional and discriminatory (indicators of success in 
external appropriateness). The conclusion summarises the extent to which the 
five operations have been externally successful and relates this to the findings 
regarding internal success in the previous chapter. The purpose of this 
undertaking is to examine whether the operations have been successful overall. 
Based on this evaluation the second part of the thesis goes on to examine the 
conditions under which ESDP military conflict management operations can be 
successful.   
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Operation Concordia in Macedonia 
Operation Concordia, which was undertaken in Macedonia from March to 
December 2003, was an internal success. It fulfilled its mandate to further 
contribute to a stable and secure environment, which would allow the 
Macedonian government to implement the Framework Agreement, in an 
overall internally successful manner. With the exception of relatively minor 
security incidents the country remained stable and secure throughout the 
deployment. The absence of sustained violent conflict both during and after the 
operation demonstrates a great improvement in the security situation since the 
crisis in 2001. In his description of Macedonia at the time immediately after the 
withdrawal of the EUFOR troops Yusufi (2005, pp.72-73) states:  
 
Armed insurgents and secessionist movements no longer challenge Macedonia 
(...) the country passed the ‘existential test’ of its transition – now there is no 
longer any question about the prospect of its future existence.  
 
In March 2009 the security situation in Macedonia was still stable. The violent 
conflict has successfully been managed and a continuation, diffusion, 
escalation or intensification of violence has not occurred after the crisis in 
2001. The question from an external perspective on the success of the ESDP 
military conflict management operation is to what extent the positive 
development in Macedonia is attributable to Operation Concordia? Scepticism 
is often expressed with regard to the usefulness of the operation because 
Macedonia, it is argued, was already stable by the time the EU troops were 
deployed. It is often stressed how it was NATO, not the EU, which stepped in 
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militarily to manage the crisis in 2001 (Cascone, 2008). So was it NATO, 
rather than the EU, who successfully managed the Macedonian conflict?  
 
This research found that the management of the violent conflict and the 
stability of Macedonia today is the joint achievement of Macedonias political 
leadership, civil society and population (all three both ethnic Albanian and 
ethnic Macedonian), on the one hand, and the international community, on the 
other. The EU engagement (of which Operation Concordia was one aspect) 
played a crucial part in this process.  
 
Although it is all but forgotten in the ESDP literature it is important to recall 
that the effort to manage the ethnic conflict and prevent violence in Macedonia 
started long before the Ohrid Agreement and the NATO deployment in the 
country. Throughout the 1990s, a joint effort by Macedonias political forces 
representing both ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and a host of international organisations (including the 
UN, OSCE, NATO, EU and Council of Europe) together sought to address the 
conflict in the country. The hope was that they might prevent the outbreak of a 
war in Macedonia similar to those which had befallen its neighbours. From 
1992 to 1999, the UN made two preventative deployments in the country, first 
through an extension of the UNPROFOR mission and later in a separate 
UNPREDEP deployment.
21
 As the UNs military deployment in Macedonia 
                                                 
21 When UNPROFOR was established in February 1992 it was mandated to ensure 
demilitarisation of designated areas in Croatia. In April 1992, the mandate was extended to 
support the delivery of humanitarian relief, monitor no fly zones and safe areas in BiH. In 
November 1992, the mandate was extended for preventive monitoring in border areas in 
Macedonia (UN, 2009c). UNPREDEP, which followed UNPROFOR in Macedonia, was the 
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came to an abrupt end in 1999
22
, the successful management of the 2001 crisis 
cannot be attributed directly to this UN presence. However, the UN played an 
important role in securing the situation in the country and coordinating efforts 
to resolve the underlying conflict throughout the 1990s. The domestic and 
international efforts in the country in the 1990s arguably contributed indirectly 
to the 2001 crisis not deteriorating further than it did (Ludlow, 2003; Sokalski, 
2006; UN, 2009c).  
 
During the 2001 crisis, the EU and the US worked together with ethnic 
Macedonian and Albanian political leaders to reach a conflict settlement and 
prevent more violence. Together they managed to facilitate the signing of the 
Framework Agreement in 2001. Subsequently, NATO launched its first 
operation in Macedonia. NATO completed three military conflict management 
operations in the country before handing over its responsibilities to the EU 
force in March 2003 (Mace 2004; Ludlow, 2003; Robertson, 2003). In effect, 
from 2001 to 2003, NATO was indeed the key international provider of 
military security in the country. But since the Ohrid Agreement was 
successfully facilitated by the EU in cooperation with the US, the EU has taken 
the political lead of the international community in Macedonia. As a senior 
western diplomat based in Skopje at the time put it:  
 
                                                                                                                                 
UNs first and only preventative peacekeeping mission launched before the outbreak of a 
violent conflict (Sokalski, 2006). 
22 The Peoples Republic of China vetoed the extension of the UNPREDEP mandate. 
Observers linked the veto to Macedonias newly established diplomatic ties with Taiwan, 
which only weeks before the veto had severed Chinese diplomatic relations with Macedonia 
(Sokalski, 2006).  
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NATO had the muscle and the heaviest role in Macedonia, but the EU's 
political role was essential. The US played an important, but supporting role. 
It was an equal partnership and in the ensuing implementation of the Ohrid 
Agreement the EUSR in country was the primus inter pares with the American 
Ambassador supported by NATO's SCR (senior civilian representative) and 
NATO Task Force Fox commanders (Interview, senior western diplomat, 
17/07/2009). 
 
Under the joint leadership of the EUSR and EC delegation, which now share a 
joint mission in Skopje, the EU through a combination of political, financial, 
technical, military (Concordia) and police (Proxima) assistance has played a 
crucial part not only in the securitisation, but also in the stabilisation and 
normalisation of the conflict situation in the country. The EUs multifaceted 
approach towards Macedonia integrates conflict management within the wider 
European integration process in the country. The EUs integrated approach is 
framed within the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), which aims at 
eventual EU membership for the country. As a result of the SAP Macedonia is 
now officially an EU candidate country. One interview explained the integrated 
EU approach in the following way: 
 
The EU provides assistance to Macedonia based on a: the traditional 
enlargement model and b: the peace agreement, which of course is particular 
for this country. The EU profile here has, therefore, been divided between the 
EC, which deals with enlargement orientated assistance for EU approximation, 
and the EUSR, which is politically orientated on the viability of the Ohrid 
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Agreement. Recently the European Commission and the EUSR missions have 
been merged and the two institutions are now headed by one double-hatted 
Head of Mission. The merging of European Commission and EUSR offices is a 
clever strategy and has created a more integrated approach to dealing both 
with Ohrid Agreement implementation and EU integration. Coordinating the 
voices of Solana and Rehn in Macedonia in terms of policy guidelines for 
Macedonia on both EU approximation and Ohrid Framework Agreement 
implementation has definitely increased cohesion (…) The EU message is 
clearer. There is now one voice, one figure head, one office and one staff 
(Interview, Representative from European Agency for Reconstruction Skopje, 
29/01/2007). 
 
Although the US still plays an important part in support of these processes and 
the local authorities must be commended for their efforts it is the EU that has 
taken the lead in stabilising and securing the situation in Macedonia (Mace, 
2004). Several interviewees have stressed the EUs importance in this regard:  
 
The implementation process (of the Framework Agreement) would be 
devastated, if the prospect of EU membership disappeared. The prospect of EU 
membership is essential in preventing ethnic inflammation. The EU mission 
has a powerful voice here and through the weekly principals meeting we make 
sure that the other major international players are also in tune – so the 
international community here speaks with one voice (Interview. Representative 
from Office of the EUSR Skopje, 30/01/2007).   
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There are two main entities here, but it is all too often neglected to recognise 
other minorities. In such a diverse society it is unavoidable that there are so 
many diametrically different interests. So far the EU integration process has 
been the thing that unites everybody. Almost 98 per cent, I think, support EU 
membership. I think, if this promise was taken away it would be much more 
difficult to implement the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The Albanians want to 
see changes over night and feel that changes are not going fast enough. I 
would not dare to speculate, but EU membership is the main driving force of 
the decentralisation process. If this would be taken away progress would be 
much more difficult to achieve (Interview, Representative from the OSCE 
delegation Skopje, 30/01/2007).   
 
As a Macedonian citizen, I think the impact of the EU is very significant. EU 
accession is the number one priority for the public and the number one priority 
for the (political) parties. If this prospect of EU membership was taken away 
everything would slow down and the focus would be lost and the will to get 
things done would disappear (Interview, Representative from European 
Commission delegation Skopje, 30/01/2007). 
 
These quotes confirm how, although NATO had handled the military aspect of 
the 2001 crisis, the EU took the political lead in the management of the conflict 
after 2001. With the launch of Concordia, the EU took over also the military 
aspects of the conflict management process in the country. Although the 
security situation in Macedonia was more stable in 2003 than when NATO 
engaged in 2001, the security challenges it still faced must not (as it often is) be 
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underestimated. A senior western diplomat based in Skopje at the time 
described an incident, which illustrates this:  
 
(In 2003) there was a standoff in the hills above Tetovo, when relatives of 
Macedonian security forces insisted on visiting the site of a bloody ambush in 
2001, where eight Macedonian security force members were killed. The area 
was well inside an exclusively ethnic Albanian population area and the local 
ethnic Albanians rejected that they visit and were blocking the road up into the 
hills with a peaceful sit-in. The Macedonian Army was getting ready to force a 
way through the sit-in of several hundred men and boys with APCs (armoured 
personnel carriers) and soldiers. (A senior NATO Ambassador) got word of the 
impending clash, which would have resulted in bloodshed, and convinced the 
Minister of Interior and COMEUFOR to join him in attempting to mediate a 
solution. It nearly failed when a Macedonian police helicopter started circling 
above where they were talking in the midst of this large group, and someone in 
the trees near them opened fired with a machinegun. EUFOR was completely 
passive in the endeavour, which ended happily - or at least as happy as a visit 
to the site of a massacre can be for the loved ones - a few days later (Interview, 
Senior western diplomat, 30/06/2006). 
 
This quote illustrates the high tensions, which still existed in Macedonia at the 
time of the Concordia deployment and the perception among international 
representatives on the ground that the violent conflict could break out again. 
The fact that the UNSC deemed it appropriate to authorise an EU follow-up 
operation to the NATO deployment is another indicator of the security concern 
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at the time. Likewise, although Operation Concordia was only one aspect of a 
wider EU (and international) approach towards the management of the conflict 
it did play an important part here too by helping to provide a secure 
environment, in which the implementation of the Framework Agreement and 
the SAP could take place. By guaranteeing the military management of the 
conflict it facilitated its political management. This demonstrates Concordias 
importance within the EUs broader strategy of securing peace and stability in 
the country (Yusufi, 2005). In its role within the wider EU approach towards 
Macedonia and the Western Balkans, as well as in terms of its part in the 
broader international effort in the country, the operation was successful in 
facilitating the management of the conflict and contributing to the prevention 
of a continuation, diffusion, escalation and intensification of violence during 
and after its deployment. In effect, the operation was successful in its external 
goal attainment. This is illustrated in table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 External goal attainment: Operation Concordia  
Indicators of 
success 
Success Partial success Failure 
Preventing 
continuation of 
violence 
 
X 
  
Preventing 
diffusion of 
violence 
 
X 
  
Preventing 
escalation of 
violence 
 
X 
  
Preventing 
intensification of 
violence 
 
X 
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 EUFOR Concordia never applied force. As the quote above illustrates there are 
different opinions on whether it should have been more forceful in its 
approach. Doubts have also sometimes been expressed as to whether EUFOR 
would have been willing - and able - to manage the situation in the event that 
hostilities would have recommenced (ICG, 2005b; Howorth, 2007). However, 
it is important to base the evaluation of the operation on actual events rather 
than on hypothetical scenarios. The security situation did not deteriorate. 
Because the conflict did return to violence, it was clearly possible to manage 
the security situation without the application of force. Therefore, EUFORs 
choice not to apply force was a proportionate response to the situation. The EU 
force did also not indiscriminately inflict harm on any civilians 
(discrimination). Overall, the operation did more good than harm and was, 
thus, not only successful in terms of its external goal attainment, but also in its 
external appropriateness. This is illustrated in table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4 External Appropriateness: Operation Concordia 
Indicators of 
success 
Success Partial success Failure 
 
Proportionality 
 
 
X 
  
 
Discrimination 
 
 
X 
  
 
Other actors helped to make sure that the situation did not deteriorate and in 
this way added to Concordias external success. It is important to remember 
that the definition of success, which was developed in chapter two, does not 
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necessarily accredit or blame the EU alone for the success or failure of its 
operations. The second part of the thesis will return to the conditions that bring 
about success (or failure), but first this chapter will examine the external 
success of the remaining four operations.  
 
Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The second ESDP military conflict management operation in the Balkans, 
EUFOR Althea, was launched in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in December 
2004 and is still ongoing. By March 2009, the operation had performed well 
according to its mandate to contribute to a safe and secure environment; 
denying conditions for a resumption of violence; managing any residual aspect 
of the GFAP; and thereby allowing all EU and international community actors 
to carry out their responsibilities in BiH. Despite some political and operational 
challenges the operation has so far been an internal success. Throughout 
EUFORs deployment sustained violent conflict has been kept at bay and the 
return of violence remains, at worst, a threat rather than a reality. A threat, the 
seriousness of which is much disputed. What is widely agreed upon, however, 
is that the current situation in BiH is far from ideal and that it may get worse.  
 
In a joint article in October 2008 Former HR and EUSR to the country, Paddy 
Ashdown, and US Dayton negotiator, Richard Holbrooke, warned that BiH 
was in a real danger of collapse. The suspicion and fear that began the war in 
1992, they contended, had been reinvigorated. Ethnic nationalism was on the 
rise, as was support for nationalist parties at the time. Ashdown and Holbrooke 
argued that a serious deterioration of the situation could only be prevented by 
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maintaining an effective troop presence and a sustained international 
commitment in the country. Otherwise, their forecast was alarming:   
 
It is time to pay attention to Bosnia again, if we don’t want things to get very 
nasty quickly. By now we should all know the price of that (Ashdown and 
Holbrooke, 2008)      
 
Chris Patten (2009), former EU External Relations Commissioner and co-chair 
of the International Crisis Group (ICG), described the state of affairs in the 
country in March 2009 in the following terms:  
 
Tensions are high and stability is deteriorating. The Bosnian state is weak and 
its leadership is too hostile and divided to take charge…The problem is that 
none of the communities are really content with the Dayton compromise. All 
still hope to leverage international support to change Dayton to their liking. 
For the Bosniaks this means drastically reducing the autonomy of Republika 
Srpska or eliminating it all together. The Croats have not given up on creating 
a third territorial entity that they could dominate. And the Serbs still aspire to 
independence. As a result Bosnia is stuck.  
 
In his report to the Helsinki Commission Ashdown agreed with Pattens 
assessment and warned that BiH could become another Cyprus (Maher, 2009). 
Again his predictions were damning: 
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Divided, dysfunctional, a black hole, corruption heavily embedded, a space 
that we cannot afford to leave because it is too destabilising if we do, but we 
cannot push forward toward full statehood, either (…) That I think is the 
danger.  
 
It remains unclear whether the current tensions in BiH are of a purely political 
nature or whether the country is really at risk of another violent conflict. Policy 
makers and analysts disagree. But it is clear that ethno-political tensions in the 
country remain high. On 26 March 2009, the Peace Implementation Council 
(PIC) announced that the Office of the High Representative (OHR) will remain 
open and active until the deadlock is resolved. Along with the appointment of 
yet another last High Representative in March 2009 the open-ended mandates 
of both the OHR and EUFOR suggest that the PIC perceives the situation in the 
country not yet to be stable enough for the international community to 
disengage and the EU troops to leave. The PIC, which comprises 55 countries 
and agencies, has underlined that EUFOR remains crucial to the maintenance 
of a safe and secure environment in the country (PIC, 2009a, 2009b and 
2009c). A number of interviewees supported this assessment. As one former 
Balkans analyst (Interview, 07/05/2009) put it: 
 
The cost of keeping them (the EUFOR troops) in is much less than the potential 
cost of pulling them out - especially at a time when the situation is likely to 
become less stable with the eventual closure of the OHR.   
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This illustrates how Operation Althea has been (and still) is perceived to be 
playing a deterrent role in BiH. A closer look at the conflict dynamics 
throughout the deployment confirms this. Like in the Macedonian case the 
security situation in BiH had much improved since NATO initially engaged 
immediately after the signing of the peace agreement. The most important 
NATO achievements in BiH were the separation of warring factions and the 
development of a relatively stable security situation. An authoritative 
international presence, both military and political, was perceived to remain 
essential in BiH after NATOs withdrawal (ICG, 2004), although throughout 
the duration of the EUFOR mandate, the principal challengers to domestic 
security in BiH have been weapons smugglers, war criminals and extremist 
religious groups. One might be tempted to ask, therefore, whether EUFOR 
Althea was (and still is) really a conflict management operation? When this 
question was posed to a senior western diplomat, who had worked in the region 
for many years, he said: No, but it could have been!  
 
This quote illustrates precisely why EUFOR was - and still - is deployed in 
BiH. It is there in case things deteriorate. When Althea was launched it was 
widely believed to be a necessity for the national security and territorial 
integrity of BiH that the troops would provide a credible military and political 
deterrent in the country. This was a similar line of thinking as in the Concordia 
case, although in Macedonia the threat was perceived to be much less perilous. 
In BiH the political structures were fragile and not yet self-sustainable, 
partition or a return to war was perceived as real threats both by Bosnians and 
international observers (Black, 2003; Harton, 2004; ICG, 2004).   
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Nevertheless, the security situation in BiH has remained stable and the 
countrys territorial integrity has not been challenged militarily since the 
signing of the Dayton Accords. This is attributable in part to EUFORs 
presence. National events, such as the ten-year commemoration of the 
Srebrenica massacre, which divided the population and was widely perceived 
as a threat to national security, took place without major disturbances. This is 
but one indicator that EUFOR, which had the principal responsibility for 
national security and the military aspects of conflict management in the 
country, has been doing its job well. Furthermore, regional events such as the 
Kosovo declaration of independence and the dissolution of the state union of 
Serbia and Montenegro, which it was feared might provoke a deterioration of 
the security situation in BiH, did not do so. They had a significant destabilising 
effect, politically, but militarily BiH remained safe and secure (ICG, 2004; 
2008e).  
 
EUFOR is only one aspect of a mammoth effort to consolidate peace and 
security in the BiH. The EU with its efforts to promote the further European 
integration and the future EU membership of BiH provides the political 
backbone to the international engagement in the country. Like in Macedonia 
the EU has combined and made conditional its enlargement agenda on conflict 
management in BiH. EUFOR contributes to this wider EU effort by 
guaranteeing a secure environment, in which this can take place, should the 
political leadership in BiH want it to. As in Macedonia this process is framed 
within the SAP framework (Cameron, 2006; OHR, 2009). Whether Althea will 
continue to successfully manage the security aspects of this process and the 
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GFAP and prevent more violence in BiH in the future remains to be seen. So 
far there has been no resurgence of sustained violent conflict in the country 
throughout the EUFOR deployment in BiH. The operation as part of the wider 
EU and international community approach has thus far succeeded in preventing 
the continuation, diffusion, escalation and intensification of the violent conflict. 
In other words, it has until now been successful in terms of its external goal 
attainment. This is illustrated in table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5 Preliminary external goal attainment: Operation Althea 
Indicators of 
success 
Success Partial success Failure 
Preventing 
continuation of 
violence 
 
X 
  
Preventing 
diffusion of 
violence 
 
X 
  
Preventing 
escalation of 
violence 
 
X 
  
Preventing 
intensification of 
violence 
 
X 
  
 
In terms of its external appropriateness EUFOR Althea only used force on one 
occasion. As discussed in chapter three this was a shooting incident involving 
Italian EU officers in pursuit of a person indicted for war crimes. The EU 
forces came under fire and in the exchange one person was killed. Although 
some observers suggest that this incident could have been avoided, it is 
important to recognise that the EUFOR soldiers opened fire only once they 
were fired upon (Interview, senior western diplomat, 17/07/2009; Bassuener 
and Ferhatvic, 2008). The person who was killed in the confrontation was 
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firing at the EU soldiers at the time. Therefore, despite its unfortunate outcome, 
this incident does not compromise the external appropriateness of the 
operation. Althea meets the external appropriateness criterion both with regard 
to the proportion and discrimination of its use of force. It is important to stress 
that the EU troops only actively used force on this one occasion. Overall, the 
analysis can conclude that Althea has done more good than harm in BiH. This 
is illustrated in table 4.6. 
 
Table 4.6 Preliminary external appropriateness: Operation Althea 
Indicators of 
success 
Success Partial success Failure 
 
Proportionality 
 
 
X 
  
 
Discrimination 
 
 
X 
  
 
Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
Operation Artemis was undertaken in the Ituri region in north-eastern DRC 
from June to September 2003. The operation was a success in terms of its 
internal goal attainment. It achieved its stated objectives and contributed to the 
stabilisation of the security conditions and the humanitarian situation in the 
town of Bunia pending UN reinforcements. It was implemented in a timely and 
efficient manner. With the exception of an incident of torture-like behaviour by 
French troops the operation was an overall success from an internal 
perspective. From an external perspective Artemis success was rather more 
limited.  
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Between 1999 and early 2003, factional fighting in the Ituri region had killed 
an estimated 50,000 people. An additional 500,000 people had fled the district 
due to its long conflict over land, resources and power (Homan, 2007). The 
Ituri conflict was part of a wider conflict in the DRC, which at the time of the 
Artemis deployment included domestic actors in Kinshasa and Goma as well as 
regional actors, Rwanda and Uganda, who had supported and shipped weapons 
to rival factions in the DRC (Homan, 2007; Prunier, 2009). 
 
At the time of the Artemis deployment Ituri and its district capital, Bunia 
(Artemis focus of attention), were engulfed in crisis following the withdrawal 
of the Ugandan Peoples Defence Force in May 2003, subsequent to the 
Luanda Agreement between Uganda and the DRC in September 2002. 
Predominantly ethnic Lendu-militias and the Union of Congolese Patriots 
(UPC) mostly from the Hema ethnic group were both attempting to take 
control of Bunia. In search of safety thousands of civilians left their homes. 
Many of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) gathered around the airport 
and the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(MONUC)
23
 Headquarters in Bunia, where a 700-strong Uruguayan battalion 
was based. The thousands of civilians (numbers vary from 5-12,000) that had 
sought refuge outside the UN compound were kept alive by the UN and a 
handful of humanitarian workers (Homan, 2007, p.2). Tensions mounted, 
fighting continued and large-scale atrocities were inflicted upon the civilian 
population. Observers warned of the risk of another genocide in the Great 
Lakes region of Africa. The UN peacekeepers were unable to cope. Artemis 
                                                 
23 MONUC had been present in Ituri since 1999 (Homan, 2007). 
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was launched, on invitation from the UN, to temporarily relieve the Uruguayan 
battalion until a larger UN force could be put in place (Hendrickson, Strand 
and Raney, 2007; Homan, 2007).  
 
Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace (2004, p.510) described the situation in which the 
EUFOR troops were deployed in the following way:  
 
The violent chaos in Ituri includes a range of local conflicts with shifting links 
to the regional conflict. More than a dozen ethnic militias and the governments 
of Rwanda, Uganda and DRC have fought for power and control over Ituri’s 
resources. These militias are not disciplined military units but are to a large 
extent manned by child soldiers. Gross atrocities, including cannibalism, have 
been committed on a massive scale. An estimated 50,000 men, women and 
children have been killed since 1999. Alliances are highly volatile, and 
although most militias are based on ethnicity they are internally unstable. 
  
Upon its deployment Operation Artemis immediately alleviated the security 
situation in its area of operations. It regained control and prevented what was 
otherwise expected to be a serious deterioration of the security situation in 
Bunia. A common criticism of Operation Artemis is that it was too limited in 
terms of the time, scope and geographical area of operations (Homan, 2007). 
Similarly, it has been argued that Artemis restored stability in Bunia only 
temporarily; and because it did this by driving the militia out of this area rather 
than by disarming or dismantling the groups it allowed them to continue to 
operate elsewhere (Giegerich, 2008; Ladzik, 2009).  
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 Operation Artemis, like the international management of the DRC conflict 
more generally, left much to be desired in terms of security in the country. But 
the impact of the Artemis operation must not be underestimated. It is important 
to recall that over 50,000 people had been killed in Ituri since 1999 and that at 
the time of the Artemis deployment the region was in complete turmoil. No 
other international security actor was willing or able to provide even a short-
term stabilisation of the situation at the time. The impact that this operation had 
on the ground was significant both in terms of the direct limitation of killings 
and human rights abuses inflicted on civilians and indirectly as the lull in 
violence allowed access to humanitarian aid (medical assistance, food and 
drink supplies); movement for refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) 
and a recommencement of the political negotiations in Kinshasa (Howorth, 
2007, pp.231-241; Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, pp.174-198; Tull, 2009). 
These were significant achievements. The operation, therefore, despite its 
limitations, was an important contribution to the overall management of the 
violence in the DRC and the protection of civilians in Bunia.  
 
As with any military conflict management operation and in particular one as 
limited as Artemis there was a danger that the violent conflict would 
recommence after the operation terminated. The geographical, temporal and 
functional constraints of its mandate compromised the sustainability of the 
positive impact that the Artemis operation had on the Ituri conflict. Shortly 
after Artemis handed over its responsibilities to MONUC the security situation 
in Ituri deteriorated once again. Renewed massacres in Katchele on 6 October 
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2003, just a month after the EUFOR withdrawal, added to the enormous 
suffering already sustained by the population. This happened despite 
MONUCs continued peacekeeping efforts in the region. However, even with 
its reinforced mandate, MONUC had lesser capabilities in Ituri than Artemis. 
Consequently, it failed to sustain the positive momentum and prevent more 
violence in the region (Giegerich 2008). 
 
Although Artemis performed well and made significant achievements in Bunia 
throughout its deployment, the broader international strategy of securing peace 
and stability in the region, let alone the country, was only marginally and 
temporarily advanced by the EUFOR deployment (Giegerich, 2008; Homan, 
2007). Since then there has been another upsurge in violence. In November 
2008, there were several attacks against the Congolese Army (FADRC) by the 
Front de Résistance Patriotique dIturi (FRPI) in the Irumu territory. In 
December 2008, the FADRC, supported by MONUC, was able to reoccupy 
some of the villages that had been captured by the FRPI, but renewed clashes 
took place in mid-February 2009. In March 2009, the situation in Ituri 
remained volatile (UNSG, 2009).  
 
This illustrates how not even in the specific area in which the EU force was 
deployed did the operation have a sustainable impact in terms of preventing 
more violence. After the EUFOR withdrawal the violent conflict in Ituri 
continued and intensified. It did not, however, bring in new external parties to 
the conflict (escalation) or spread further geographically (diffusion) than it had 
before the EU troops were deployed. The deterioration in the security situation 
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was arguably primarily due to the limitations to Artemis mandate and 
MONUCs failure to sustain the advance after the EU operation. The ESDP 
deployment had been successful in terms of its external goal attainment during 
its deployment, but the larger international conflict management effort of 
which Artemis was part failed to prevent the continuation and intensification of 
violence beyond the withdrawal of the EU force.  
 
From an external goal attainment perspective the operation is, thus, only a 
partial success, as its achievements, although significant in the short term 
proved short-lived and unsustainable in the longer term. This is not to blame 
EU soldiers for EU decision-making in Brussels or for the actions of 
belligerent parties in the DRC, but rather to reflect that as part of the wider 
international conflict management effort Artemis did not succeed in preventing 
more violence in Bunia, in Ituri or in the DRC. In effect, it was only a partial 
success in terms of its external goal attainment. This is illustrated in table 4.7 
below. 
 
Table 4.7 External goal attainment: Operation Artemis 
Indicators of 
success 
Success Partial success Failure 
Preventing 
continuation of 
violence 
 
 
X  
Preventing 
diffusion of 
violence 
 
X 
  
Preventing 
escalation of 
violence 
 
X 
  
Preventing 
intensification of 
violence 
 
 
X  
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 With regard to its external appropriateness Operation Artemis was the first 
ESDP military conflict management operation that repeatedly came under fire. 
EU ground forces were on several occasions caught up in violent 
confrontations with local militia factions. The EU forces killed more than 20 
local militiamen during their deployment, but the armed confrontations were 
localised and of short duration (Giegerich 2008). Considering the volatile 
security situation in which the troops operated, the specificities of the situations 
in which they engaged in armed confrontations and their positive impact on the 
security situation for civilians in Bunia at the time, the use of force was 
proportionate to the challenge at hand. It was also discriminatory in the sense 
that it made the appropriate distinction between combatants and non-
combatants. Overall, the operation did more good than harm. However, former 
Swedish Artemis soldiers have accused French soldiers of using torture-like 
methods against a Congolese civilian on at least one occasion during the 
operation (Deutsche Welle, 2008). The Swedish national television, SVE 
(2008), broadcast the following account by the Swedish soldiers: 
  
In July 2003, French soldiers captured a young man in his twenties, and took 
him to the Swedish-French base (…) The man was paraded around the base 
with a snare around his neck by a French Colonel’s aide. During the 
interrogation, which continued several hours in the French section, the 
prisoner was subjected to mock drowning. The prisoner’s screams were heard 
over the entire base (…) The prisoner was bent down against the ground and 
an officer performed a mock execution by shooting his gun at the prisoner’s 
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head without a shot going off (…) The torture continued all evening until 
midnight when the prisoner with a hood over his head was loaded onto a 
French jeep and driven out of the camp. His destiny is unknown.  
 
SVT (2008) quoted one soldier saying:  
 
They said they let him go, the question is only where? If it was in the enemy 
camp then it was equivalent to a death sentence.  
 
Swedish soldiers at the time filed a complaint with the Swedish operational 
chief, who was also head of the Special Protection Group. Upon their return to 
Sweden several members of the Swedish force reported the incident to their 
superiors there too. The Swedish Armed Forces subsequently undertook an 
investigation, which concluded that torture had indeed taken place. The 
Swedish report of the incident was sent to the French Defence Department, 
which in turn undertook its own investigation and concluded that no offence 
had been committed (SVE, 2008; Interview, Researcher, 31/07/2009). An 
interviewee, who has investigated this case extensively, claims otherwise:  
 
It was an operation where one of the nations, Sweden, more or less acted as a 
chaperone for the other one, France. Mainly to gain points in the intra-EU 
defence game. Although the case in question was ‘just’ one prisoner there were 
reports of other, less brutal, incidents of violence towards prisoners and there 
was rampant racism among the French officers during the operation 
(Interview, Researcher, 31/07/2009). 
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 Academic sources make no reference to this incident, except Hadden (2009, 
p.139) who briefly dismisses the claim: No evidence of any cases of alleged 
violations by EU forces. Instead it has been suggested that Artemis was a 
French success rather than an EU success and that the French force, which 
made up the majority of the Artemis operation, was coherent, prepared and 
highly experienced in operations in Africa (Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace, 2004, 
p.516). Interviews conducted for the purpose of this research have revealed 
different perceptions with regard to these allegations. No EU or member state 
officials were willing to speak about this on the record (despite the promise of 
anonymity) or able to confirm or deny the allegations outright. Several 
interviewees claimed, often convincingly, that they had never heard of the 
incident. The German government, which did not send troops, but provided 
logistical support to the operation, could also not confirm the allegations to 
Deutsche Welle (2008). The data concerning this incident is limited. However, 
the accounts and official complaints from the Swedish soldiers, the Swedish 
Armys formal investigation and the independent report from the Swedish 
National Television all indicate that this was in fact a disproportionate and 
indiscriminate use of force against a civilian. Although the implementation of 
the operation was otherwise appropriate, the gravity of this incident justifies 
the conclusion that the operation was only a partial success in terms of its 
external appropriateness. This is illustrated in table 4.8 below.  
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Table 4.8 External appropriateness: Operation Artemis 
Indicators of 
success 
Success Partial success Failure 
 
Proportionality 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
Discrimination 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
This is a particularly important contribution to the academic debate, as this 
incident has so far been ignored in the ESDP literature. The torture of a civilian 
and the alleged mistreatment of prisoners during an otherwise successfully 
conducted operation demonstrates why it is important to include this criterion 
in the overall evaluation of success.  
 
Operation EUFOR DR Congo  
EUFOR DR Congo was undertaken in the DRC capital, Kinshasa, from June to 
November 2006. It was an internal success in the sense that it achieved its 
internally defined purpose to support the UN operation, MONUC, during the 
elections. Its delayed deployment, however, caused a partial success only in its 
internal appropriateness. From an external perspective the operation was also 
only partially successful. Although it successfully provided support to 
MONUC in Kinshasa, it contributed little to the management of the violence 
still ongoing in other parts of the country at the time.  
 
When the EU launched EUFOR DR Congo in 2006 the overall security 
situation in the country was still dire. The International Rescue Committee 
estimated that 1,200 people, half of them children, died daily as a direct or 
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indirect consequence of the conflict in the country (UNICEF, 2006). The 
security situation in the east of the country was particularly unstable. In July 
alone, while EUFOR DR Congo was being deployed in Kinshasa, 17,000 
people fled renewed fighting in Ituri. Despite the increased violence and the 
need for further international assistance in the east of the country, EUFOR DR 
Congo was not deployed there. The EU troops were confined to their area of 
operations in the capital and much of the force remained in Gabon, where the 
over-the-horizon reserve was stationed in case of a deterioration of the security 
situation in the capital during the elections. Except for relatively minor 
disturbances in Kinshasa in August 2006 the security situation there was 
comparatively stable throughout the EUFOR deployment. Although the 
operation did successfully support MONUC in the handling of these 
disturbances the achievements of the operation with regards to the peace and 
stability of the country as a whole did not constitute an external success 
(Gegout, 2007). At its beginning Haine and Giegerich (2006) warned:  The 
operation is limited, brief, risk-averse and ultimately ineffective. 
 
In its contribution towards the management of the DRC conflict operation 
EUFOR DR Congo became exactly that. It did not in any tangible way 
contribute to the prevention of more violence in the country as a whole. 
Consequently, the violence continued and intensified in the east of the country. 
In terms of its external goal attainment the operation was, therefore, only a 
partial success. This is illustrated in table 4.9.  
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Table 4.9 External goal attainment: EUFOR DR Congo 
Indicators of 
success 
Success Partial success Failure 
Preventing 
continuation of 
violence 
 
 
X  
Preventing 
diffusion of 
violence 
 
X 
  
Preventing 
escalation of 
violence 
 
X 
  
Preventing 
intensification of 
violence 
 
 
X  
 
With regard to its external appropriateness the operation was successful as it 
did not use force in its handling of any incidents in Kinshasa. This is illustrated 
in table 4.10. Although it did not do much good in terms of improving the 
conflict situation in the country it did play a deterrent role in Kinshasa. In 
effect, the operation still did less harm than good.  
 
Table 4.10 External appropriateness: Operation EUFOR DR Congo 
Indicators of 
success 
Success Partial success Failure 
 
Proportionality 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
Discrimination 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
In March 2009, the security situation in the DRC was still volatile and the 
humanitarian situation was desperate. 70 per cent of the population according 
to the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) was affected by food insecurity in the 
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country.
24
 Many refugees have repeatedly been displaced by further violence. 
The population displacements, the overcrowded conditions in the refugee 
camps and the limited access to health care caused by conflict have led to 
significant increases in illnesses such as cholera (Medicins Sans Frontieres, 
2008). Civilians remain vulnerable as a result of the recent rise in insecurity. 
Exploitation, abduction and sexual harassment of men, women and children are 
taking place on all sides of the conflict.
25
 Recent reports confirm that armed 
rebels and undisciplined members of the security services (both military and 
police) have committed grave human right abuses including arbitrary 
executions and torture. Looting is widespread and human rights defenders, 
journalists and politicians are regular victims of arbitrary arrest, harassment 
and intimidation by local authorities. Since February 2009, harassment and 
attacks on humanitarian workers by armed groups have significantly increased, 
which in turn has worsened the already dire humanitarian situation. With the 
exception of a few recent cases of prosecution of low-ranking officials, 
impunity remains the rule rather than the exception in the DRC (HRW, 2009; 
Medicins Sans Frontieres, 2008; UNSG, 2009). 
 
                                                 
24 The country was hit hard by the global economic downturn. The decline of global 
commodity prices followed by a sharp rise in DRC food prices added to the already grave 
humanitarian situation. Activities in the national mining sector have dramatically dropped, 
while the deteriorating security situation has compelled the government to allocate additional 
budgetary resources to military rather than humanitarian activities (HRW, 2009; UNSG, 2009). 
25 A recent UNSG report (2009) confirms that sexual and gender based violence is still 
widespread in the DRC. Some 1,100 rapes are currently being reported each month with an 
average of 36 rapes per day for the first three months of 2009. More than 10 per cent of the 
rape victims are under the age of ten. Reports also confirm that children are still being 
systematically recruited, voluntarily or forced, and used as child soldiers by the Forces 
Démocratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR), Front Nationaliste et Intégrationniste (FNI), 
Ugandan Lords Resistance Army (LRA) and Mayi-Mayi groups, including the Coalition des 
Patriots Résistants Congolais (PARECO). Children have also been reported present in the 
official ranks of the Armed Forces of the DRC (FADRC) and the integrated and non-integrated 
Congrés National Pour la Defénse du People (CNDP) brigades (UNSG, 2009). 
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In the last year the security situation in the country has slightly improved. In 
his most recent report on MONUC the UN Secretary-General stated that from 
November 2008 until March 2009 some progress had been made by the DRC 
government and its neighbours towards stabilising the security situation in the 
country. In December 2008, the DRC and Rwanda had announced a joint 
military plan to address the continued presence of the FDLR in eastern parts of 
the country. The agreement also introduced concrete steps to restore 
democratic relations between the two countries. In January 2009, the CNDP, 
after an internal leadership rift between Laurent Nkunda and Bosco Ntaganda 
also reached a ceasefire agreement with the DRC government. The agreement 
included provisions for CNDP participation in the operation against FDLR and 
the immediate integration of CNDP combatants into the FADRC. A few days 
later, Nkunda, who had been a long-time ally of the Rwandese government, 
was arrested in Rwanda (BBC, 2009c). Alongside the CNDP ceasefire 
PARECO also released a statement promising a cessation of hostilities. Similar 
announcements followed from other Congolese armed groups in North Kivu. 
The integration of combatants from the CNDP, PARECO and Mayi-Mayi into 
the FADRC followed. The joint DRC/Rwanda operation was not extended to 
South Kivu, where the FDLR control the Mwenga territory economically as 
well as militarily. It is also controlling the mines and collecting taxes from 
the civilian population. In the Orientale province FADRC, Uganda Peoples 
Defence Forces (UPDF) and Sudans Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) 
launched a joint operation against the Ugandan Lords Resistance Army (LRA) 
from December 2008 until March 2009. The operation was not successful in 
destroying the LRA command-and-control structures or capturing the LRA 
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leadership. The LRA has since split into groups and dispersed into the 
surrounding area including the Central African Republic and southern Sudan. 
Subsequently, LRA elements undertook brutal reprisals against the civilian 
population (UNSG, 2009). Violence is still occurring in the mineral rich 
eastern provinces and the situation remains fragile in particular in the Kivus 
and Haut Uélé (UNSG, 2009).  
 
It is clear from the present day situation that neither of the two ESDP 
operations, Artemis and EUFOR DRC, facilitated an end to violent conflict in 
the DRC. However, these two operations, unlike Operations Concordia and 
Althea in the Balkans, were not mandated, equipped or as such intended to 
operate throughout the country or indeed to manage the DRC conflict as a 
whole. Artemis and EUFOR DRC were each only a small piece in a much 
larger international conflict management puzzle. The EU forces were in the 
DRC, supporting the 17,000 strong UN mission, only for a few months at a 
time. Unlike in the Balkans, where the EU had a lead role in the international 
conflict management effort during the Concordia and Althea deployments, in 
the EU and its military conflict management operations played only a 
supporting role to the much larger UN operation in the DRC. MONUC is the 
backbone of the international attempt to manage the violent conflicts in this 
country. It is important to keep this in mind, when considering the limitations 
to the external success of the two ESDP military conflict management 
operations. With these two military operations and the civilian ESDP 
operations to assist the police and security sector reform (EUPOL and EUSEC) 
in the country, however, the EU has increased its role in the DRC.   
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EUFOR Chad/CAR 
The EU undertook its most recent ESDP military conflict management 
operation in eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR from January 2008 to March 
2009. This operation successfully achieved its mandated purpose to support the 
UNs MINURCAT mission. But the timeliness and efficiency of EUFOR was 
compromised by the delayed deployment both of its own troops and the 
civilian MINURCAT component. The EU launched EUFOR Chad/CAR under 
precarious conditions in both Chad and CAR and with the crisis in 
neighbouring Darfur threatening to make the situation even worse.  
 
From its very beginning conditions for EUFOR Chad/CAR were tough. Just 24 
hours after the operation was officially launched the deployment was 
interrupted by a major rebel offensive on Chads capital, Ndjamena. Sources 
suggest that the rebel alliance consciously decided to storm the city in 
anticipation of the EUFOR deployment (Fletcher, 2008; Interview, National 
Representative to the EU, 09/06/2009). Both EUFOR Chad/CAR and 
MINURCAT were initially delayed, but EUFOR managed to deploy its forces 
and start implementing its mission with much less of a delay than 
MINURCAT. The problems facing MINURCAT, however, directly affected 
the external success of the ESDP operation, as its success was dependent on 
effective cooperation and coordination with the UN operation. Nevertheless, 
EUFORs presence, its regular patrolling and targeted operations contributed to 
an increased sense of security in its area of operations (Oxfam, 2008). In 
December 2008, the ICG reported that there was a lull in violence in northern 
CAR, although it stressed the frailty of the situation, which it argued could 
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only be sustained by an appropriate UN takeover upon EUFORs withdrawal 
(ICG, 2008a). EUFOR had a positive, albeit limited, impact on security in 
Chad as well, but here too its achievements risked being compromised, if the 
UN follow-up mission did not successfully manage to sustain them. Some 
observers at the time suggested that MINURCAT was not up to the challenge 
(Ehrhart, 2008; ICG, 2009). After the handover a representative from the 
Council of the EU (Interview, 08/06/2009) begged to disagree:  
 
The handover went well. There is no security vacuum. The problems have been 
in terms of logistics. Of course the EU and the UN have different standards. 
But some of the European troops stayed, for example, the French contingent 
stayed in the country under a UN badge. I do not understand why people think 
there is a security vacuum, but the situation between Chad and Sudan is 
difficult. 
 
When EUFOR handed over responsibility to MINURCAT in March 2009 the 
situation in the tri-border area encompassing western Sudan (Darfur), eastern 
Chad and north-eastern CAR was still precarious. The operation, which was 
specifically mandated to protect refugees from the conflict in Darfur, withdrew 
amid rising tensions resulting from the international arrest warrant against 
Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir. Al-Bashir responded to the indictment by 
expelling thirteen western humanitarian agencies from Darfur, which in turn 
threatened the already dire humanitarian situation. UN Secretary-General Ban-
Ki-Moon and US President Obama warned that the situation in the region 
might deteriorate even further. Observers on the ground confirm that the 
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regional security situation is still precarious (Pop, 2009). It is clear from the 
current instability in the region that EUFOR Chad/CAR has not helped 
facilitate an end to violent conflict in the region. The situation in the area is far 
from secure. The situation in Chad is still one of permanent political crisis. 
President Deby is threatened and the security situation in the east of the 
country has the potential to destabilise Chad further. This in turn could have a 
negative effect on stability in the neighbouring countries and could potentially 
worsen the already severe security conditions and humanitarian crisis in the 
region (ICG, 2008b; ICG 2008c; ICG 2009b; Ladzik, 2009).  
 
Like operation Artemis in the DRC the EUFOR Chad/CAR operation did have 
some success in temporarily alleviating the violence in its area of operations 
pending the UN reinforcements (Ladzik, 2009; Mattelaer, 2008; Oxfam. 2008). 
However, unlike Artemis, which was deployed with remarkable speed, EUFOR 
Chad/CAR, had less of an impact than its mandate allowed, due to the delays in 
its own and MINURCATs deployment (Ehrhart, 2008). Moreover, the EU 
soldiers were not authorised to provide security within the camps. The 
intention was that this should be provided by Chadian police officers trained by 
MINURCAT. However, the Chadian police were not fulfilling this role 
throughout most of EUFORs deployment; in effect, a security vacuum, which 
was exploited by local bandits and militias, left refugees and IDPs in the camps 
unprotected (Mattelaer, 2006; Oxfam, 2008). As aid workers in the area were 
also increasingly threatened, humanitarian efforts were down-scaled. This 
negatively affected EUFORs ability to support the delivery of humanitarian 
aid (Ehrhart, 2008). Finally, President Debys objection to an EU deployment 
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directly on the border between Chad and Sudan limited the operations success 
in managing the regional aspect of the conflict. Consequently, the proxy war 
between Sudan and Chad continued, while the EU troops were deployed in the 
region. As the EU force was not operating in the area, where the instability was 
worst, the operation had less of an impact on the humanitarian consequences of 
conflict in these areas (Ehrhart, 2008; Ladzic, 2008). Rye Olsen (2009, p.256) 
has argued that this demonstrated that: 
 
The EU does not (and will not for the foreseeable future) have the capacity to 
manage a complex and year-long regional crisis such as the one in Darfur.  
 
It is important to recognise that this operation, like the two operations in the 
DRC, was not mandated, equipped or intended to operate throughout the whole 
territories of these three countries. It was, for example, not mandated to deploy 
to the border area between Chad and Sudan. The force was also not authorised 
to enter Sudan. When two EUFOR Chad/CAR soldiers accidentally crossed 
into Sudanese territory they immediately came under fire (BBC, 2008; EUFOR 
Chad/CAR, 2008a; Pineau, 2008). Under these conditions and with significant 
limitations to its mandate the EU force was not able to manage the violent 
conflict. In effect, the EU forces did not succeed in preventing more violence. 
In its area of operations, however, the operation did help to improve the 
situation. From this perspective the operation was, therefore, a partial success 
in its external goal attainment, as illustrated in table 4.11. 
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Table 4.11 External goal attainment: EUFOR Chad/CAR 
Indicators of 
success 
Success Partial success Failure 
Preventing 
continuation of 
violence 
 
 
X  
Preventing 
diffusion of 
violence 
 
 
X  
Preventing 
escalation of 
violence 
 
 
X  
Preventing 
intensification of 
violence 
 
 
X  
 
The EU did not decide to extend its operation, despite an invitation from the 
UNSG to do so. It did, however, offer that some of its force could stay on 
under the UN mandate. It remains to be seen, whether the UN and EU together 
have prepared for an effective MINURCAT follow-up of the EUFOR operation 
(Council of the EU, 2009g; Pop, 2009).  What is clear so far is that the EUFOR 
Chad/CAR operation was only partially successful in terms of its external goal 
attainment. Where it was deployed, once it was deployed, EUFOR did deter 
violence and significantly improved the security situation, however, the 
operations contribution to the international efforts to manage the conflict was 
limited by a lack of support from domestic, regional and international actors 
involved both in the conflict and its management. Part two of the thesis will 
examine these conditions for success in greater detail.  
 
With regard to its external appropriateness EUFOR Chad/CAR repeatedly 
came under fire and on at least three occasions it fired back. Two of these 
incidents were confrontations with local armed groups in Chad and the third 
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incident occurred when a single EUFOR land rover strayed into Sudan and came 
under fire. In Chad both attacks on EUFOR were conducted by unidentified armed 
groups. EUFOR sustained no serious casualties here and there are no reports of the 
two groups suffering any fatalities. In both incidents EUFOR opened fire only 
after they had been fired upon and on both occasions civilians were helped from 
the scene by EUFOR soldiers. There are different accounts of what happened 
when the EUFOR vehicle crossed into Sudan. Both the Sudanese authorities and 
EUFOR claim to have fired in self-defence and both have reported casualties. 
Although France has officially criticised the Sudanese army for its un-proportional 
response, the incident could have been avoided, if the troops had not strayed into 
Sudanese territory (EUFOR Chad/CAR, 2008a, 2008b and 2008c; Pineau, 
2008). Nonetheless, it is important to recognise that under the circumstances 
EUFORs use of force was both proportionate and discriminatory.  Throughout 
its deployment the operation did more good than harm. The operation was a 
success according to the indictors for external appropriateness. This is 
demonstrated in table 4.12 below.     
 
Table 4.12 External appropriateness: Operation EUFOR DR Congo 
Indicators of 
success 
Success Partial success Failure 
 
Proportionality 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
Discrimination 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion and key findings 
The violent aspect of the conflicts in Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
has been successfully managed. Violence has not continued, diffused, escalated 
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or intensified in Macedonia during or after Operation Concordia or in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina during EUFOR Althea (still ongoing). The security situation 
in both countries is now relatively stable. In the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Chad and the Central African Republic the security situations are much 
more precarious. These violent conflicts have not been successfully managed 
and after the launch of the ESDP military conflict management operations the 
violence in all three countries has continued and periodically intensified. 
According to the definition developed in chapter two, success in external goal 
attainment depends on whether the operations have contributed significantly to 
the management of the violent conflicts in which they engaged. It is clear from 
the above analysis that none of the operations have had a negative impact on 
conflict management. As such none of the operations outright failed in this 
regard. In Macedonia and BiH the EU forces acted as the primary military 
guarantors of peace during their deployments and both operations have (so far - 
in the case of Althea) succeeded in playing their part in the international effort 
to prevent more violence. In effect, they are both classified as successes in 
terms of their external goal attainment. Operation Artemis too succeeded in 
managing the localised conflict in Bunia during its deployment, but after its 
withdrawal the situation deteriorated once more. Likewise, in terms of its 
contribution to the management of the wider DRC conflict Artemis success 
was only partial. Although it provided an important relief both to civilians and 
international actors in Bunia at the time, its positive achievements proved both 
limited and unsustainable after the EU force departed. Therefore, Artemis was 
only a partial success in external goal attainment. EUFOR DR Congo 
succeeded in its supporting role to the UN mission, which prevented sustained 
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violent conflict in Kinshasa during the DRC elections. However, EUFOR DRC 
failed to make a significant contribution to the management of the wider 
conflict in the country. Its external goal attainment was, thus, only a partial 
success. Finally, EUFOR Chad/CAR made an important contribution in terms 
of improving the security situation around the refugee camps in Chad and the 
Central African Republic. But it was only partially successful in its external 
goal attainment, as its role in the management of the wider regional conflict 
was limited. All the five ESDP military conflict management deployments had 
a positive impact on the violent conflicts in the areas where they operated for 
the duration of their mandates. The degree to which they have helped prevent 
more violence has, however, varied significantly.  
 
All the operations did more good than harm. With regard to the external 
appropriateness of the operational use of force Concordia and EUFOR DRC 
did not apply force and were consequently successful in this respect. With the 
exception of the 2006 shooting incident Operation Althea did also not use 
force. Despite this unfortunate episode the operation was successful according 
to the external appropriateness criterion, because its use of force was 
proportionate and discriminatory. It did only fire when fired upon and it did not 
directly target civilians. Artemis and EUFOR Chad/CAR both repeatedly 
applied force. In EUFOR Chad/CAR this was done in an appropriate manner, 
whereas the torture case compromised Artemis external appropriateness. The 
external success of all the five operations is outlined in table 4.13.  
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Table 4.13: External success in ESDP military conflict management operations 
 External goal 
attainment 
External 
appropriateness 
Operation Concordia Success Success  
Operation Althea Preliminary success Preliminary success 
Operation Artemis Partial success Partial success 
EUFOR DR Congo Partial success Success 
EUFOR Chad/CAR Partial success Success 
 
The five operations engaged in different conflict situations in different ways. 
From the above analysis it seems that these dissimilar scenarios have affected 
the success of these operations, but it is unclear how and why. The next part of 
the thesis will carefully examine the conditions for success in ESDP military 
conflict management operations.   
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Chapter five: A theoretical discussion of conditions for success  
Part one of this thesis evaluated the success of the ESDP military conflict 
management operations undertaken from 2003 to 2009. It found that the five 
operations vary significantly with regard to their success. The findings above 
indicate that the success of an ESDP military conflict management operation is 
related to the context in which the operation occurs. Why and how exactly this 
is the case is not yet clear. The second part of the thesis will examine this in 
greater detail, as it seeks to answer the central research question: under which 
conditions can ESDP military conflict management operations be successful?  
 
Before initiating the analysis, it is necessary to present a few words of caution. 
The analytical focus of this thesis is on the conditions that determine success in 
ESDP military conflict management operations. This must not be confused 
with the conditions for success of the overall EU policy towards the countries 
in question or the successful settlement of the conflicts, in which these 
operations engage. Furthermore, the research question concerns the conditions 
that are necessary for operations to be able to succeed, rather than conditions, 
which are simply conducive to success. The research question is explored from 
a strategic rather than a tactical perspective, as this will allow for a comparative 
analysis of the conditions that are necessary for any ESDP military conflict 
management operation to be able to succeed.  
 
This chapter develops the theoretical framework for the empirical analysis of 
the conditions for success, which follows in the next two chapters. This chapter 
introduces a set of theoretically grounded research hypotheses regarding the 
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conditions for success. The hypotheses are based on the theoretical assumption 
and the preliminary empirical finding in part one, which suggests that the 
success of an ESDP military conflict management operation is conditioned by 
the context in which it occurs. The chapter contends that there are two different 
dimensions to this context: the internal dimension and the external dimension. 
The internal dimension is the EU-specific context, in which the operation is 
undertaken. It is made up of EU member states and EU institutions. The 
external dimension is the conflict-specific context, in which an operation takes 
place. This encompasses domestic, regional and international actors, which are 
actively involved in the conflict and its management. The two contextual 
dimensions are illustrated in table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1: Contextual dimensions of ESDP military conflict management  
Internal context  External context 
EU-specific context:  EU member 
states and EU institutions  
Conflict-specific context: domestic, 
regional and international actors  
 
This chapter hypothesises that if an ESDP military conflict management 
operation cannot secure sufficient support then it cannot succeed. It suggests 
that for an operation to succeed it is necessary that it secures support both (a) 
from the key actors inside the EU, which are involved in the operation and (b) 
from the key actors outside the EU that are involved in the conflict and its 
management.  
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Levels of analysis  
The context in which an ESDP military conflict management operation occurs 
is complex. As mentioned above it has two different dimensions: an internal 
dimension and an external dimension. Each of these contextual dimensions is 
made up of different actors. The internal dimension comprises the key actors at 
the EU level, which are involved in the ESDP military conflict management 
operation. These are primarily EU member states and EU institutions. The 
external dimension is divided into three levels: (a) the domestic, (b) the 
regional and (c) the international level. At each of the three external levels 
there are different actors, who are expected to affect the success of an ESDP 
military conflict management operation. The key actors at each of these levels 
of the analysis are outlined in tables 5.2 and 5.3 below.   
 
Table 5.2: Internal dimension: the EU level  
Level of analysis Key actors 
EU level EU member states and  
EU institutions 
 
Table 5.3: External dimension: the domestic, regional and international levels 
Levels of analysis Key actors 
Domestic level Domestic actors involved in the 
conflict and its management  
(sub-state and state level): state, 
army and irregular armed groups  
Regional level Regional actors involved in the 
conflict and its management: states, 
armies, irregular armed groups and 
regional security organisations  
International level International actors involved in the 
conflict and its management: states 
and international security 
organisations  
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In order to examine if and how actors at the different contextual levels affect 
success the thesis applies a levels-of-analysis approach. This is traditionally an 
International Relations approach. It has typically been used to explain the 
foreign policy behaviour of states and its international outcomes (Levy, 2001). 
The levels-of-analysis framework was first systematised by Waltz (1959), who 
argued that causes of war could be examined and explained at the level of the 
individual, the nation-state and the international system. Singer (1961) has also 
stressed the significance of different levels of analysis in the study of 
international relations. He focused on the system (international) and the unit 
(national) level and argued that scholars must choose to apply either one or the 
other in their study of international relations. He accepted that it may be 
possible to combine the two, but did not explore this option in any further 
detail. Levy (2001, p.4) has argued that in the study of interstate and intrastate 
war: 
 
It is logically possible and in fact usually desirable to combine causal 
variables for different levels of analysis, because whether war and peace occur 
is usually determined by multiple variables operating at more than one level of 
analysis.  
 
Cordell and Wolff (forthcoming, p.10) support this point and contend that:  
 
Despite the traditional focus on states and their relations with one another 
there is nothing inherently prohibitive in the levels-of-analysis approach to 
extend its application to non-state actors and structures and issues that fall 
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somewhere outside the actor and structure dichotomy yet remain important 
independent variables when accounting for the causes of ethnic conflicts and 
for success and failure of specific policies adopted to prevent, manage or settle 
them. 
 
This thesis endorses this argument and applies the levels-of-analysis approach 
to the study of conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management 
operations. The analytical framework developed here comprises one internal 
level (EU) and three external levels of analysis (domestic, regional and 
international). These four levels of analysis reflect the complex context in 
which ESDP military conflict management operations are undertaken and 
allow for a systematic analysis of the conditions for success that exist at each 
of the levels. This distinction between the levels of analysis is not to suggest 
that the levels are empirically isolated. On the contrary, the thesis argues that 
the levels of analysis are inherently linked through processes such as conflict 
diffusion and escalation. By way of example, an internal conflict can become a 
regional conflict or vice versa either of which will usually have international 
ramifications. Another example of how the different levels of analysis may 
overlap is in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the highest authority in the 
domestic context is in fact international, because the Office of the High 
Representative representing the international Peace Implementation Council 
has effectively run the country since the 1995 Dayton Agreement (Chandler, 
2000). Complexities like these complicate an analysis of this nature, but they 
do not hinder it, as long as they are recognised and taken into consideration. 
The levels-of-analysis approach is a useful analytical tool in this regard. The 
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following two chapters will examine the conditions for success at each level in 
more detail, but first it is necessary to take a closer look at the question of 
structure and agency in this realm. 
 
Structure and agency 
As outlined in chapter one Brown (1996) explained the violent aspect of 
conflicts through a framework of permissive conditions and proximate causes. 
Permissive conditions are the underlying factors that make some conflicts more 
likely to turn violent. Proximate causes are the catalytic factors, which cause 
violence-prone conflict situations to actually turn violent. This thesis posits that 
Browns framework for understanding why and how conflicts turn violent can 
also be used to explain the dynamics of a conflict once it has turned violent. It 
suggests that there are permissive conditions that make more violence likely 
and that there are proximate causes that make continuation, diffusion, 
escalation or intensification of violence happen. This is not to suggest that the 
specific factors that cause a given conflict to turn violent are necessarily the 
same factors that cause it to remain or become more violent. But there is a 
common denominator between the two in the importance of agency. With 
regard to proximate causes Brown (1996, p.23) argues that: 
 
Most major conflicts are triggered by internal, elite-level activities – to put it 
simply, bad leaders (…) Elite decisions and actions are usually the catalysts 
that turn potentially volatile situations into violent confrontations (…) External 
forces are occasionally the proximate causes of internal conflicts, but the 
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discrete actions of some neighbouring states – bad neighbours – are more 
important than mysterious, mass-level ‘contagion’ or ‘diffusion effects’. 
 
In other words, proximate causes of violent conflict are specific actions 
undertaken by often identifiable actors (agency), whereas permissive 
conditions are the underlying structures of a conflict. Conflict prevention and 
conflict settlement aim to address the underlying permissive conditions of a 
conflict. Conflict management by definition seeks to prevent more violence. To 
this end, it must address a conflicts proximate causes. Because conflict 
management focuses on the proximate causes of conflict and because 
proximate causes are specific actions by key actors in the conflict it is logical 
for this analysis to focus on agency rather than structure. This is not to suggest 
that structures are insignificant for the development of violent conflicts, but 
rather to emphasise that it is primarily the actions of specific actors that cause a 
conflict to turn more (or less) violent (Brown 1996; Lake and Rothchild, 1998; 
Wolff, 2006).  
 
Every conflict in which the EU has launched an ESDP military conflict 
management operation has had a complex constellation of actors involved  
directly and indirectly  in the conflict and its regulation. Were all these actors 
to be included in this analysis, its thematic focus and comparative nature could 
easily be lost in the detail of their description. For the purpose of analytical 
clarity only the key actors, which are directly involved in each violent conflict 
and its management are included in the analysis. This focus is justified, 
because these are the actors, which are expected to determine success in ESDP 
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military conflict management operations. The analysis, thus, leaves out other 
actors, for example, with trade links (legal or illegal) to belligerent parties. This 
is not to say that actors such as these are not significant to the successful 
settlement of the conflict, but the analytical focus here is on ESDP military 
conflict management operations and the key actors and actions that are 
expected to condition their success. The following section examines what the 
existing literature on the ESDP, international peacekeeping and conflict 
management reveal with regard to the conditions for success in ESDP military 
conflict management operations. Reflecting the two contextual dimensions, the 
conditions for success will be examined first from an internal and then from an 
external perspective.   
 
Internal conditions for success 
The internal dimension of the context in which an ESDP military conflict 
management operation is undertaken consists of a variety of different actors. 
The key actors involved in these operations are member states and institutions 
of the EU. It is important to include both the member states and institutions at 
this level of the analysis, because together they determine the EU support for 
an operation, which, as the following will explain, is expected to affect the 
operations success. 
 
It is important to underscore that this thesis examines the conditions for success 
in the undertaking of ESDP military conflict management operations. That is 
the period from the official launch to the formal completion of an operation. 
Because this thesis focuses on the deployment in the field rather than the 
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decision-making and planning procedures leading to it, these are not described 
in great detail in the following; although, naturally, they have informed the 
analysis. The ESDP decision-making structures and planning procedures have 
been covered extensively in the literature (Howorth, 2007; Keukeleire and 
MacNaughtan, 2008; Mattelaer, 2008). An overview of the EUs institutional 
structure for decision-making regarding ESDP military conflict management 
operations is provided in figure 5.4 and an example of the planning process for 
such an operation is illustrated in figure 5.5.  
 
Figure 5.4: EU institutional structure for ESDP military conflict management  
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(Wolff and Rodt, 2008, p. 141) 
 
Figure 5.5: Planning and preparation process for EUFOR Chad/CAR  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 May 2007 France suggests an initiative for Chad 
13 July 2007 Joint Council/Commission Options Paper 
23 July 2007 GAERC gives planning authority to the Council Secretariat 
27 July 2007 PSC issues Crisis Management Concept task 
3 Sept 2007  Operation HQ pre-activated 
10 Sept 2007 PSC approves Crisis Management Concept and gives planning 
authority to Mont Valerien Operation HQ 
12 Sept 2007 Council approves Crisis Management Concept:  
Military Strategic Option released 
24 Sept 2007 Indicative force generation conference: draft mission analysis brief 
reviewed 
25 Sept 2007 UNSCR 1778 
4 Oct 2007 Military Strategic Option 3 adopted 
15 Oct 2007 Council issues Joint Action: Operation Commander arrives in 
Operation HQ 
23 Oct 2007  Initiating Military Directives issued by EUMC 
8 Nov 2007 PSC adopts Concept of Operations 
9 Nov 2007 1st force generation conference 
12 Nov 2007 Council adopts Concept of Operations 
14 Jan 2008 Operation Commander presents draft Operation Plan  
18 Jan 2008 Revised Operation Plan released 
28 Jan 2008  Council accepts Operation Plan and launches operation 
1-4 Feb 2008 Rebel coalition launches attack on Ndjamena 
12 Feb 2008 EUFOR deployment restarts 
15 Mar 2008 EUFOR reaches Initial Operating Capability 
17 Sept 2008 EUFOR reaches Full Operating Capability 
15 Mar 2009 Operation formally completed 
(Mattelaer, 2008, p.14) 
 
This section of the thesis explores the internal EU-level context in which ESDP 
military conflict management operations are undertaken and examines how this 
might affect success in the field. The key actors within the EU, which are 
expected to affect the success of an ESDP military conflict management 
operation, are those actors that are actively involved in the operation. That is 
the contributing member states to the operation and the ESDP institutions, 
which support it. An example outlining the key actors involved the 
implementation of EUFOR Chad/CAR is provided in figure 5.6.  
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Figure 5.6: Key actors involved in implementing EUFOR Chad/CAR 
 
 
Council of the European Union 
 
Political and Security Committee (Political-strategic level) 
 
Operational Commander (Military-strategic level) 
Operational Headquarters: Mount Valerien (France) 
22 member states present  
 
Force Commander (Operational level) 
Force Headquarters: Chad/Central African Republic (Joint Area of Operation) 
 
Component Commanders (Tactical level) 
3,400 troops 
19 states represented in the field 
(Council of the EU, 2009a; Hadden, 2009, p.83) 
 
Because of its intergovernmental nature EU member states play a particularly 
important role in the ESDP. The member states have not only a decisive part in 
ESDP decision-making, but also in the undertaking of the ESDP military 
conflict management operations. At the political-strategic level the member 
states are the dominant players in the Council, the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) and the EU Military Committee (EUMC). Moreover, most of 
the financial and practical burden of supplying the operations rests with 
participating member states (and non-EU contributing countries), as does much 
of the responsibility at the operational level, where staff from the contributing 
member states, and framework nations in particular, have an important role to 
play. At the tactical level, the operations are undertaken by military staff also 
provided by the participating member states (and non-EU contributing nations) 
(Giegerich, 2008; Hadden, 2009; Howorth, 2007). In effect, the EU support 
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allocated to a given operation depends in large part on the interests and 
resources of the Unions member states.  
 
In the undertaking of the operations the contributing member states are 
supported by ESDP institutions and staff within the Council (Howorth, 2007, 
pp. 61-91; Rye Olsen, 2009, p.248-249). Like the member states these 
institutions are expected to affect success in these operations. In a discussion 
regarding the internal conditions for their success it is crucial not to 
underestimate the role of EU institutions. These increasingly have their own 
interests and resources and can contribute significant support to ESDP military 
conflict management operations. With regard to role of the institutions in EU 
conflict management efforts Rye Olsen (2009, p.248) has argued that: 
 
Not only do decision-makers and states have interests and preferences, so also 
do common European institutions (…) institutions are important when it comes 
to establishing a conflict management policy, giving decisions political clout, 
but also producing challenges for coordinating EU crisis management policies. 
 
The role of individual member states and institutions varies in each operation. 
This will be explored in the empirical analysis. However, the purpose of this 
thesis is not to investigate the divisions of power, influence and labour within 
the ESDP, nor is it to judge the underlying motivations for different national or 
institutional involvements. The thesis concentrates on the conditions, which are 
necessary for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. In this 
context both member states and institutions are important. It is critical to make 
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a distinction between the role of EU member states and EU institutions in their 
capacity within a specific ESDP military conflict management operation and 
other activities that they might be involved in (outside of the operation) in the 
country in question. EU member states and institutions are usually otherwise 
engaged in countries, where ESDP military conflict management operations are 
undertaken. By way of example, the Council has launched civilian ESDP 
operations in Macedonia, BiH and DRC alongside its military conflict 
management operations; and France has been active militarily, outside the 
ESDP military conflict management operations, in the DRC.  
 
Having established who, internally in the EU, may affect the success of an 
ESDP military conflict management operation, it is important to examine how 
they may condition success. Hill (1993) in his influential article on the EUs 
capability-expectations gap argued that what the Union can achieve 
internationally depends on the capabilities it has at its disposal. Biscop (2004) 
has similarly suggested that what the EU can achieve militarily depends on 
both its will and its ability in this regard. Gordon, Rodt and Wolff (2008) posit 
that the EUs achievements in conflict management also depend on the 
capabilities and the political will that it demonstrates in these endeavours. 
Together these three arguments suggest that an ESDP military conflict 
management can only succeed, if it has sufficient support at the EU level both 
in terms of EU commitment and EU capabilities.  
 
What constitutes sufficient EU support naturally depends on the task at hand. 
However, it has been suggested that there are three categories of capabilities 
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that the EU must possess in order to succeed in conflict management; namely, 
(1) capabilities to act, (2) capabilities to fund and (3) capabilities to cooperate 
and coordinate (Gordon, Wolff, Rodt, 2008). The three categories of 
capabilities are illustrated in figure 5.7 below.  
 
Figure 5.7 EU conflict management capabilities 
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(Gordon, Rodt and Wolff, 2008, p.7) 
 
 
As these three categories refer to the necessary capabilities for both civilian 
and military conflict management, only certain aspects are expected to be 
necessary conditions for success in military conflict management operations. 
The necessary capabilities to act here are (a) personnel and hardware allocated 
to the operation and (b) EU institutions and instruments backing the operation. 
The necessary capabilities to fund relate to short-term funding of the ESDP 
military conflict management operation. The capabilities to cooperate and 
coordinate refer to EU efforts to cooperate and coordinate initiatives between 
EU member states and EU institutions as well as with relevant third parties. 
Together these three categories make up the expected necessary EU 
capabilities to succeed in ESDP military conflict management operations. In 
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order to make the necessary capabilities available to a given operation, the 
thesis posits that the EU must have the commitment to do so.  
 
The above suggest that for EU commanders in the field to be able to undertake 
an ESDP military conflict management operation successfully the EU 
(encompassing its member states and institutions) must dedicate the necessary 
commitment and capabilities to support them. This assumption is pervasive in 
the ongoing debate on EU military conflict management (Giegerich, 2008; 
Howorth, 2007; ICG, 2005b; Smith, 2008). It is also implicit in the academic 
practice of evaluating ESDP military conflict management operations, which in 
large part focuses on issues of political commitment and military capabilities 
(Cascone, 2008; Mace, 2004; Gegout, 2005, 2007 and 2009; Haine and 
Giegerich, 2006; Mattelaer, 2008). Although it is often taken for granted it is 
important to carefully examine the empirical relevance of this theoretical 
assumption to confirm whether and why EU support is a necessary condition 
for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. This aspect of 
the analysis is particularly important considering that the responsibility for 
success (or failure) in ESDP military conflict management operations is usually 
allocated to the EU (Interview, former Balkan analyst, 18/09/2007 and 
07/05/2009). This thesis, therefore, introduces the following research 
hypothesis concerning the internal conditions for success: 
 
(H1): If an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure 
sufficient EU support, it cannot succeed.  
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EU support here refers to the sum of support from the member states and 
institutions of the EU to an ESDP military conflict management operation. The 
term sufficient EU support suggests that the internal actors within the EU 
together must allocate both the necessary commitment and capabilities for an 
operation to succeed: that is to achieve its goals and implement its purpose 
appropriately from both an internal and an external perspective. The following 
chapter will examine the empirical relevance of this hypothesis, but first the 
remaining part of this chapter will discuss the external conditions, which are 
expected to be necessary for an ESDP military conflict management operation 
to be able to succeed.  
 
External conditions for success 
Although they are comparatively under-emphasized in the ESDP literature this 
thesis posits that external conditions for success exist alongside the internal 
conditions. This chapter suggests that together internal and external conditions 
determine whether an ESDP military conflict management operation can be 
successful or not. This section of the thesis develops a set of research 
hypotheses regarding the external conditions for success, but first it is useful to 
have a closer look at what the external context consists of.  
 
The external context, in which ESDP military conflict management operations 
are undertaken, can be divided into three external levels of analysis. The 
distinction between the levels is useful for the analytical purpose of this thesis, 
because there are three contextual levels, outside of the EU, at which 
conditions are expected to influence success in ESDP military conflict 
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management operations. These are (1) the domestic level, (2) the regional level 
and (3) the international level. The three levels that make up the external 
context for ESDP military conflict management operations are illustrated in 
figure 5.8 below.  
 
Figure 5.8: External context of ESDP military conflict management operations 
International 
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Regional 
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Domestic 
context 
 
The following section will explain why and how each of these three levels 
represents a potential condition for success. As the relationship between the 
external context and success in conflict management operations is under-
theorised in the ESDP literature, this section takes its starting point in the 
literature on international peacekeeping, military intervention and conflict 
management.   
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The domestic level 
The first external level of analysis is the domestic level. This level 
encompasses the conflict setting in the country of engagement and the specific 
area of operations. This level includes state and sub-state actors within the 
country, in which each ESDP military conflict management operation is 
undertaken. The term domestic must not be confused with domestic conditions 
within the EU or its member states. The domestic level does also not include 
actors or actions, which originate at the other contextual levels, although these 
may have domestic-level consequences, which in turn may affect the success of 
an operation. These will be addressed within the level at which they originate. 
The domestic-level hypothesis suggests that: 
 
 (H2): If an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure 
sufficient domestic support, it cannot succeed.  
 
This hypothesis is deduced from the existing scholarship of international 
peacekeeping and military intervention. With regard to external military 
intervention Freedman (2006) has explained that there is a critical difference 
between (a) conflicts where the warring parties are willing to accept an 
intervention and (b) conflict situations in which they are not. Freedman (2006) 
argues that it is essential to distinguish between what in military terminology is 
referred to as a permissive environment and a non-permissive environment. A 
permissive environment is a conflict setting in which all the belligerent parties 
consent to the presence of the intervening troops, whereas in a non-permissive 
environment consent from all or some of the warring parties is absent. 
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Traditional peacekeeping, for example, is governed by a principle of domestic 
consent. Traditional peacekeeping operations are always undertaken in 
permissive environments where the conflicting parties have formally accepted 
the presence of the peacekeepers (Cooper and Berdal, 1993). Traditional 
peacekeeping troops are also not conventionally mandated to militarily impose 
the management of a conflict (Howard, 2008, pp.13-14). UN Chapter VI 
mandates typically authorise peacekeeping operations. A Chapter VI mandate 
authorises troops to use force only in self-defence. It relies on the host country 
for infrastructural support and fields a broad-based, neutral international force, 
which is expected to behave in a pacific and conciliatory fashion both towards 
the parties to the conflict and the civilian population. A Chapter VII mandate, 
on the other hand, considers one or more of the parties to the conflict as 
adversaries. Here the commanders on the ground are mandated to use force 
strategically, for example, to secure positions. Such operations cannot always 
rely on the host country for support and the troops must be prepared for war-
like scenarios. Chapter VII mandates typically authorise peace enforcement 
operations in non-permissive environments (Howard, 2008, pp.13-14).       
 
A consensus in the peacekeeping literature suggests that cooperative operations 
in permissive environments are more likely to succeed than coercive operations 
in non-permissive environments. This suggests that the domestic context is 
directly linked to the success of an operation of this nature. In much of the 
peacekeeping literature domestic consent is perceived as a condition for 
success (Cooper and Berdal, 1993; Diehl, 1994; Howard, 2008). Brown (1993) 
has highlighted how operations launched with the approval of local authorities 
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have higher probabilities of success and lower costs than their coercive 
counterparts. Consequently, Brown (1996, p.620) suggests that coercive 
operations should be undertaken selectively: 
 
Coercion is more expensive and riskier and should be employed only when 
important interests are at stake or when crimes against humanity such as 
genocide or the deliberate slaughter of civilians are being committed (…) The 
international community should engage in these kinds of high-cost, high-risk 
undertakings only when the stakes are high and only if it is determined to see a 
serious campaign through to the bitter end.  
 
This thesis does not address the question of whether the EU should engage in 
ESDP military conflict management operations, but it does endeavour to 
determine which conditions are necessary for such operations to succeed. Here 
the arguments put forward by scholars such as Brown (1996), Cooper and 
Berdal (1993) and Freedman (2002) are important. Their shared logic suggests 
that the EUs military conflict management operations (like those conducted by 
other international actors) are more likely to succeed where the domestic 
parties to the conflict consent to the operation and are willing to accept and 
support the troops. Kaldor (2007, p.119-149) has argued that consent from the 
domestic population as well as from the belligerent parties is necessary for an 
operation to be perceived as legitimate. A domestic perception of legitimacy, 
she suggests, makes a military intervention more likely to succeed. In support 
of her argument Kaldor (2007) cites the British Peacekeeping Manuals 
argument that without the broader co-operation and consent of the majority of 
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the local population and the leadership of the principal ruling authorities, be 
they parties to the dispute or government agencies, success is not a reasonable 
or realistic expectation. Domestic consent and support, Kaldor (2007) argues, 
are, therefore, necessary for an operation of this nature to succeed.  
 
In some conflicts there may be a significant difference, as highlighted by 
Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2005) between consent and support from 
(a) the belligerent parties and (b) the civilian population. In violent conflict the 
interests (and attitudes towards external interveners) of civilians and their 
professed leaders may differ substantially. Political and military leaders, 
soldiers, rebels, warlords, profiteers and the like may have vested interests in 
the continuation of a conflict; and in effect, oppose external conflict 
management operations. For example, protagonists, who are closely related to 
and/or identified with the violence, may oppose a military conflict management 
operation out of fear of losing power, being overthrown, prosecuted and/or 
killed as a consequence of outside intervention. Civilian populations, which 
often suffer immensely in violent conflicts, are more likely to benefit from 
conflict management. In effect, civilians are more likely to support a military 
conflict management operation. This is frequently the case in conflicts where 
the number of civilians affected is high and the way in which they are affected 
is grave.  
 
Persecution of civilians in violent conflict is often a conscious military 
strategy. In such a scenario the public interest in peace, and thus, also in the 
external military management of the conflict as a means to peace is more 
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likely. Public support for a military conflict management operation may indeed 
to be shared among civilians across conflicting communities. In this way, 
moderate leaders and constituencies on different sides of a conflict make up a 
large reservoir of potential support for a military conflict management 
operation, if it is perceived as credible, reliable and legitimate (Ramsbotham, 
Woodhouse and Miall, 2005). Domestic support for military conflict 
management operations is often divided. Moreover, domestic support may be 
anything from passive acceptance to active cooperation. It is important to 
examine the type as well as the level of domestic support towards ESDP 
military conflict management operations and assess both if and how this affects 
success in the operations.  
 
As illustrated above the peacekeeping literature suggests that domestic consent 
is necessary, but not sufficient for an operation to succeed. It must also have 
domestic support - and ideally support from (a) the political leadership, (b) the 
fighting factions and (c) the wider population. In practice, however, such wide 
support may be difficult to achieve as the different belligerent parties to the 
violent conflict may be many and are often disconnected from the publics that 
they claim to represent. Consensus and shared support for external military 
conflict management operations may, in effect, be near impossible to reach. 
The need for troops rather than unarmed, non-coercive conflict management 
initiatives usually indicates, as Kaldor (2007) has argued, that all parties to the 
conflict will not support the operation. For example, one party to the conflict 
may seek external military conflict management as armed protection from 
another, who opposes it. Building and/or retaining the support of a local 
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population may mean acting without or directly against the consent of 
belligerent parties. Domestic support is not a constant. It can increase or 
decrease throughout an operation. This illustrates why it is important to 
comparatively assess and evaluate empirically not only if, but also how and to 
what extent domestic support is a necessary condition for success in ESDP 
military conflict management operations.  
 
The regional level 
The second external level of analysis is the regional level. In comparison to the 
domestic and international levels, the regional context of military conflict 
management is understudied. The next hypothesis, however, posits that the 
regional level is important for success in ESDP military conflict management 
operations:  
 
(H3) If an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure 
sufficient regional support, it cannot succeed.  
 
The regional level of the analysis is based on the studies of regional conflict 
formations by Vayrynen (1984); of regional dimensions of internal conflict by 
Brown (1996, pp. 590-601); and of regional conflict complexes by Wallensteen 
and Sollenberg (1998). Academic debates on conflict diffusion and escalation 
such as the works edited by Lobell and Mauceri (2004) have also informed this 
part of the thesis. The regional aspect in conflict studies is complemented by an 
emerging regional focus in case studies of specific conflicts. Here the 
hypothesis is inspired by the works on the regional dimension of the conflicts 
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in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the wider Great Lakes region by 
Rubin, Armstrong and Ntegeye (2001), Quinn (2004) and Prunier (2009); the 
regional examinations of the Balkan wars by Glenny (2001, pp. 634-663) and 
Silber and Little (1996); and Bergs (2008) report on the conflict dynamics in 
the tri-border region of Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic. 
Comparative academic analyses of the regional aspects of military conflict 
management operations are few and far between. However, the recent increase 
in academic attention on the regional dimension of conflict is reflected in a 
growing regional focus in EU discourse and policy towards conflict 
management more generally (Interviews, EU representatives in Sarajevo, 
29/06/2006; Interviews, EU representatives in Skopje, 29/01/2007; Interviews 
with EU representatives in Brussels, 18/09/2007 and 07/05/2009). This makes 
it ever more important to investigate the regional conditions for success in 
ESDP military conflict management operations.  
 
The regional setting in which a violent conflict occurs is expected to influence 
the success of ESDP military conflict management operations for a number of 
reasons. Brown (1996) has argued that conflicts are more difficult to manage, 
once the fighting spreads to neighbouring countries (diffusion) and/or brings in 
external support for one or more of the belligerent parties (escalation). Once 
regional actors become embroiled in a conflict through support (be it military, 
political, ideological and/or material) to belligerent parties and/or through the 
spread of violence or its consequences to neighbouring countries (for example, 
through refugees or fighting factions seeking shelter in or launching attacks 
from neighbouring territories), an otherwise internal conflict can quickly 
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become a regional conflict. Likewise, a regional conflict may increase tensions 
in the domestic context of a country, which had so far been excluded from the 
initial regional conflict. This is, for example, happening in the Central African 
Republic at present, where the regional conflict between Sudan and Chad is 
adding to the existing domestic instability in CAR and gradually engulfing the 
country in a wider regional conflict (Berg, 2008). The nature of regional 
conflict dynamics depends on the type, degree and source of external support 
for belligerent parties. Once new structures, actors and issues are injected into 
an existing conflict, additional sets of interests and resources affect the 
situation of the combatants (and any external interveners) and as a consequence 
the conflict is expected to be more difficult to manage (Brown, 1996).  
 
Vice versa, the third hypothesis suggests that support for an ESDP military 
conflict management operation from regional actors would increase the 
likelihood of its success. Regional support can come not only from states and 
rebel groups involved in the conflict, but also from neighbours or regional 
security organisations involved in the management of the conflict. With regard 
to peacekeeping Henrikson (1995) has suggested that without regional 
involvement these missions are likely to lack continuity and consistency. 
Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2004) have argued that regional organisations 
can provide a framework of rules and accountability in which an operation can 
operate. However, Pushkina (2006) found that support and involvement of 
regional organisations, contrary to her expectations, did not appear to correlate 
with success in UN peacekeeping operations. This illustrates why it is 
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important to establish whether and how support from regional actors affect 
success in ESDP military conflict management operations.  
 
The international level 
The third external level of analysis is the international level. The theoretical 
assumption here is that the successful outcome of an ESDP military conflict 
management operation is conditioned by the international context in which the 
conflict occurs and the operation is undertaken. The fourth and final research 
hypothesis suggests that:  
 
(H4) If an ESDP military conflict management operation cannot secure 
sufficient international support, it cannot succeed.  
 
The international level includes the international security actors that are 
directly engaged either in the violent dimension of the conflict or in its 
management. These include third countries (outside the region) and 
international security organisations (excluding regional organisations from the 
region). This is not to suggest that other actors are not involved (directly or 
indirectly) in the dynamics of the underlying conflict and its wider regulation, 
but the focus of this analysis is on necessary conditions for success in ESDP 
military conflict management not for the successful settlement of the conflict. 
International actors can arguably condition the operational environment of 
ESDP military conflict management operations in two different ways: (a) 
through their actions in the specific conflict context on the ground or (b) 
through their actions in the international security arena. The actions of 
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international actors involved in the violent conflict can, thus, have domestic, 
regional or international level consequences, but as they originate at the 
international level, they will be dealt with here. Based on the logic of the 
hypotheses above it might be expected that support also at the international 
level is a necessary condition for success. The existing literature supports this 
expectation. Croker (2006, pp.229-448) has argued that in the context of 
intervention, disunity, confusion or divided loyalties among international actors 
must be avoided. He has argued that agreement and coherence between 
international actors both in military and political spheres is necessary for 
successful military conflict management. International support for an ESDP 
military conflict management operation can vary from a congruence of interest 
or a shared sense of unity in purpose to a negotiated consensus with 
international agreement or acceptance not to actively disrupt or discredit the 
operation. Different international security actors may (and often do) have 
radically different perceptions of a conflict and of the actions and actors that 
are appropriate  or not  to manage it, if indeed international actors agree that 
it should be externally managed at all.  
 
Different international actors may also have different interests at stake, which 
may affect their behavior both in the international security arena and in the 
conflict situation on the ground. Brown (1996) and Pushkina (2006) have both 
pointed out how external actors may engage in a conflict in a way which 
opposes, and sometimes directly hinders another international intervention. 
International actors, like regional actors, may  directly or indirectly  support 
belligerent parties through material, ideological, political, diplomatic, financial, 
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military and/or other means. The difficulty that this causes for the intervener 
depends on the type, degree and source of any international support for the 
warring parties and of the intervention. Military or financial support to one of 
the belligerent parties, for example, has a direct effect on the conflict 
environment in which conflict management operations engage; whereas 
political, diplomatic and ideological support may affect the international 
security environment in which the conflicting parties and the conflict manager 
make their strategic decisions.  
 
For the purpose of this analysis it is useful to distinguish between actors at the 
regional and the international levels. There is a difference between regional 
organisation with a regional reach like the African Union and the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe and regional organisations with an 
international reach like NATO and the EU. NATO and the EU will be 
considered at the international level because of their wider international role 
and reach beyond their own borders.  
 
The EU has (so far) never undertaken an ESDP military conflict management 
operation anywhere where other international actors were not already heavily 
engaged. In fact, all the ESDP military conflict management operations 
launched from 2003 to 2009 were undertaken in cooperation with other 
international actors as part of a wider international effort to manage the 
conflicts. Consequently, cooperation and coordination with other international 
actors is expected to be of particular importance to the success of ESDP 
military conflict management operations. As Hadden (2009, p.4) points out:  
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 Liaison and intervention with these other bodies, the United Nations, NATO, 
the African Union and voluntary coalitions, is an essential element in decision-
making and deployment at every level. 
    
In line with this argument, the final level and the interplay between different 
bilateral and multilateral international actors involved in the international 
security arena and in the conflict environment on the ground is expected to 
condition success in ESDP military conflict management operations.  
 
Analytical considerations  
To test the empirical relevance of the four hypotheses the selected analytical 
approach of this research project (retrospective, structured and focused 
comparison) is advantageous, as it makes the link between causes (conditions) 
and effect (success) clearer. It minimises the danger of misinterpreting single 
events in individual cases throughout the period of evaluation. Three analytical 
considerations in particular help to increase the integrity of the analysis. 
Firstly, it is essential to establish a likely causal relationship. That is that a 
given development cannot be attributed to another condition alone. Secondly, it 
must be expected that the absence of this condition would have led to another 
outcome. Thirdly, the condition must have proceeded and be credibly 
associated with a specific development and theoretically sufficient to explain it. 
In this way, the selected analytical approach allows for a careful comparison of 
the expected (theoretical) and actual (empirical) effects of the conditions for 
success in ESDP military conflict management operations across time and 
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space (Druckman et al, 1997; Ross and Rothman, 1999). To avoid 
misinterpretations the multi-pronged data gathering and analytical processes 
have ensured that the data collected from the interviews and participant 
observation was complimented by a chronological document analysis and a 
thorough review of independent reports concerning each conflict and operation. 
The empirical data will in the following two chapters be used to test the 
hypotheses deduced from the existing literature (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & 
Miall, 2005; Ross & Rothman, 1999).  
 
Conclusion and key findings 
This chapter developed four hypotheses concerning the necessary conditions 
for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. These 
hypotheses are all based on the theoretical assumption that operations are 
conditioned by the specific context in which they occur. The chapter suggested 
that there are two different dimensions to this context: the internal dimension 
and the external dimension. The internal dimension refers to the EU-specific 
context in which the operation is undertaken. This is made up of the EU 
member states and institutions that are involved in the operation. The external 
dimension reflects the conflict-specific context in which an operation is 
undertaken and includes the key domestic, regional and international actors 
actively involved in the conflict and its management. The overall expectation 
deduced from the existing literature on the ESDP, international peacekeeping, 
military intervention and conflict management is that if an ESDP military 
conflict management operation does not secure sufficient support, it cannot 
succeed. The four hypotheses suggest that for an operation to succeed it is 
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necessary that it has sufficient support both internally within the EU from the 
member states and institutions actively involved in the operation and externally 
outside the EU from the domestic, regional and international actors actively 
involved in the conflict and its management. The four hypotheses deduced in 
this chapter are illustrated in tables 5.9 and 5.10. 
 
Table 5.9: Research hypothesis: Internal conditions for success 
Condition for success Hypothesis 
EU support  H1: If an ESDP military conflict management 
operation cannot secure sufficient EU support, it 
cannot succeed. 
 
Table 5.10: Research hypotheses: External conditions for success 
Conditions for success
 
Hypothesis 
Domestic support H2: If an ESDP military conflict management 
operation cannot secure sufficient domestic 
support, it cannot succeed. 
Regional support 
 
H3: If an ESDP military conflict management 
operation cannot secure sufficient regional 
support, it cannot succeed. 
International support H4: If an ESDP military conflict management 
operation cannot secure sufficient international 
support, it cannot succeed. 
 
The above suggests that the internal and the external conditions for success are 
all necessary but neither is sufficient on their own to facilitate a success. If an 
operation does not have sufficient support both internally (at the EU level) and 
externally (at the domestic, regional and international levels) it is not expected 
to succeed. Success refers to overall success as it was defined in chapter two; 
that is, when the operations purpose has been achieved and implemented in an 
appropriate manner from both an internal and an external perspective.  
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The following two chapters will examine the empirical relevance of the four 
hypotheses in a comparative case study of the conditions for success in ESDP 
military conflict management operations from 2003 to 2009. Chapter six 
concentrates on the internal conditions and chapter seven focuses on the 
external conditions for success. Finally, the last chapter of the thesis compares 
the empirical findings to the theoretical expectations regarding the conditions 
for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. It considers the 
relationship between the internal and external conditions for success and 
examines how this affects the overall success in these operations. 
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Chapter six: An empirical assessment of internal conditions for 
success 
The previous chapter developed four hypotheses concerning the conditions for 
success in ESDP military conflict management operations. These hypotheses 
are deduced from the existing literature on ESDP, international peacekeeping, 
military intervention and conflict management. The hypotheses are based on a 
theoretical assumption deduced from this literature, which suggests that for an 
operation of this nature to be successful it must secure sufficient support 
internally within the intervening organisation (the EU) and externally in the 
context in which it engages (domestically, regionally and internationally). This 
final part of the thesis will compare and contrast the empirical data from the 
five ESDP military conflict management operations and examine whether this 
supports or dismisses the research hypotheses. The empirical analysis of the 
conditions for success is structured around the four hypotheses. This chapter 
focuses on the internal conditions for success within the EU and chapter seven 
explores the external conditions for success, which exist beyond the EU.    
 
This chapter examines whether the empirical evidence supports the theoretical 
expectation that: (H1) if an ESDP military conflict management operation 
cannot secure sufficient EU support, it cannot succeed. The analysis will first 
examine the level and nature of support from the EU (member states and 
institutions) to each operation. This will allow for a comparative assessment of 
whether EU support has proved to be a necessary condition for these operations 
to be successful  and if so, why and how?  
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Operation Concordia in Macedonia 
Operation Concordia was an overall success. It experienced some problems in 
terms of the internal appropriateness of its implementation, but its success in 
internal and external goal attainment and the external appropriateness of its 
non-application of force made the operation a success overall. Table 6.1 
provides an overview of the operations success. The following section looks at 
the internal conditions under which this was achieved. 
 
Table: Analytical breakdown of success in Operation Concordia 
 Success Partial success Failure 
Internal goal 
attainment 
 
 
X 
  
Internal 
appropriateness 
 
  
X 
 
External goal 
attainment 
 
 
X 
  
External 
appropriateness 
 
 
X 
  
 
When Operation Concordia was launched in Macedonia in March 2003, it had 
broad support from within the EU. 13 out of the then 15 member states took 
part in the operation (Hadden, 2003, p.133).
26
 Some member states were 
particularly important to the success of the operation. At the political-strategic 
level the UK played a crucial bridging role between the US and the EU in 
negotiating the Berlin Plus arrangements between the EU and NATO, which 
made Concordia possible both in practical and in political terms. At the 
                                                 
26 13 non-EU member states also took part in Operation Concordia: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
and Turkey (Hadden, 2009, p.133).  
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operational level France performed the Framework Nation responsibilities for 
the duration of the original mandate. It also provided the first EU Force 
Commander Major General Maral who was followed by Portugals General 
Dos Santos in September 2003. At the tactical level France, Portugal and 
Sweden were each responsible for the one of the three multinational sectors to 
which the twenty-two field liaison teams, which made up the force in the 
former crisis area, were assigned. France and Italy provided the heavy 
platoons, which acted as the reserve for the entire area of operations. There was 
widespread support from the member states to undertake the operation in 
Macedonia. Denmark and Ireland were the only EU member states, which did 
not take part in the operation, but their abstention was based on political 
reservations with regard to military aspects of the ESDP rather than opposition 
to the specific operation in Macedonia (Hadden, 2009, p.133). The high level 
of support among the member states lasted for the duration of the operation 
(Augustin, 2005; Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP 27/1/2003; Council of 
the EU, 2009a; ICG, 2005b, p.48-49).  
 
The support for Operation Concordia among the member states was reflected 
in the Council, which was enthusiastic about the EU undertaking its first ESDP 
military conflict management operation in Macedonia. The Council had 
already through the HR for the CFSP Javier Solana (alongside NATO SG Lord 
Robertson) been deeply involved in the negotiations leading to the Ohrid 
Agreement for Macedonia. Therefore, it had an extra interest in seeing the 
country stabilised and the Ohrid Framework Agreement; and in effect, the 
Unions efforts in its facilitation succeed. Solana and his staff had also worked 
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hard to conclude the Berlin plus arrangements. Once the operation was 
underway it was strongly supported by the Council - both in word and deed. 
The Council extended the mandate for another six months in July 2003 and 
transferred the framework responsibilities from France to multinational EU 
Headquarters. Upon Concordias conclusion the Council launched an EU 
police mission, EUPOL Proxima, in its place. This illustrates that the Council 
had a wider commitment towards Macedonia also after the withdrawal of the 
Concordia troops (Cascone, 2008; ICG, 2005b, pp.48-49; Mace, 2004).  
 
EUFOR Concordia was part of a much wider EU effort in Macedonia and the 
Western Balkans. In June 2003, the Council endorsed The Thessaloniki 
Agenda for the Western Balkans, which confirmed the EUs support for 
European integration and the prospect of future membership of the Union for 
the countries in the region. The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) 
model, which had steered the EU accession process in Central and Eastern 
Europe, was now to provide the framework for European integration in the 
Western Balkans. The SAP was intended to further consolidate peace and 
promote stability and democratic development in the region (Council of the 
EU, 2003a). This process launched a number of new initiatives in Macedonia, 
which helped the EU establish a lead role in the country. The SAP also 
facilitated more EU institutional support on the ground for the ESDP military 
conflict management operation. As a result, the European Commission 
delegation in Macedonia supported Concordia, which was seen to add another 
important aspect to the wider EU engagement in the country. As one 
interviewee from the Commission delegation in Skopje explained:  
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Concordia's presence enabled the government of Macedonia to concentrate on 
the reform process and the implementation of the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement. Concordia demonstrated crucial support for the political process 
and to the legitimate institutions in the country and led to the establishment 
and maintenance of an environment conducive to the democratic governance, 
multi-ethnicity, rule of law and economic regeneration that are the 
prerequisites for European integration. (…) Concordia demonstrated to the 
wider EU circles the importance of building a strong, fully functioning state 
capable of delivering on the needs of the citizens and of ensuring of more 
advanced relations with the European Union. Reconstruction needs required 
the European Union to have the capability to instruct and train and to rebuild 
local judicial or police structures rather than mere rebuilding of war-torn 
infrastructure and monitoring security in the former crisis areas. The Union 
had to combine its stabilisation and crisis management tools with 
communitarian integration policies. Concordia was a turning point for the 
Union’s presence in the country. With the launch of Concordia and its work the 
Union became aware of the challenges on the ground and redefined its 
presence accordingly. That led to a shift of its overall policy from stabilisation 
to institution-building that had effects to all missions of the European Union 
(Interview, representative from the European Commission Delegation in 
Skopje, 30/04/2009).  
 
Operation Concordia enjoyed strong commitment from the EU institutions both 
in Skopje and in Brussels as well as from the EU member state capitals. It had 
support both from those EU-level actors, which actively engaged with the 
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operation and more widely from those involved in the resolution of the conflict 
and the SAP in Macedonia. The widespread EU commitment to the operation 
was expressed in the allocation of the necessary EU capabilities for the 
operation to fulfil its purpose in an appropriate manner. In this case the EU had 
sufficient capabilities to act, to fund and to cooperate and coordinate internally 
within the Union as well as with third parties.  
 
With Operation Concordia the EU demonstrated that it could successfully 
undertake an ESDP military conflict management operation. It established that 
the new ESDP mechanisms and the Berlin Plus arrangements with NATO 
worked in practice, although there were aspects that could have worked better. 
This was a great achievement for the Union and had arguably been a strong 
incentive for the decision to undertake the operation in the first place. 
Especially considering that the operation was launched at a time when the Iraq-
crisis had created great foreign policy divisions both within Europe and across 
the Atlantic. Concordia was a chance to bridge this gap and demonstrate a 
unity of purpose in international conflict management (Felicio, 05/2003). 
Therefore, it was important for the EU and for NATO to use the Berlin Plus, 
although some observers argue that militarily the EU could have undertaken 
the operation autonomously (Mace, 2004). In reality, the launch of the 
operation was delayed in waiting for the Berlin Plus agreement, which had 
been halted by Turkish objections to the co-operation with non-NATO member 
states. A former Balkan analyst remembers the scenario:  
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The purpose of Concordia was not to keep the peace in Macedonia, which was 
already being kept by locals, thank you, but to demonstrate that the EU could 
deploy a military mission without destroying the transatlantic relationship 
incidentally at a time when that relationship was as stressed as I can remember 
it being in my lifetime. Remember (..) that there had been no EU military 
missions at all before this. The whole idea of Berlin Plus was not only 
integration with NATO, but also compensating for the EU's inadequate and 
untested command and control structures (Interview, former Balkan analyst, 
23/05/2009). 
 
Another interviewee made a similar point: 
 
The discussion of a NATO-EU transition in (Macedonia) predates the 
conclusion of the Berlin Plus package. Actually, from what I know, the 
transition from NATO operation, Amber Fox, to a possible EU operation had 
been kept on hold for a while, because there was no framework through which 
it could take place - except NATO leaving on one day and the EU taking over 
without any coordination or handover mechanism the following day. On the 
other hand, I am sure that once Berlin Plus was approved, the Amber Fox-
Concordia transition constituted a kind of proving ground to see if the 
framework could actually work. So, in short, my impression is that some kind 
of coordination mechanism was genuinely needed, but once it turned into the 
full blown Berlin Plus package the chance was too good to let it slip and not 
try as much as possible to see if this was an arrangement that could work 
(Interview, representative from NATO, 23/05/2009). 
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In conclusion, this was an operation high in political symbolism for the EU 
(Howorth, 2007, p.231). It had great levels of EU support both from its 
member states and institutions. It is clear that in this first case the commitment 
and capabilities allocated to the operation from the EU were sufficient to 
facilitate an overall successful operation from both an internal and an external 
perspective. In terms of the limitation to the internal appropriateness of the 
operation the teething problems within the Berlin Plus were resolved on an ad-
hoc basis and the criminal activity of some EUFOR officers in Macedonia 
demonstrated a lack of personal rather than member state or institutional 
commitment to the success of the operation. This demonstrates how EU 
support can create the necessary internal conditions for an operation to 
succeed, but it is still up to the soldiers on the ground to do the job properly.  
 
Concordia illustrates how now that the EU had the capabilities it was keen to 
commit them and demonstrate its ability as well as its will to undertake an 
operation of this nature. This explains the general EU enthusiasm for the 
operation. The case also indicates that there was a link between the high level 
of EU support and the success of the operation. However, in terms of its 
capabilities it is important to recognise that because the operation was launched 
under the Berlin Plus it could make use of NATO assets. This also meant that 
much of the institutional support came from NATO in addition to EU 
institutions. This suggests that the necessary level of EU support can be 
supplemented by support from an external actor (here NATO). The next 
chapter examines this relationship between internal and external conditions for 
success in greater detail.    
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 Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
Operation Artemis is widely perceived as a military success, but this research 
found that the operations success was only partial. It was a success in terms of 
its internal goal attainment. However, according to the three other criteria, it 
was only a partial success due to its limited (although important) contribution 
to the management of the wider conflict and to the misconduct of individual 
soldiers involved in the torture of a Congolese civilian. Table 6.2 gives a 
breakdown of the research results concerning the success of this operation. The 
following section looks at the internal conditions under which it was 
undertaken. 
 
Table 6.2: Analytical breakdown of success in Operation Artemis 
 Success Partial success Failure 
Internal goal 
attainment 
 
 
X 
  
Internal 
appropriateness 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
External goal 
attainment 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
External 
appropriateness 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
Operation Artemis, which was launched in June 2003, was undertaken on 
French initiative. When the UN first called for an interim force to be deployed 
to help manage the conflict in Ituri, France agreed to contribute to such a force 
on three conditions: (1) that it would have a strong and robust mandate; (2) that 
it would not be acting alone; and (3) that the regional governments involved in 
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the crisis, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, formally accepted the operation. 
Having received the relevant assurances from the UN, France started preparing 
the operation. France played a significant role in persuading the other member 
states that this was an operation that the EU was ready to undertake. France 
also took a lead role in formulating the official EU response to the UN request 
and drafting the operations mandate. Once Operation Artemis was launched, 
France acted as its Framework Nation and the Operation Headquarters were 
located in Paris. At its peak Operation Artemis comprised 2,200 troops, 1,785 
of which were provided by France (Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP 
5/6/2003; Howorth, 2007, pp.231-241).
27
 
  
France had a significant hand in undertaking the Artemis operation. In fact, 
because of the considerable French involvement Artemis has often been called 
an Europeanised French operation (ICG, 2005b; Ulriksen, Gourlay, Mace, 
2004). This view is common also among practitioners, as the following quote 
from one interviewee demonstrates:  
 
Artemis was 95 per cent French. It was French in all but name. As a French 
military operation in Africa, there was really nothing new about it (Interview, 
national representative to the EU, 09/06/2009).    
 
The French Artemis contribution was substantial, but it is important not to 
overlook the fact that other nations both within and outside the EU made 
significant contributions to the operation. Besides France, the main EU 
                                                 
27 For a more in depth discussions on why France had an interest in launching this operation 
see Rye Olsen (2009), Gegout (2005 and 2009) and Ulriksen, Gourlay, Mace (2004). 
 205
member state contributors were: Sweden (infantry unit including Special 
Forces), UK (engineering units) and Belgium (medical teams). Germany also 
agreed to contribute 350 non-combat troops and a medical component, but only 
once a certain number of other countries had agreed to take part, so that the 
contribution could be justified in the German Bundestag.
28
 Seven other 
member states took part in smaller capacities: Austria, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain (Hadden, 2009).
29
 Although the extent to 
which the operation was supported by other EU member states (in addition to 
the large French contribution) is often downplayed or ignored in the ESDP 
literature, it is an important aspect in explaining the level and nature of its 
success. The condition, which France put to the UN before the decision to 
launch the operation, is the first indicator of the importance of the multi-
national force. In this condition, France itself indicated that it was more likely 
to succeed, if it was supported by other EU member states. 
 
In the undertaking of the Artemis operation Frances most important EU 
partners were Sweden and the UK. The Swedish participation was particularly 
important to the success of the operation in two ways. The Artemis force 
included 230 Special Forces, 150 of which were French, Sweden contributed 
the remaining 80. The Swedish Special Forces played an important role both in 
terms of the operations internal and external success. At the tactical level it 
had a significant hand in Artemis goal attainment, but it also facilitated a 
higher level of appropriateness, in so far as the Swedish contingent helped 
                                                 
28 The German Bundestag voted 441-31 in favour of sending troops to the DRC on 19 June 
2003 (Hadden, 2009). 
29 Participating non-EU member states were Brazil, Canada, Hungary, South Africa and 
Cyprus (Hadden, 2009). 
 206
monitor and control the French force. It was Swedish officers, who raised 
concerns about the torture of a civilian by their French peers. Apart from the 
torture case the Swedish contingent also objected to racism and maltreatment 
of prisoners by French soldiers. The Swedish commander raised these issues 
with the French commander in the field and warned against it happening again. 
This affected the appropriateness of the operation for the remainder of the 
deployment. One interviewee described it in the following way:  
 
It was an operation where one of the nations, Sweden, more or less acted as a 
chaperone for the other one, France (Interview, Researcher, 31/07/2009). 
 
The UKs support was important to the success of the operation for three key 
reasons. From a tactical perspective the UK provided key engineering units to 
the operation. Alongside their French peers the UK engineers were tasked with 
the preparation and maintenance of Bunia airport. This included building some 
10,000m
2
 of aircraft parking and repeatedly resurfacing the runway. The 
British support was essential to the success of the tactical-airlift of the 220 
flights from Entebbe (Uganda) to Bunia, which were necessary to deploy the 
Artemis personnel and equipment (Giegerich, 2008). From a military-strategic 
perspective the UK participation helped secure formal support for the operation 
from the key regional security actors involved in the conflict: Rwanda and 
Uganda. Support, without which France had declared that it would not 
intervene, and in effect, the UN would not have received the assistance it 
needed so badly in Bunia at the time. From a political-strategic perspective the 
UK was important because its contribution helped convince other EU member 
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states such as Germany, which had initially been hesitant to support the 
operation. It also helped persuade other international security actors that this 
was indeed a multilateral EU operation. In political terms Franco-British 
cooperation became the driving force behind the operation. Overall, the UK, 
alongside France and Sweden, thus, contributed tactical, operational and 
strategic support to the operation without which it could not have achieved the 
level of success that it did (Hadden, 2009; ICG, Europe Report 160, 2005; 
Ulriksen, Gourlay, Mace, 2004). But as Giegerich (2008, p.22) has pointed out:  
 
The mission was attractive to participants because it had clearly set limits on 
the key parameters of size, duration and responsibilities.   
 
Although some member states were initially hesitant once the troops were in 
the field there was general support among the member states for the operation. 
This was reflected in the Council, where Artemis was perceived as another 
important test for the ESDP and a chance to prove the EUs ability to act (a) 
autonomously; (b) beyond the European continent; (c) in a more challenging 
operational environment than Macedonia; and (d) in partnership with the UN; 
but also (e) to prove that the EU remained united on ESDP matters after the 
recent political crisis over Iraq. Solanas staff conducted a feasibility study for 
the operation, which was followed by the Council decisions on the objectives 
and limitations of the operation. The PSC exercised political control and 
strategic direction for the operation and was explicitly given powers to change 
the Operation Plan, Rules of Engagement and Chain of Command. It also set 
up the Committee of Contributors for non-EU participating countries. The EU 
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Military Committee (EUMC) monitored the operation and reported on the 
development to the PSC. This would become the framework for EU 
institutional support in autonomous ESDP military conflict management 
operations. As such, the operation was subject to close multilateral political 
and military scrutiny at the EU institutional level, although it is unclear how 
the misconduct by the French soldiers was dealt with internally at the time 
(Ulriksen, Gourlay, Mace, 2004). Otherwise, the EU institutional support 
clearly helped facilitate the partial success in the undertaking of the operation. 
 
Despite initial hesitation among some EU member states, most notably 
Germany, about whether the EU could manage an operation of this calibre; 
once it was launched Operation Artemis was widely supported both by the 
member states and the institutions of the EU. Once the troops were in the field 
the EU demonstrated sufficient capabilities to act, to fund and to cooperate and 
coordinate for the operation to succeed fully in terms of its internal goal 
attainment and partially according to the three other success criteria. The fact 
that the operation was only a partial success in internal and external 
appropriateness was due to the behaviour of individual soldiers rather than the 
level of commitment and capabilities allocated to the operation from the EU. 
Limits to the EU support, however, were expressed in the mission mandate, 
which set clear boundaries to the time, space and function in which the force 
could operate. This limited the operations chance of success in external goal 
attainment. The limited mandate and the extensive French contribution, which 
were both direct consequences of the initial reservations of other member 
states, paradoxically facilitated the operations success in internal goal 
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attainment, but limited its success according to the other three success criteria. 
The Artemis case, thus, shows how strong support from one member state can 
to some extent make up for lack of support from other member states, but a 
lack of shared support among the member states does still condition the success 
of the operation, for example, by limiting the terms of its mandate. Finally, this 
case also illustrates the significant benefits that multilateral participation from 
several member states have for success, in particular in terms of this 
operations level of appropriateness.           
 
Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The EUs third conflict management operation, Operation Althea in BiH, is the 
most successful ESDP military conflict management operation to date. Because 
the operation has not yet been completed, this assessment can only be 
preliminary, but so far the operation has succeeded according to all four 
success criteria. Table 6.3 illustrates the preliminary success of the operation.  
 
Table 6.3: Analytical breakdown of preliminary success in Operation Althea 
 Success Partial success Failure 
Internal goal 
attainment 
 
 
X 
  
Internal 
appropriateness 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
External goal 
attainment 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
External 
appropriateness 
 
 
X 
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Operation Althea is the largest and longest running ESDP military conflict 
management operation to date. Its 7,000 strong deployment to BiH in 2004 
indicates that there was strong and widespread EU-level support for the 
operation from its beginning. An ICG report at the time explains this:  
 
Bosnia was the painful crucible of European foreign policy in the 1990s 
demonstrating all too clearly its gravest weaknesses. The EU has a strong 
commitment - moral, financial and political, to do better this time (ICG, 2005b, 
p.49) 
 
The numerous extensions of Altheas mandate and the fact that four and a half 
years on 2,200 EU troops are still operating in country demonstrate that at the 
EU level Altheas support has been significant throughout the deployment. 
This is confirmed also by the open-ended nature of the operations current 
mandate (Council of the EU, 2009b; ICG, 2005b, p.49). In comparison to the 
other ESDP military conflict management operations exceptional levels of both 
EU commitment and EU capabilities were dedicated to Althea. 28 countries 
have together provided the necessary capabilities to the operation, 22 of which 
are EU member states. The active participation of a wide range of member 
states has been a characteristic of the operation from its very beginning, when 
11 of then 15 member states took part (Council of the EU, 2009b).
30
 
 
                                                 
30 The European commitment to sending troops to BiH did not start with EUFOR. SFOR, 
IFOR and UNPROFOR all had significant European contributions. The ESDP format was a 
new framework for deployment, but SFOR, from which EUFOR took over its responsibilities, 
transferred significant numbers of its European troops to stay on under EUFOR (ICG, 2005b, 
p.49).     
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Like Operation Concordia in Macedonia, Operation Althea in BiH is part of a 
wider EU approach to the country. EU institutions and member states have 
launched a wide range of initiatives intended to promote conflict management 
(and settlement) in the country. The foundation, upon which this wider 
approach is based, like in the rest of the Western Balkans, is the SAP and the 
prospect of EU membership. The EU has introduced a series of carrots and 
sticks to encourage this process in BiH (ICG, 2005b, p.49).  
 
From an institutional perspective the EUSR coordinates the EU initiatives in 
BiH. The fact that the EUSR is also the High Representative for peace 
implementation in the country has allowed for Althea to be integrated into the 
broader conflict management efforts of the wider international community 
represented in the country. Although EUFOR has a separate chain of command 
its Force Commanders have worked closely with the Office of the HR/EUSR. 
The relationship between the two organisations and between EUFOR and other 
members of the so-called EU family in BiH has varied over time (ICG, 2005b, 
p.49). This will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter, which 
examines the relationship between internal and external conditions for success 
in ESDP military conflict management operations. But overall the EU support 
for the operation was strong and consistent.  
 
The sustained EU support for Operation Althea has facilitated the operations 
overall success to date. A shared sense of purpose between the EU member 
states and institutions meant that the EU as a whole in this case committed the 
necessary capabilities to act, to fund and to cooperate and coordinate. The 
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operation has had sufficient support to help it achieve and implement its goals 
appropriately from both an internal and an external perspective.     
 
EUFOR DR Congo 
EUFOR DR Congo successfully achieved its internally defined purpose to 
support the UN operation (MONUC) in Kinshasa during the 1996 DRC 
elections. With the exception of its delayed deployment, the operation was 
implemented in an internally appropriate manner. From an external perspective 
the operation was only a limited success. Although it provided support to 
MONUC in Kinshasa, it contributed little in terms of the management of the 
violent conflict in other parts of the country at the time. However, the operation 
was a success in terms of its external appropriateness. Table 6.4 illustrates this 
mixed assessment of the operations success. The following section takes a 
closer look at the internal conditions under which this operation was 
undertaken. 
 
Table 6.4: Analytical breakdown of success in Operation EUFOR DR Congo 
 Success Partial success Failure 
Internal goal 
attainment 
 
 
X 
  
Internal 
appropriateness 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
External goal 
attainment 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
External 
appropriateness 
 
 
X 
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Operation EUFOR DR Congo is the ESDP military conflict management 
operation, which has so far enjoyed least EU support. As such, it was a stark 
contrast to Operation Althea. A lack of enthusiasm for this operation among 
the EU member states conditioned its success from the beginning. Out of the 
big three initially both the UK and Germany were disinclined to take part in or 
support the operation. This reluctance among key member states caused a 
delayed EU response to the UN invitation to conduct the operation. The UN 
made its formal request in December 2005 and received an affirmative reply 
from the EU only in March 2006 (Haine & Giegerich, 2006). This delay is 
particularly striking considering the quick response and rapid deployment of 
the Artemis troops in the country three years earlier. The delayed response 
illustrates not only less commitment shared across the cohort of member states, 
but also that there was less enthusiasm from France, or any other single 
member state, to take the lead in this operation. The UK, which was heavily 
engaged militarily in both Iraq and Afghanistan, maintained its decision that it 
would not take part. However, Germany was persuaded not only to contribute, 
but eventually also to officially lead the operation. France played a great part in 
persuading Germany to take on this responsibility, and eventually, France and 
Germany together provided two-thirds of the EUFOR DRC personnel. 
Officially 22 EU member states took part in the operation, but in real terms 
both the commitment and the capabilities dedicated to this operation from the 
EU member states were limited (Hadden, 2009). More than half of the 
countries involved sent only a symbolic contribution, as Haine and Giegerich 
(2006, p.2) put it: just to add their flag to the European pole, whether it makes 
operational sense or not. 
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 The main EU member state contributors to EUFOR DR Congo were: Germany, 
which deployed 780 troops (280 only in Kinshasa) and made available three 
helicopters (CH-53); France, which contributed some 500 troops and had three 
Mirage aeroplanes (f1CR) based in Ndjamena at EUFORs disposal; Portugal 
and Spain, which deployed 100 troops each; Sweden and Belgium each sent 50 
people; and Belgium contributed four unmanned aerial vehicles (Gegout, 
2007). National caveats and limitations to the Rules of Engagement 
constrained the operation. For example, Germany, despite accepting an official 
lead role in the operation, restricted its few forces deployed in the DRC to 
operate in the capital area only and otherwise sought to keep as many of its 
soldiers as possible in Gabon throughout the deployment (Haine and Giegerich, 
2006). 
  
With less than half its soldiers actually deployed in the DRC and the rest of the 
force stationed over-the-horizon in Gabon, EUFOR DR Congo has been 
accused of tokenism (Howorth, 2007, p.239). With a maximum of 1,000 troops 
on the ground in the DRC at any one time, confined to a small area around the 
capital city in a country three times the size of Western Europe with 50,000 
polling stations and serious instability in its eastern regions, it is clear that the 
EU support for this operation was limited. Especially considering the fact that 
twice as big a force was actually generated for the operation, but half of the 
soldiers were kept in waiting in Gabon. As DRC Presidential Candidate, 
Christophe Mboso, has pointed out, the elections after all did not take place in 
Gabon (Howorth, 2007, p.239).  
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 The limits to the EU commitment and capabilities allocated to the operation 
were a great contrast to the 7,000 EU troops deployed in BiH at the time and 
particularly striking considering the severe security situation in the DRC. As 
the EU force was being deployed to Kinshasa, Haine and Giegerich (2006) 
stressed that if the Union was serious about the electoral process in Congo, it 
should deploy its troops in the east of the country, where troubles were likely 
to arise. Instead, Haine and Giegerich (2006, p.1) argued: 
  
The mission’s rationale has more to do with Franco-German cohesion and 
with the desire to bolster the credibility of the European Security and Defence 
Policy after the fiasco of the Constitutional Treaty’s rejection in referendums 
in France and the Netherlands. The actual reality on the ground in Congo is 
only a secondary factor. 
 
Vogel (2008) supported this argument and stressed that the unstable region on 
the countrys eastern border with Rwanda and Uganda is 2,000 km from 
Kinshasa, where the EU force was deployed. Gegout (2009 and 2007) has 
argued a similar case, pointing out that the EU did not chose to extend the 
operation beyond the end-date of its initial mandate despite the UN request to 
do so and the tense situation in Kinshasa at the time. Although France and 
Belgium favoured an extension of the mandate, Germany decided to withdraw 
as planned in December 2006 (Hadden, 2009). These criticisms are supported 
by the fact that the EU has not since EUFOR DR Congo responded positively 
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to further calls from the UN and the French government for another EU 
military intervention in the DRC (Vogel, 2008).  
 
From the EU institutions the operation received operational, political and 
diplomatic support. EUFOR DR Congo was framed as part of the Unions 
developing comprehensive approach to the country, which amounts to a sizable 
measure of assistance (Howorth, 2007). On the Council side, in addition to the 
two military operations, the Union had also deployed three civilian ESDP 
missions in the DRC: EUPOL Kinshasa, EUPOL RD Congo and EUSEC RD 
Congo. EUPOL Kinshasa was assisting the Congolese National Police during 
the electoral period from April 2005 to June 2007. EUPOL RD Congo was 
subsequently deployed in July 2007 (mandated until June 2010) to assist the 
DRC authorities with police reform. EUSEC RD Congo is a EU advisory and 
assistance mission for security reform in the country. This mission was 
launched on 8 June 2005 and is mandated until 30 September 2009 (Council of 
the EU, 2009a). The two EUSRs to the African Union and the Great Lakes 
region sought to support both the military operations and the civilian missions 
and coordinate these efforts with the Commissions engagement in the country. 
The European Commission is currently one of the most significant donors in 
eastern DRC. It has donated 300 million to the region in humanitarian 
assistance and rehabilitation and capacity building programs since 2003 
(European Commission, 2008).  
 
The limitations to the success of EUFOR DR Congo, however, shows that a 
significant amount of EU institutional support to the country in which an ESDP 
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military conflict management operation engages cannot alone facilitate the 
operations success or make up for a lack of support dedicated to the operation 
from the EU member states. Ironically, the operations success in its internal 
goal attainment and its external appropriateness was facilitated by the 
limitations to the operations mandate, which were caused by lack of support 
from the member states. The operation achieved everything it set out to do, 
because it set out to do very little (internal goal attainment). It also did not use 
force, because it was practically ensured beforehand that the troops would not 
be deployed in a situation where they would need to use force. In terms of its 
internal appropriateness and it external goal attainment, however, the operation 
was only a limited success, as it failed to make a timely deployment (internal 
appropriateness) and any real contribution to the management of the conflict 
(external goal attainment). These partial failures were attributable to the lack of 
support from the EU member states, which were reluctant not only to 
participate in the operation, but also to support it. Overall, this case highlights 
two important findings of this analysis. Firstly, it shows that more EU support 
than was available in this case is necessary for an operation of this nature to 
make a timely deployment and a significant contribution to the management of 
a conflict of this magnitude. With regard to the EUFOR DRC operation the EU 
did not dedicate the necessary capabilities to allow the operation to succeed. In 
particular, the capabilities to act were limited by the restrictions in the mandate 
and the size and scope of the force. Although the EU had the capabilities to 
fund the operation and to cooperate and coordinate with its internal and 
external partners, this could not facilitate a success without the necessary 
personnel and hardware. Secondly, this case demonstrates how the definition 
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and criteria for success, which were developed in this thesis, ensure that a 
success cannot be achieved simply by aiming to do very little in the mandate.   
 
EUFOR Chad/CAR 
The Unions most recent ESDP military conflict management operation, 
EUFOR Chad/CAR, was only a partial success. It succeeded in its internal goal 
attainment and its external appropriateness. The incident, in which two EU 
soldiers accidentally crossed over into Sudan and one of them was killed, 
hindered EUFORs internal appropriateness. Moreover, although the EU force 
significantly improved security conditions in its area of operations for the 
durations of its mandate, the operations contribution to the management of the 
violent conflict in the region was limited. The following takes a closer look at 
the extent to which EU support conditioned EUFOR Chad/CARs partial 
success. Table 6.5 gives an analytical break down of the operations partial 
success according to the four criteria developed in chapter two.  
 
Table 6.5: Analytical breakdown of success in Operation Chad/RCA 
 Success Partial success Failure 
Internal goal 
attainment 
 
 
X 
  
Internal 
appropriateness 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
External goal 
attainment 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
External 
appropriateness 
 
 
X 
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EUFOR Chad/CAR was another French initiative. The Chadian government 
had opposed a plan to deploy a UN military component to the MINURCAT 
mission in the region. In response, France proposed an ESDP military conflict 
management operation in its place. In May 2007, the French foreign ministry 
submitted the proposal to its EU counterparts. The reaction from other member 
states was mixed. Although the scepticism was not as profound as in the case 
of EUFOR DRC, there was still not a shared sense of purpose or widespread 
support for the operation among the EU member states. The tough negotiations 
between the member states regarding the motivations and logic behind the 
proposed deployment illustrate this. France was keen to stabilise the situation 
in Chad and favoured an EU rather than a bilateral intervention. Because 
France already had troops in Chad supporting President Deby, there was 
cynicism among some member states as to the underlying interests of both 
France and Chad in the proposed EU operation. Moreover, the operation was 
predicted to be the most expensive and cumbersome ESDP military conflict 
management operation yet undertaken. Germany raised the issue of how 
immense efforts to renovate the Chadian infrastructure would have to be 
undertaken and paid for by the EU to allow for the relatively short deployment. 
Germany questioned whether the main beneficiary of such an investment in the 
end would be France. Other member states felt that since it was now a year 
since EUFOR DRC it was time for another military deployment to demonstrate 
the continued development of the ESDP. There was also some discussion about 
whether to try out the newly developed Nordic battle group in eastern Chad, 
but this plan never materialised.  
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In an interview at the time a national representative to the EU described the 
negotiations concerning the proposed Chad/CAR deployment:  
 
Sarkosy is completely politically driven and wants an EU mission in eastern 
Chad, but the UK and Germany think it is a stupid idea. It is expensive and 
cumbersome. The borders that we are supposed to defend are thousands of 
kilometres long and there is no infrastructure to do it (…) So France is there 
diplomatically convincing everyone to go, and the UK wants to support France 
on this in hope of getting something on Zimbabwe, but Germany is not keen on 
intervening in Africa at all. It is a mess. And then when Sarkosy gets his 
resolution on eastern Chad, he gets the diplomatic glory. At the same time he 
does not want to send the troops and he’s wondering why everyone is looking 
at him. Meanwhile, the UK and Germany are trying to escape paying too much 
and they want to limit the mandate by having a clear exit strategy (Interview, 
national representative to the EU, 18/09/2007).  
 
Despite these divisions among the member states there was a shared frustration 
in the PSC about the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. In the end, this caused the 
EU to launch the operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (Seibert, 
2007; Mattelaer, 2009). Although most of the member states were still 
reluctant to contribute to the operation, a consensus was finally reached. The 
EU member states as a whole consented to the operation on condition that it 
would be a French-led endeavour. Agreement was reached once again by 
imposing strict political constraints on the operation both in terms of its 
mandated time and function. Impartiality was made an absolute condition and 
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the operational objective was limited to contributing to a safe and secure 
environment. The operational concept for EUFOR Chad/CAR was as such 
developed from the lowest-common denominator agreed upon by the 
politically divided member states (Mattelaer, 2008).       
 
The lack of support among the member states was illustrated also in the force 
generation process. Not a single member state, other than France, agreed to 
contribute in any significant way to the operation at the initial force generation 
conference. Another five conferences would be held before 23 EU member 
states finally agreed to contribute to the operation. France ended up having to 
fill the gaps, providing half of the troops for the operation and a General for the 
position of Force Commander.
31
 
 
Despite the tough negotiations, the six force generation conferences and the 
additional support from France, EUFOR Chad/CAR was still more than 600 
soldiers short of the planned 4,000 forces when it reached Full Operating 
Capability (Berg, 2008; Ehrhart, 2008; Council of the EU, 2009g). The 
difficult force generation process also meant that the operation did not reach its 
full strength until halfway through its mandate. In terms of military hardware 
EUFOR Chad/CAR was also short-handed. The operation had to rely on Russia 
for four helicopters, as the EU member state failed to provide the 16 
helicopters needed for the operation (Ehrhart, 2008; Pop, 2009). These 
helicopters, according Operation Commander Pat Nash, are particularly 
                                                 
31 Since the mid-1980s, France had at least 3,000 troops stationed in Chad. This enabled her to 
provide military support to President Deby and maintain a strategic role in the country. Most of 
the French troops, which took part in EUFOR Chad/CAR, came from this force already 
deployed in the country (Council of the EU, 2009g; Mattelaer, 2008; Rye Olsen, 2009). 
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important in an area of operations of this size, because it increases the 
operations mobility and ability to maintain an element of surprise and 
reactivity. As Nash (2008) put it himself: The more helicopters I have the more 
flexibility the Force Commander has. 
 
Once the operation was deployed the political quarrels among the EU member 
states undermined the operation politically and caused confusion at the 
operational level (Mattelaer, 2009). In particular it was unclear both to the 
Chad authorities and the rebels it was fighting, whose side the EU was on, 
despite the Unions insistence on its impartiality. This confusion, Chad expert 
Bjoern Seibert has argued, directly caused a rebel offensive on Chads capital, 
Ndjamena, as EUFOR was being deployed. The next chapter will explore the 
domestic context of the operation in further details. However, for the purpose 
of this level of the analysis, this event exemplifies how the disagreements 
among the EU member states had a negative effect on the domestic 
circumstances for the operation in the field.  
 
Despite the serious political, conceptual and logistical hurdles, the EU 
institutional support for the operation was significant. The military planning 
system did a remarkable job, all things considered, in preparing the operation. 
Once the force was deployed, it completed its tasks well. It received the 
operational support from HQ to be able at the tactical level to reach its stated 
objectives and make a valuable contribution to security situation on the ground 
in its area of operations (Mattelaer, 2009; Oxfam, 2008). Despite an invitation 
from the UNSG the EU did not decide to extend the operation beyond its initial 
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mandate. Instead Solana offered that some of the EU soldiers would stay on in 
a UN capacity (Council of the EU, 2009g; Pop, 2009).  
 
This case illustrates once again how the member states have a crucial impact 
on the success of an operation. It demonstrates that the EU institutions, 
although important to the overall level of EU support, cannot make up for such 
significant limitations of the commitment and capabilities allocated to the 
operation by the EU member states. EUFOR Chad/CAR had significant trouble 
securing sufficient support both in terms of the EU capabilities to act (hardware 
and forces) and to fund the operation. This, as well as the limitations to the 
mandate, again caused by lack of commitment from the member states, had a 
negative impact of the external goal attainment of the operation. Although this 
case illustrates that other actors cannot substitute the necessary support from 
EU member states, it does indicate that EU support at the institutional level is 
important for the smooth running of the operation (internal appropriateness) 
once it is launched. The Russian supply of helicopters to this operation also 
indicates that external actors can help to contribute necessary capabilities to act 
(personnel and hardware), when the EU struggles to provide them.        
 
Conclusion and key findings 
This chapter examined the internal conditions for success in ESDP military 
conflict management operations from 2003 to 2009. Internal conditions for 
success are the conditions, internally within the EU, which are necessary for 
operations of this nature to be able to succeed. The research hypothesis 
concerning the internal conditions for success suggested that: if an ESDP 
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military conflict management operation does secure sufficient EU support, it 
cannot succeed. The findings in this chapter confirm the empirical relevance of 
this hypothesis. In all five cases it is clear that EU support is necessary for 
ESDP military conflict management operations to succeed. There is a clear 
correlation between high levels of EU support and high levels of success on the 
one hand and limited success and limited EU support on the other.  
 
The case study also illustrated that EU support is not static. It can increase over 
time and can be encouraged by the actions of individual member states. For 
example, France has often taken the initiative to launch operations and then 
convinced other member states to take part through a combination of 
diplomatic pressure and persuasion and the practical promise of a French lead 
or a significant French contribution to the operation.  
 
The analysis found that if an operation cannot secure sufficient EU support, as 
was the case for example in EUFOR DRC, it cannot fully succeed. It is 
important to recall, as the first part of the thesis concluded, that an operation 
could succeed in some aspects, whilst not in others. An operation may, thus, 
have sufficient EU support to succeed according to one criterion, but not 
another. All five cases had sufficient EU support to succeed in their internal 
goal attainment. In terms of their external goal attainment, the operations had 
very different levels of success and of EU support for such success. The 
findings above suggest that there is a causal link between the two. Limitations 
to success in internal appropriateness were generally attributable to a lack of 
sufficient EU support. Limitations to success in external appropriateness; 
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however, were caused by individual staff of the operations rather than 
conditions at the EU level.   
 
Overall, the five cases indicated that the more EU support an operation has, the 
better able it will be to succeed. In Macedonia and Bosnia high levels of 
support both from the EU member states and the EU institutions, not only 
towards the operations, but also to the wider management of the conflicts 
proved advantageous to their success. This indicates that not just the level but 
also the nature of the EU support has an effect of the likelihood of success. The 
experience of Concordia and Althea, which were both overall successes, 
suggest that when operations are an integrated part of a wider comprehensive 
EU approach towards the conflict and the country, in which the operation 
engages, there is more EU support for the operation, and in turn the operation 
is more likely to succeed. However, EUFOR DRC illustrated that a wider EU 
approach towards the country in question does not facilitate success in the 
ESDP military conflict management operation, if the operation itself does not 
have sufficient EU support.  
 
What constitutes sufficient EU support for an operation to succeed proved to 
vary on a case-by-case basis, but the chapter found that there are two 
conditions, internally within the EU, which are necessary for ESDP military 
conflict management operations to be able to succeed. These two conditions 
are: EU commitment and EU capabilities. The analysis can conclude that it is 
necessary that the EU, as a whole, supports the operation both in word and in 
deed. It is not enough that EU member states or institutions have a general 
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interest in the operations success or indeed in the successful management of 
the conflict. For the operation to succeed this interest must translate into actual 
commitment dedicated to the successful undertaking of an operation. Interest is 
conducive to success, but commitment is necessary.  
 
Likewise, it is not sufficient the EU, as the sum of its parts, has the resources 
that are needed for an operation to succeed. It is a condition for success that the 
necessary capabilities are also made available to the operation when it needs 
them. For example, EUFOR Chad/CAR illustrates that it is not enough that the 
EU member states have 16 helicopters between them, if they are not willing or 
able to commit them to the operation. With regard to the necessary capabilities 
to succeed the analytical findings support the claim that EU capabilities (a) to 
act, (b) to fund and (c) to cooperate and coordinate are all significant for an 
operation of this nature to be able to succeed. Most important are the EUs 
capabilities to act and to fund. The chapter found that if the EU does not 
allocate the necessary personnel and hardware to the operation and fund it 
sufficiently, then it would not be able to succeed. Support from the EU member 
states is, therefore, crucial to success, as it is the contributing member states, 
which supply the operations with manpower, equipment and money. Moreover, 
it is the member states, which together determine the operations mandate, 
which this chapter found, can limit an operations success especially in external 
goal attainment. The member states, thus, decide both what the operation 
should do and to a large extent what it is able to do. In this way, commitment 
from the EU member states has a significant impact on an operations ability to 
succeed. On this basis, the chapter can conclude that sufficient support 
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(commitment and capabilities) from the EU member states is the sine qua non 
for success in ESDP military conflict management operations, but support from 
the EU institutions is also necessary in the successful implementation of the 
operations. EU institutions play an important part in the capabilities to act and 
in the capabilities to cooperate both with actors both within and outside the EU. 
The next chapter will examine the cooperation with external actors in further 
detail.  
 
The comparative case study above can conclude that it is support for the 
operation from the EU as a whole that facilitates success. To achieve success it 
does not matter which member states contributes what as long as the sum of 
EU support as a whole is sufficient for the operation to succeed. Why the EU 
or individual member states and institutions support an operation does also not 
directly affect its success. This is a question of legitimacy rather than a 
condition for the success in the undertaking of these operations in the field. As 
such, although legitimacy is an important question more generally, it did not 
prove a necessary condition for success. It is the active support from the EU as 
a whole to the operation, which is important for success. If the EU does not 
allocate sufficient commitment and capabilities to an operation, it cannot 
succeed. The chapter found that the commitment and capabilities, although 
necessary, are not sufficient on their own to facilitate a success. The findings 
above suggest that the external context in which the operation engages also 
conditions the success of these operations. The next chapter will examine if, 
how and why this is the case.       
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 Chapter seven: An empirical assessment of external conditions 
for success 
The existing scholarship of the ESDP has yet to undertake a structured analysis 
of the conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. 
It is this gap in the literature and the conceptual understanding of the ESDP, 
which the second part of this thesis set out to address. To this end, chapter five 
made an analytical distinction between the two categories of (1) internal and 
(2) external conditions for success. It deduced hypotheses concerning the 
conditions for success within each category. Chapter six analysed the internal 
conditions for success in a comparative study of the five ESDP military 
conflict management operations conducted from 2003 to 2009. It concluded 
that if an operation does not have sufficient EU support, it will not succeed. 
This support must comprise sufficient commitment and sufficient capabilities 
dedicated from the EU member states and institutions to the operation for it to 
be able to achieve its purpose in an appropriate manner. The research findings 
suggest that these internal conditions are necessary, but not sufficient for 
success. In addition to the internal conditions, the two previous chapters 
suggest, the success of an operation depends also on conditions in the external 
context in which the operation is undertaken. This chapter examines whether 
external conditions for success do indeed exist, and if so  why and how they 
condition success. The study of the external conditions for success is divided 
into three levels of analysis. This is based on the theoretical premise, developed 
in chapter five, which suggests that there are three contextual levels outside the 
EU, which are expected to influence the success of ESDP military conflict 
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management operations. These are the domestic level, the regional level and 
the international level. Chapter five developed a hypothesis for each of the 
external levels of analysis. The three hypotheses are presented in the table 
below.   
 
Table 7.1: Research hypotheses: External conditions for success 
Conditions for success
 
Hypothesis 
Domestic support H2: If an ESDP military conflict management 
operation cannot secure sufficient domestic 
support, it cannot succeed. 
Regional support 
 
H3: If an ESDP military conflict management 
operation cannot secure sufficient regional 
support, it cannot succeed. 
International support H4: If an ESDP military conflict management 
operation cannot secure sufficient international 
support, it cannot succeed. 
 
The three hypotheses suggest that domestic, regional and international support 
is necessary for an ESDP military conflict management operation to be 
successful. This chapter tests the empirical relevance of this assumption in the 
five ESDP military conflict management operations from 2003 to 2009. The 
five cases will be examined region by region rather than in their chronological 
order. The chapter will first examine the two operations in the Western Balkans 
(Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina), then the two operations in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and finally, the joint operation in Chad and the 
Central African Republic. This is analytically useful in order to examine how 
operations that engage in conflicts, which share similar domestic, regional and 
international circumstances compare in terms of the external conditions for 
their success. This separation will also help illustrate how the EU has 
undertaken different types of military conflict management operations and 
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allow for an investigation of how the type of military conflict management 
affects the conditions for its success. The analysis takes a comparative 
perspective on the external conditions for success in ESDP military conflict 
management operations and relates this to the internal conditions for success 
presented in the previous chapter.  
 
The external context of operations Concordia (Macedonia) and Althea (BiH) 
This first section takes a closer look at the external context of operations 
Concordia and Althea, which the EU has been and in the case of Althea still is 
undertaking in the Western Balkans.  
 
The domestic level 
When Operation Concordia was launched in Macedonia in 2003 the domestic 
situation in the country had already much improved since the crisis two years 
earlier. There had been genuine signs of political compromise. The Ohrid 
Agreement and the subsequent elections had resulted in the main Albanian 
political party being represented in government and both political and security 
relations between the conflicting parties were improving. The Macedonian 
authorities now representing both ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians 
fully supported Operation Concordia. The operation was launched upon 
explicit invitation from the government and the domestic authorities greeted its 
deployment with enthusiasm (Council Decision 2003/7537/CFSP, 18/3/2003; 
ICG, 2005b).  
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At the time President Boris Trajkovski explained the governments motivations 
behind its invitation and its support for the Concordia operation in the 
following way: 
 
The successful ending of this mission will mark the termination of the last 
phase of the process of the consolidation of the security. It will mean taking on 
our own responsibility for the internal stability and fulfilment of one of the 
preconditions for membership of the Republic of Macedonia in the European 
Union and NATO (…) This mission offers us a chance to develop a particularly 
close collaboration with the EU forces from the moment of their establishment, 
a chance that we do not intend to miss (…) Our ambition is full membership in 
the Union, and I would like to see this mission and our joint efforts in 
promoting stability as a step in that direction. The more of EU we have in 
Macedonia, the more of Macedonia there is in the EU (Trajkovski, 2003).  
 
An interviewee from the European Commission delegation in Skopje 
confirmed the widespread domestic support for Concordia and explained the 
governments enthusiasm for the operation in a similar way:  
 
Concordia was a symbol of Macedonia’s ambition to establish tighter links 
with the EU in all areas, including full membership in the Union. It was one 
dimension of the European integration of Macedonia and a symbol of an ever-
closer union and partnership between the EU and Macedonia. By inviting the 
EU to launch (the) military mission Macedonia signalled its willingness and 
ability to adopt the logic, norms, patters of behaviour and regulations 
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associated with European integration into its political, security and defence 
system (Interview, Representative from the European Commission delegation 
to Macedonia, 30/04/2009). 
 
The high level of domestic support for the operation at the state-level was 
shared at the sub-state level (Mace, 2004). The relationship between the EU 
forces and the Macedonian population was good, as an interviewee explained:  
 
In the sphere of improving the social and economic situation of the country, 
Concordia conducted civil military cooperation projects in the villages of 
former crisis areas with the aim of improving the living conditions of people. 
These projects helped the members of Concordia to establish close 
relationships with the local population that contributed to improving their 
mutual rapport (Interview, representative from European Commission 
delegation to Macedonia, 30/04/2009). 
 
Colonel Pierre Augustin (2005), the operations representative from France, 
also stressed the importance of what he called the Concordias systematic 
contact with the ethnic communities. In particular, he highlighted that: 
 
The combination of light and heavy teams performing missions strongly 
reinforced a palpable deterrence in addition to establishing the perception of 
the EUFOR as an integrated force dedicated to restoring public confidence. 
Building this confidence set the foundation for the information collection effort 
and proved essential to restoring a peaceful environment lost following the 
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events of 2001. EUFOR has become a federating security element in the daily 
life of the ethnic communities. Immersion and openness of these patrols in the 
FCA (former crisis area) has been elemental (Augustin, 2005, p.58).   
 
Mace (2004) has suggested that the handover from NATO to the EU and the 
continuity of the approach between the two operations helped Concordia to 
quickly win the trust and confidence of domestic parties in Macedonia. This 
chapter will return to the link between the two organisations at the international 
level, but it is important to note that the operational connection between the 
two made Concordia look more robust both in the eyes of the domestic 
authorities and the different ethnic communities in Macedonia. This fostered 
further domestic support for Operation Concordia from key state and sub-state 
actors in Macedonia (Cascone, 2008; Howorth, 2007; Mace, 2004).  
 
The high level of domestic support was essential for EUFORs success both in 
terms of its internal and its external goal attainment in Macedonia. The fact that 
the EU force had political support from the authorities and communal support 
from the population made it easier for the operation to achieve its goals in a 
timely, cost-effective and relatively efficient manner. The fact that there was 
domestic support also for the wider EU-led international effort to manage the 
political conflict through the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement and the 
Stabilisation and Association Process to bring Macedonia on track for EU 
membership meant that Concordia was able to contribute positively also to this 
wider process. Finally, the domestic support meant that the EU troops were 
never challenged militarily and in effect they never decided to apply force. In 
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this way, domestic support also made it easier for Concordia to be successful in 
terms of its external appropriateness. The domestic consent and support for the 
operation provided a permissive environment on the ground in which 
Concordia could succeed. As explained in the previous chapter, the only 
spoilers to the operation and limitation to its overall success were a few of its 
own staff involved in criminal activities in the country. 
 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina too the security situation when EUFOR was 
deployed in 2004 had much improved since the end of the war in 1995. 
However, the legacy of the war had left the former parties to the conflict wary 
not only of each other, but also of the EUs capability as a conflict manager. 
The political leaders of the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat 
communities agreed, albeit with different degrees of enthusiasm, that an 
international military presence was still necessary to ensure stability in the 
country after NATOs planned departure in 2004. But there was also a shared 
domestic perception that Europe had failed Bosnia during the war. An ICG 
report from the time when Operation Althea was launched explained this 
domestic scepticism:  
 
Due to its failure to act unanimously and decisively during the war the EU is 
still viewed with considerable suspicion in Bosnia (ICG, 2005b, p.50). 
 
Unlike the EU, NATO had proved itself as a credible security provider in BiH. 
The majority of domestic authorities and large parts of the population believed 
that the NATO presence had played a significant role in preventing the return 
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to war. A new international military deterrent was still deemed necessary, but 
the potential hand-over to a EU operation raised domestic concern. It was not 
just the European Union that experienced domestic scepticism. European 
soldiers also had a tarnished reputation in the country after the mostly 
European UNPROFOR mission had failed to protect civilians on all sides 
during the war in the 1990s. The wariness of the EUs political commitment 
and military capability, although shared across ethnic divisions in the country, 
was particularly strong among Bosnian Muslims. One interviewee remembered 
how when British diplomat Robert Cooper attempted to reassure Bosniak PM 
Adnan Terzic that the EU would make sure that the security situation did not 
deteriorate Terzic looked at Cooper and said:  
 
That is what you said last time. I guess, I will just have to trust that you will do 
it this time (Interview, representative from the European Commission, 
07/05/2009).  
 
This initial domestic scepticism about the EUs ability as a military conflict 
manager must not be mistaken for lack of domestic support for Operation 
Althea. On the contrary, the domestic fear that it would fail demonstrates a 
high level of domestic support for EUFORs principle purpose: to prevent 
more violence. The majority of the population and the political leadership 
wanted peace. Although the political context in the country was difficult, all 
sides wanted to prevent further violence and, therefore, supported the operation 
once it became clear that it would become NATOs replacement. The 
Presidency, representing all three constituent peoples of BiH, officially 
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welcomed the NATO-EU transition and 74 per cent of the countrys population 
supported the EU force once the troops arrived in the country (Budin, 2006). 
The only real opposition that the operation has encountered at the domestic 
level has been from a criminal minority and not from the majority of 
population or the political leadership.  
 
It is important to make a distinction between domestic support for EUFOR and 
domestic support for the EU, which have not always gone hand in hand. 
Whereas EUFOR has received a high level of domestic support during its 
deployment, the EU has at times been very unpopular in the country. It is also 
important to recognise that the highest domestic authority in BiH is the 
international Office of the High Representative (OHR). Because the High 
Representative (HR) is mandated to sanction any anti-Dayton behaviour and 
EUFORs own mandate is annexed in the Dayton Agreement, domestic support 
for the operation is to a certain degree institutionalised in the constitutional 
arrangements of BiH. Although the relationship between the different High 
Representatives and EUFOR Commanders has varied over time, the state 
structures of post-Dayton BiH have by law limited potential political 
obstruction to the EUFOR operation. This is not to say that without these 
structures EUFOR would have met much more domestic opposition, but rather 
to underline that domestic support could be facilitated by the OHR/EUSR 
(Council of the EU, 2009b; Friesendorf and Penska, 2008; GFAP, 1995; OHR, 
2009).  
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Domestic support has been imperative to the overall success of operations 
Althea and Concordia. In both cases, there was domestic consent from (a) the 
political leadership, (b) the former belligerent parties and (c) the domestic 
populations. There was no domestic obstruction to the operations and they both 
enjoyed active support from the key political and security actors at the 
domestic level. It is important to stress in this context that the operations did 
not engage in an active violent conflict, but rather acted as a deterrent to 
prevent more violence. Overall, this suggests that a permissive environment 
and consent and support for the operations at the domestic level facilitate 
success in ESDP military conflict management operations.  
 
The regional level 
During the violent break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s the instability affected 
the entire Western Balkan region. The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
actively involved regional actors: Serbia (then Yugoslavia) and Croatia 
(Glenny, 2001; Silber and Little, 1996). When the Macedonian crisis broke out 
in 2001, the security situation in the region was different. This conflict was for 
the most part contained within the Macedonian territory and fought out 
between domestic state and sub-state level actors. Although it is still disputed 
to what extent the National Liberation Army, the armed wing of the ethnic 
Albanian rebels in the conflict, were aided from Kosovo (Mace, 2004; 
Vankovska, 2002).  
 
At the time of the launch of both operations Concordia (2003) and Althea 
(2004) unsettled status issues with regard to Kosovo and the Serbia-
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Montenegro state-union were generating wider concerns about the stability of 
other borders and geo-political entities in the region. In BiH the status of 
Republika Srpska was (and still is) disputed and in Macedonia there were fears 
of insecurity on the border with Kosovo (ICG, 2005a).  By March 2009, the 
regional security context in the Western Balkans had much improved. As one 
interviewee put it: 
 
In the Western Balkans regional security is no longer in danger. Serbia and 
Croatia are focusing on EU accession. They are not interested in interfering in 
Bosnia. Albania and Montenegro are stable. So are Kosovo and Macedonia, 
although there may be some isolated violence with regard to Serbia-Kosovo 
relations regarding the northern part of Kosovo, and this could spill over the 
Macedonian border. But all in all - the situation is stable. This is not the EU’s 
achievement as such, but the EU has succeeded in changing the focus and 
priorities on the national political agenda in these countries towards EU 
membership. This is now the first priority (Interview, representative from the 
European Commission, 07/05/2009).   
 
Since their deployments neither Operation Concordia nor Operation Althea has 
been challenged by any actors at the regional level. The operations have also 
not been actively supported by regional actors. In fact, both operations have 
been free from interference at the regional level. As the quote above illustrates 
regional political and security actors did not have an interest in hindering these 
operations or interfering with the security situation in Macedonia or BiH 
during their deployments. Therefore, all the key security actors in the Balkans 
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accepted the presence of the EU forces in both countries. As operational 
support from regional actors was absent in these two cases, which have both 
been largely successful, such support did not prove to be a necessary condition 
for success in these two cases. Political support, in the sense that these actors 
accepted and did not seek to hinder the operations, however, is widely 
perceived as a necessary condition for their success. This issue was often raised 
by interviewees, in particular in BiH, with reference to the way in which 
regional interference, at least in part, caused the failure of the UNs attempt 
(UNPROFOR) to militarily manage the conflict in BiH a decade earlier. This 
supports the domestic-level finding, which suggested that the nature of the 
conflict affects the necessary conditions for success in ESDP military conflict 
management operations. The fact that these were not active violent conflicts 
helped operations Concordia and Althea to succeed in the sense that they were 
not challenged militarily or politically (Interviews, Representatives from BiH 
Council of Ministers, 29/06/2006; Interview, Representative from the European 
Commission delegation in BiH, 30/06/2006; Interview, Representative from 
the OHR, 30/06/2006). The research findings also support the argument above 
that the Stabilisation and Association Process has changed political and 
security agendas throughout the Western Balkans. Several interviewees 
suggested that the prospect of EU membership to which all the countries in the 
region have declared a desire has increased the Unions leverage in the region. 
This in turn has positively affected regional security and indirectly discouraged 
actors in the region from interfering in a negative way with the two ESDP 
military conflict management operations.  
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The international level 
For both Operation Concordia and Operation Althea the most important 
international security partner was NATO; firstly, because both operations had 
operational support and access to NATO assets through the Berlin Plus 
arrangements; and secondly, because both operations took over responsibilities 
from previous NATO operations in the field. NATO had completed three 
operations (Essential Harvest, Amber Fox and Allied Harmony) in Macedonia 
before the EU launched Operation Concordia. Likewise, NATO had 
undertaken two operations (IFOR and SFOR) in BiH prior to Operation Althea. 
In both countries NATO had engaged at the height of the crisis and facilitated a 
significant improvement in the overall security situation throughout its 
deployments. At the termination of its operations in both countries NATO 
transferred most of its authority and responsibility for security to the EU (and 
some to local authorities). In this process the EU benefited from NATOs 
extensive operational experience in both planning and undertaking its many 
operations in the Balkans, which were not limited to these two countries 
(Cascone, 2008; Howorth, 2007; Mace, 2004).  
 
The relationship between the EU and NATO was of paramount importance for 
the successful undertaking of both these ESDP military conflict management 
operations. Apart from relatively minor turf battles the two organisations 
worked closely, professionally and well together during both Operation 
Concordia and Operation Althea. With regard to Concordia Mace (2004) has 
argued that the relationship between the two was good, although competitive at 
times. Cascone (2008) has made the case that these operations were successful 
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and useful tests for NATO-EU cooperation, but he stresses that the 
coordination between the two organisations in the Balkans was mostly practical 
coordination in the field, facilitated more by individual member states of the 
two organisations pushing for a coherent message than from a genuinely joint 
EU-NATO approach towards the conflicts in the region.  
 
A smaller NATO presence remained in both countries after the official 
termination of its peace support operations. NATO kept a Senior Civilian 
Representative and a Senior Military Representative in Skopje to help the 
Government with security sector reform and adaptation to NATO standards for 
the Partnership for Peace and eventual NATO membership (Mace, 2004). The 
situation was much the same in BiH, where NATO opened a new HQ in 
Sarajevo when it officially terminated the SFOR operation. The new NATO 
HQ led by a Senior Military Representative was intended to provide advice on 
and assistance to the Bosnian authorities in reforming the armed forces and 
moving towards a single military force. NATO HQ Sarajevo was also intended 
to undertake certain operational tasks in relation to counter-terrorism; 
intelligence sharing with the EU; and ensuring force protection and support to 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the 
detention of persons indicted for war crimes (NATO, 2004).  
 
For the purpose of this analysis it is important to recognise that the 
international community in both countries was no larger than that EU and 
NATO representatives would continue to be in close contact. For example, the 
two organisations were co-located in Camp Butmir outside Sarajevo for the 
 242
first few years of EUFOR Althea. In both countries the respective EUSRs are 
in charge of coordinating the international community, which also reinforced 
cooperation. Overall, the coordination and cooperation was good both in 
Macedonia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, although to some extent this did 
depend on personalities and personal rapport between specific Head of 
Missions. For example, several interviewees pointed out how it benefited 
NATO-EUFOR-OHR/EUSR cooperation in BiH that EUSR and High 
Representative Paddy Ashdown had both a political and military background. 
As one interviewee explained:  
 
Paddy’s military background was helpful. It made it easier for him to 
cooperate with military people at all levels (Interview, Representative from the 
European Commission, 07/05/2009).  
 
The role of individuals is underestimated in the ESDP literature.
 
However, as 
Friesendorf and Penska (2008) have suggested with regard to EUFOR Althea 
personalities and how well different individuals work together are of utmost 
importance to the success of these operations. Another important factor with 
regard to inter-organisational cooperation between NATO and the EU in 
Macedonia and BiH is that the previous NATO operations in both countries 
had large European contingents, which ensured a degree of shared institutional 
memory and understanding across the official NATO-EU divide. Many of the 
member states of the two organisations and contributing nations in the 
operations were the same. This does not necessarily mean that member states 
always behave consistently in the two organisations (or in the different 
 243
operations), but in these two cases it has facilitated a better cooperation and 
coordination between the EU and NATO. For example, the UK, which had 
played a significant role in IFOR and SFOR, initially took the lead in 
Operation Althea. A number of NATO staff also stayed on under the EU flag 
in both operations Concordia and Althea. These important details are 
sometimes neglected in the literature, which often refers to the two 
organisations as further apart than they were in reality on the ground.  
 
A final issue which must not be overlooked in the international context of 
Operations Concordia and Althea is the role of the US both within and outside 
NATO. The Balkan wars of the 1990s left the US with a powerful reputation in 
the region. The US had made it clear that it had the capability to act and that it 
was willing to use it. Whether people agreed with its specific actions or not 
America was (and still is) recognised throughout the region as an important 
actor, in particular, in matters of security. In BiH, for example, previous to 
Operation Althea the US (through NATO) was seen as the only trustworthy 
guarantor of peace. As the ICG wrote six months before the launch of 
Operation Althea: 
 
Most Bosnians – the Bosniaks in particular – see the US as playing a major 
part in maintaining the peace and unity of the country. Serb and Croat citizens 
acknowledge that without the US presence the political and security situation 
might deteriorate (ICG, 2004, p.6) 
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The empirical accuracy of this analysis was demonstrated in February 2004 
(two months into the Althea deployment) when the collective BiH Presidency, 
which represented all three parties to the conflict, formally asked the US 
authorities to consider maintaining a base in the country (ICG, 2004). But the 
Bush administration was eager to downscale its military contributions to the 
NATO operations in the region and had repeatedly expressed its distaste with 
NATOs involvement in nation-building in BiH (Mace, 2004). Nonetheless, the 
US needed to ensure that its political investments in the region pay off (ICG, 
2004, p.3) This made the US support an EU take-over of military conflict 
management responsibilities from NATO in BiH, although only once the 
Berlin Plus had been negotiated and successfully tested in Concordia. For the 
US, Operation Concordia was a trial run for Operation Althea. The following 
quote illustrates this:  
 
EUFOR carried out a ‘live fire’ exercise there (in Macedonia). Here was no 
threat to a safe and secure environment and no operations that carried any risk 
other than traffic accidents or alcohol poisoning by the troops on Friday night. 
But it offered a benign environment in which the EU could find out the 
complexities and challenges of mounting a real operation without any risk of 
failure. The exercise was successful as EUFOR confronted important issues 
like communications, logistics and operational mobility and found solutions 
(Interview, senior western diplomat, 17/07/2009). 
 
A good strategic relationship between the US and the EU proved essential for 
the successful functioning of the Berlin Plus at the operational level, which 
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facilitated the necessary institutional support for the successful undertaking of 
the operation at the tactical level. With regard to the relationship between the 
EU and the US, the UK played an important part in both cases. In negotiating 
the Berlin Plus and the terms for Concordia, the UK, which had led NATO 
Operation Essential Harvest, played an important bringing-role between the US 
and the EU (Mace, 2004). The fact that the UK had already proved itself to the 
Americans in IFOR and SFOR also helped muster up the necessary US support 
(Interview, representative from NATO, 02/02/2007). This is but one example 
of how in the Balkan operations the EU often became its own partner either 
through its member states and institutions represented in the field or through 
their advocacy in international negotiations. This illustrates how the EU can 
affect the international context in which ESDP military conflict management 
operations operate.  
 
There were many other international actors involved in conflict regulation in 
both Macedonia and in BiH, but as the above demonstrates NATO with the US 
within it was the Unions single most important security partner. At the 
tactical, the operational and the strategic levels NATOs support for these two 
operations was crucial to their success. The UN was important in so far as it 
authorised the mandates for both operations. But although the UN had 
deployed peacekeeping operations in both countries in the past (before NATO), 
these were withdrawn long before Operations Concordia and Althea were on 
the drawing board and the UN no longer had a strong security profile in either 
country. The UN, in operational and tactical terms, therefore, did not have a 
direct impact on the success of operations Concordia and Althea. It was 
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conducive to the success of both operations that they cooperated and 
coordinated well with non-military international partners in the field. However, 
support from these other international actors did not prove to be necessary for 
the success of the operations. As this thesis focuses on the necessary conditions 
for success only, the role of other international actors in these countries will not 
be examined in further detail here. 
 
With the exception of the criminal behaviour by individual EU soldiers in 
Macedonia, the two operations in the Balkans were successful. The above 
illustrates how both EUFOR Concordia and EUFOR Althea had good 
relationships with all the key political and security actors at the domestic, 
regional and international levels. This helped the operations succeed both 
internally and externally. Active support from key actors at the domestic and 
international level proved necessary for success, as did the absence of 
obstruction at the regional level. Moreover, the operations in Macedonia and 
BiH demonstrated how the EU could influence the domestic, regional and 
international contexts in which its operations engage. The EU soldiers can 
foster support for the operations by engaging actively and positively with 
domestic actors and populations; and through its member states and institutions 
the EU can help (or hinder) itself at each of these levels through simultaneous 
initiatives on the ground or in the international security arena. In other words, 
the EU itself can affect the external conditions, which determine the success of 
its operations. Through its integrated comprehensive approach in the Western 
Balkans and the prospect of EU membership the EU indirectly encouraged 
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support for its ESDP military conflict management operations domestically, 
regionally and internationally in both these cases.  
 
The external context of Operation Artemis and EUFOR DR Congo in the DRC 
This next section looks at the external context of operations Artemis and 
EUFOR DR Congo, which the EU deployed in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo in 2003 and 2006, respectively. 
 
The domestic level 
When Operation Artemis was launched in the DRC in 2003 the domestic 
context in which the EU soldiers were deployed was complex and dangerous. 
The Ituri conflict, which was the focus of the Artemis operation, was part of a 
wider conflict in the DRC, which at the time included domestic actors in 
Kinshasa and Goma as well as regional actors from Rwanda and Uganda. From 
1999 to 2003, factional fighting in the Ituri district alone had killed 50,000 
people and caused another 500,000 to flee the area. When the EU soldiers 
arrived the situation in the district capital, Bunia, was out of control. The 
withdrawal of the Ugandan Peoples Defence Force, which was officially 
initiated in May 2003, had led to fierce fighting between the ethnic Lendu-
militia and the ethnic Hema Union of Congolese Patriots. Thousands of 
civilians sought refuge at the UN compound hoping for protection, which the 
UN peacekeepers were unable to provide. The humanitarian crisis was acute. 
On urgent request from the UN, Artemis was launched to temporarily relieve 
the UN in Bunia until it could bring in reinforcements (Homan, 2007; Prunier, 
2009).  
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 It is important to recognise the serious and complex nature of the conflict in 
Ituri at the time in order to appreciate why the UN battalion was unable to get 
the violence under control and to understand the domestic context in which 
Artemis operated. There was no active support for Operation Artemis at the 
domestic level in the DRC. Instead, the EU troops were faced with direct, 
armed opposition. In May 2003, when France agreed to help the UN stabilise 
the situation in Ituri, the Ugandan Peoples Defence Force leader, Thomas 
Lubanga, declared that French troops would be treated as enemies 
(Hendrickson, Strand and Raney, 2007). The following month the first French 
forward elements (100 French troops) of the Artemis operation were deployed 
to Bunia. Less than a week later the force was caught up in its first violent 
confrontation with the local Lendu militia, and in early July, the EU forces 
experienced violent opposition also from armed ethnic Hema. For the rest of 
the deployment Artemis soldiers were repeatedly challenged militarily from 
both sides (Hendrickson, Strand and Raney, 2007; Homan, 2007).   
 
The lack of support from key domestic security actors limited Artemis success 
even before its soldiers arrival in the DRC. The domestic context in Ituri 
caused hesitance with regard to the operation in EU capitals. This in turn led to 
the strict limitations to the operations mandate and the French troop 
dominance. These, as concluded in the previous chapter, would become the 
primary reasons for the limits to the operations overall success. The 
geographic, temporal and functional limits to the mandate clearly signalled the 
boundaries and transitory nature of the Artemis deployment to the belligerent 
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parties. Homan (2007) has argued that the strict insistence by the EU member 
states on a very limited area of operations merely pushed the conflict out of 
Bunia into other areas where atrocities continued. The relief that Artemis did 
provide for civilians in Bunia positively affected EUFORs relationship with 
local non-military actors and the civilian population in Bunia. The good 
relationship with the non-military domestic actors, however, did not constitute 
sufficient domestic consent to facilitate an overall success in this case. Artemis 
demonstrates that the lack of domestic support from key security actors 
involved in the conflict limits an operations chance of overall success. 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that the groups, which attacked the 
EU troops, were the same groups that threatened the civilian population in 
Bunia. The success that the operation did have, although limited, was crucial to 
the wellbeing of civilians in Bunia, which the UN alone could not protect. 
Therefore, although the operation did not succeed overall, it demonstrates how 
even a partial success can be an important achievement considering the 
dangerous domestic context in which it engaged. Finally, the Artemis operation 
also demonstrated that high levels of EU support could to some extent make up 
for low levels of domestic support. Because the EU, with a firm French lead, 
dedicated the necessary commitment and capabilities for the force to be 
deployed quickly and to implement its mission in an efficient manner the 
operation was able to successfully fulfil its mandate (internal goal attainment) 
despite the lack of domestic support.     
 
In 2006, when the EU launched its second ESDP military conflict management 
operation in the DRC, the humanitarian situation in the country was still 
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dreadful. Nevertheless, for EUFOR DRC the domestic context in its area of 
operations, which was limited to the area around the capital, was very different 
from that which EUFOR Artemis had encountered in Bunia three years earlier. 
In Kinshasa, Operation DR Congo was endorsed by the DRCs Supreme 
Defence Council. Some of the domestic parties standing at the elections, 
however, did not politically support the operation from its beginning. The 
leader of the countrys political opposition, Jean Pierre Bemba, claimed that 
the operation was not neutral. Bemba alleged that EUFOR was supporting the 
incumbent President Joseph Kabila. These claims seemed convincing to many, 
given the historic ties between France and the DRC and the large French 
contribution to the EU operation. Even before its deployment, EUFOR DR 
Congo was drawn into the DRCs political game. EU Special Envoy for 
the African Great Lakes region, Aldo Ajello, rejected these allegations as 
domestic political campaigning and insisted that there was no truth to them 
(Gegout, 2007). The EU repeatedly reiterated the operations political 
neutrality. Interviewees across the board support the neutrality claim. One 
interviewee pointed to the fact that Bemba took a U-turn in sudden support of 
the operation after a Polish EUFOR contingent came to his rescue, when his 
home came under attack (Interview, national representative to the EU, 
09/06/2009). 
 
Regardless of its underlying motivations the domestic political opposition to 
EUFOR resulted in demonstrations against the operation in Kinshasa in the 
period leading up to its deployment (May and June 2006). As the troops were 
deployed and started operating, actions such as the move to protect Bemba 
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allowed the force to demonstrate its neutrality (Interview, representative from 
national representation to the EU, 09/06/2009; Interview, representative from 
the European Council, 08/06/2009). In effect, the domestic political and public 
opposition to the operation diminished as the operation came under way and 
EUFOR eventually secured domestic support for its mission (Gegout, 2007). 
This again demonstrates how the EU can affect the external context in which 
its troops operate. This case is important also because the domestic political 
opposition to the operation in Kinshasa did not cause the limits to the success 
of EUFOR DR Congo. The operation was a success in terms of its internal goal 
attainment. It provided the service it was meant to in Kinshasa, despite the 
political opposition it experienced there. It was the fact that it was not 
mandated to operate beyond Kinshasa, which limited its success in external 
goal attainment. This was caused by the political decision by EU member 
states to strictly limit the mandate. This decision was based on the lack of EU 
support for the operation, which also caused the delayed deployment and in 
effect the limitation to EUFORs internal appropriateness. 
 
Despite the fact that the overall security situation in the DRC had not changed 
significantly from 2003 to 2006, the two ESDP operations engaged in two very 
different domestic contexts. They enjoyed different levels of support from 
domestic actors on the ground. Both operations experienced opposition, but 
Artemis was challenged militarily in Ituri, whereas the challenge to EUFOR 
DRC in Kinshasa was mainly political in nature. The domestic support that the 
two operations enjoyed was also different. Artemis had the support of the local 
population in its area of operations, whereas EUFOR DRC in the beginning did 
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not (although this developed over time). EUFOR DRC, on the other hand, had 
greater political support from the domestic authorities than Artemis. Overall, 
the domestic opposition to EUFOR DR Congo was less threatening than the 
domestic opposition to Artemis, yet Artemis made a bigger contribution to the 
management of the conflict in the DRC as a whole (external goal attainment). 
This is an important finding, because it suggests that the higher levels of EU 
support for Operation Artemis than for EUFOR DR Congo was more important 
for its success than the lower levels of domestic opposition for operation 
EUFOR DR Congo than for Artemis. The lack of domestic support limited 
both operations indirectly through the hesitation this caused in the EU capitals. 
 
The regional level 
The conflicts that Artemis and EUFOR DR Congo engaged in were not 
confined to Bunia or Kinshasa or even to the DRC. They were part of what 
Ulriksen (2004) has called Central Africa’s web of wars. Over the last decade 
this complex conflict scenario has involved eight regional governments, the 
state-level authorities in Kinshasa, at least a dozen rebel movements and a vast 
number of smaller armed groups and militias dispersed throughout the eastern 
parts of the country (Ulriksen, Gourlay and Mace, 2004; Ulriksen, 2004). For 
the purpose of this thesis, it is important to recognise the regional complexity 
in which Operation Artemis and EUFOR DR Congo were operating. This is 
important because it contextualises the operations and allows for an 
examination of whether and to what extent support from key regional actors 
involved directly in the violent conflict in the country of engagement is 
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necessary for an ESDP military conflict management operation to be able to 
succeed.  
 
Before France agreed to help the UN in Ituri in 2003, it set as a condition for its 
military engagement that the countries in the region that were involved in the 
fighting, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda, all officially supported the operation 
(Homan, 2007). This illustrates how France, which had extensive experience in 
the country, deemed official support from the regional actors involved in the 
conflict important. What France was requesting was consent and a promise of 
non-interference from Rwanda and Uganda. Both countries were initially 
weary of the prospect of Frances engagement due to its strong ties with the 
government in the DRC. The fact that this became an EU operation, rather than 
a bilateral French operation, helped ensure the regional support that France 
deemed necessary for a successful operation. HR Solana and EU Special 
Envoy Adjello engaged in diplomatic overtures with Rwanda, Uganda and the 
DRC to facilitate the regional consent. The promise of UK participation in the 
operation helped reassure Rwanda and Uganda, which eventually granted 
France their official support for the operation (ICG, 2005b; Hadden, 2009; 
Hendrickson, Strand and Raney, 2007). This is another example of how the EU 
can help muster up domestic and regional support and create the necessary 
external conditions for its own success. In the Artemis case this enabled 
EUFOR to alleviate a crisis where other actors (the UN and France) could not. 
Because EUFOR DR Congo by its mandate was confined to the area 
surrounding Kinshasa, the regional dimension of the conflict was of less 
importance to the internal success of this operation and the EU operation of 
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less of concern to the regional actors involved. In this way, the nature of an 
operation affects the importance of the regional conflict context and the 
support for the operation of the actors involved.   
 
These two cases also illustrate another important regional aspect, which 
although it is often overlooked in the ESDP literature, was of utmost 
importance to the success of these two operations. That is operational support 
from regional actors. The grouping base for Operation Artemis was located in 
Uganda and the over-the-horizon reserve for EUFOR DR Congo was deployed 
in Gabon (Council of the European Union, 2009a). The consent and 
operational support of these regional actors was a necessary condition for the 
success of both these operations. Without this support neither of the operations 
could have taken place, let alone succeed.  
 
The international level 
The EUs main international security partner in Operation Artemis and EUFOR 
DR Congo was the UN. Both operations were invited and authorised by the 
UN. Moreover, the main purpose of both operations was to assist the UN 
mission in the DRC, MONUC. The nature of the assistance that the UN 
requested and that the EU troops provided was very different in the two 
operations. Because the operational theatre on the ground; the task at hand; and 
the role of domestic, regional and other international actors varied significantly 
in the two cases, the partnership between the UN and the EU was very different 
in the two operations. In 2003, the EU force was deployed to help the UN 
regain control of the situation in Ituri, whereas in Kinshasa in 2006 the EU 
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troops were there to help prevent the UN from loosing control in the first place. 
The EU took over the lead in Bunia, whereas the UN kept the lead in Kinshasa. 
In both instances the UN remained the primary conflict manager in the country 
as a whole, with the EU filling the gaps where the UN was lacking capabilities 
(Morsut, 2009). The EU troops were, thus, supporting the UN mission, rather 
than the UN troops supporting the EU operations. In effect, the two ESDP 
military conflict management operations in the DRC had much lower levels of 
international operational support than operations Concordia and Althea in the 
Balkans. This in turn affected what the operations could successfully achieve, 
which illustrates the link between the level of international support and the 
level of operational success.  
 
The cooperation between the EU and the UN in these two operations was good. 
In 2003, there had been some initial confusion among MONUC officials in the 
field as to the nature of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force, which was 
to be deployed in Bunia. Once the EU troops were deployed, however, clear 
and simple procedures for a mutual flow of information were set up and 
worked well. Also in Kinshasa in 2006 the cooperation with MONUC went 
relatively smoothly (Homan, 2007; Morsut, 2009). Nonetheless, there were 
significant differences between the two organisations. In particular, their 
diverse operational cultures have been raised by a number of interviewees:  
 
We need to make the UN better, not just bail it out. The UN could do better in 
the DRC. There are already 15,000 troops there. These are not being made 
proper use of. (…) There is also an issue of the EU - and NATO for that matter, 
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having better equipment, better troops, better command and control structures 
and better behaviour. We do not steal from the people we are supposed to 
protect (Interview, national representative to NATO, 14/05/2009). 
 
Another interviewee explained the differences between the two organisations 
in terms of their institutional structures: 
 
The cooperation (between the UN and the EU) is good, but the UN is a 
different kind of organisation. The EU and NATO are almost identical in their 
set up. If there is a committee in one, then there is a parallel committee in the 
other. The EU is modelled on NATO. (…) The UN has an easier structure. 
There are a lot less people dealing with this in UN HQ. NATO and the EU 
have almost as many people in HQ for each operation as they have in the field. 
That is why the EU and NATO are so detailed in the planning of their 
operations. The UN is more ‘fire and forget’. They give a mandate and then 
you go away and do it. Their mandates are less specific. The EU and NATO 
micro-manage (Interview, national representative to the EU, 09/06/2009).   
 
As facilitating the work of non-military international actors was among the key 
objectives of both Operation Artemis and EUFOR DRC, the relationship with 
non-military international actors was also important to the success of the two 
operations. Artemis, for example, aimed to help facilitate the provision of 
international humanitarian assistance to resume, to which a good working 
relationship with those that provided humanitarian assistance was necessary. 
Unlike the often difficult relationship between military and humanitarian actors 
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in conflict situations, cooperation between Artemis and the international 
humanitarian agencies on the ground in Bunia was good. For the purpose of 
this analysis, this is important in so far as it attributed to the success of 
Artemis, which benefited tactically from the good dialogue, cooperation and 
information-sharing that it had with its humanitarian partners on the ground 
(Homan, 2007). Likewise, in Kinshasa in 2006, the 2,000 election observers 
from a range of partners contributed to the successful undertaking of the DRC 
elections, which was part of the overall political purpose of EUFOR DRC 
(Gegout, 2007). In the international security arena, there was generally a 
positive atmosphere towards both operations. This was reflected in the 
invitation that the UN extended to the EU to undertake the two operations and 
in its robust authorisation in the Chapter VII mandates for both operations 
(Interview, representative from the Council of the EU, 08/06/2009; Council of 
the EU, 2009d).  
 
Overall, both the DRC operations enjoyed support at the international level, 
although not to the same extent as Concordia and Althea in the Balkans. At the 
regional level both Artemis and EUFOR DRC secured formal consent from the 
key regional actors involved in the conflict. Both operations also had 
operational support from regional actors willing to let the EU locate temporary 
military bases and troops within their territory. At the domestic level the 
conditions for the two operations were less permissive (military opposition in 
Ituri and political opposition in Kinshasa). These cases illustrate how lack of 
domestic support can threaten the success of an operation. However, the DRC 
cases also underline how EU support to these operations can affect the extent 
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to which domestic, regional and international contexts condition their success, 
and vice versa. For example, the warning of domestic military opposition to the 
French troops, announced before Artemis was launched, made the French 
government insist on a Chapter VII mandate from the UN, which then affected 
what the EU troops were able to achieve. On the other hand, the domestic 
context in Ituri also made the EU restrict itself in the time, space and function 
of the mandate, which had a negative effect on the operations overall success. 
This illustrates how both the internal and the external dimensions of the context 
in which an operation is undertaken affects its chance of success. It also shows 
how actors within the internal and the external contexts affect each others 
behaviour, which in turn may have an effect on the success of ESDP military 
conflict management operations.  
 
The external context of Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR 
This next section takes a closer look at the external context of the ESDP 
military conflict management operation, which the EU undertook jointly in 
Chad and the Central African Republic from January 2008 to March 2009.  
 
The domestic and regional level 
The security situation in which EUFOR Chad/CAR engaged is the product of a 
multi-layered set of conflicts. At the sub-state level both Chad and CAR 
alongside neighbouring Sudan were experiencing a multitude of smaller 
conflicts between local groups. At the state-level rebel groups in all three 
countries were seeking to topple the regimes of President Deby (Chad), 
President Bozize (CAR) and President al-Bashir (Sudan). At the regional level 
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Chad is involved in proxy warfare with Sudan. CAR is increasingly becoming 
embroiled also in this conflict. Although Chad and CAR are not directly 
opposed in this wider regional conflict, they are also not wholly aligned or 
allied in the traditional sense (Berg, 2008; ICG, 2008b; Mattelaer, 2008). The 
following will take a closer look at how domestic, regional and international 
conditions affected the success of EUFOR Chad/CAR. The domestic and the 
regional levels will be examined together as they overlap significantly in this 
particular case, because the operation itself had a regional character. 
 
EUFOR Chad/CAR was deployed amid an escalation both in the regional 
conflict and in the state-level power struggle in Chad. The 2007 Sirte 
Agreement, brokered by Libya, had proved short-lived and fighting between 
the Chadian armed forces and various rebel groups continued especially in the 
east of the country. In 2008 three rebel groups
32
 had formed an alliance and 
launched a joint attack on the capital. The attempt to overthrow President Deby 
failed, but the power struggle within Chad and tensions between the three 
countries in the region continued, as President Deby clamped down on security 
and accused Sudan of supporting the rebel attack.  
 
Already in December 2007, Deby had ordered air strikes on Chadian rebels in 
Darfur. Meanwhile, Sudan was assisting the newly established Chadian rebel 
alliance in preparing their attack on Ndjamena. After the attack Deby 
promised retaliation. While Darfur rebels had rushed to support Deby in 
Ndjamena the Sudanese government took advantage of the situation and 
                                                 
32 Rally of Forces for Change (RFC) led by Timane Erdimi, Union of Forces for Democracy 
and Development (UFDD) led by Mahamat Nouri and Union of Forces for Democracy and 
Development-Fundamental (UFDD/F) led by Abdel Wahid Aboud Mackaye (Seibert, 2008). 
 260
stepped up its campaign in Western Darfur. The increased fighting in Darfur 
caused further population displacements across the border into Chad. This 
influx of Darfur refugees increased the pressure on the security situation in 
Chad and caused existing tensions there to increase even further (Seibert, 
2008). 
 
At the time of the EUFOR deployment Chad specialist, Bjoern Seibert, warned 
that as Deby was losing control of the country and a fully fledged regional war 
was becoming a distinct possibility. Seibert also suggested that the rebel 
offensive on Ndjamena was directly linked to the EUFOR Chad/CAR 
operation. He perceived it as a pre-emptive tactical move by the rebel alliance 
aimed at interrupting the EU deployment, which given its large French 
component was not perceived as neutral (Seibert, 2008). The rebels had already 
criticised the operation in planning for its large number of French troops, 
which were perceived as a threat because of Frances existing military and 
political support to the Chadian regime (Fletcher, 2008). One interviewee 
explained the domestic context in which the EU force was deployed in the 
following way: 
 
Just as EUFOR was flying in the rebels launched an attack on the capital. They 
probably saw it as their last chance for a while to oust Deby. This shows why it 
is so important that the EU communicates its purpose well. The EU troops 
were not there to meddle in internal Chadian politics. The EU does not have a 
strong Chad policy. The focus was on doing something about Sudan and the 
 261
refugee camps. So as long as the rebels stayed out of the camps, they would be 
left alone (Interview, national representative to the EU, 09/06/2009). 
     
This quote illustrates how the operation originated from the pressure on 
European policy-makers to do something about the situation in Darfur. This 
had proved difficult especially because of Khartoums strong objections to any 
outside intervention in Darfur. Unable to do anything about the situation in 
Darfur directly the EU sought to launch an operation on the borders between 
Sudan and Chad to tackle the regional aspect of the conflict, but the Chadian 
authorities (despite pressure from France) objected to the idea of a EU military 
presence operating directly on the border. Consequently, the operation was 
eventually launched to support the UN and the Chadian security services in 
managing the security situation in the vast camps of refugees, which had been 
forced across the border by the violent conflict in Darfur (Seibert, 2008). This 
sway from its original purpose demonstrates how the domestic and regional 
context influenced the development of the mandate and the planning of the 
operation as well as the conceptual understanding of the operation itself within 
the EU (Mattelaer, 2008; ICG, 2008). Seibert (2008, p.3) suggests that:  
 
There appears to have been little appreciation of the linkage between the 
humanitarian crisis in Chad and the domestic power-struggle in Chad (…) the 
possible implications of deploying a European force were not well understood. 
 
The rebel attack on Ndjamena and the subsequent EUFOR deployment 
support this point. The operation, although it sought neutrality, was even before 
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its launch drawn into and itself had an impact on both the intra-Chadian 
conflict and the wider regional security situation (Seibert, 2008). When asked 
about the internal EU reaction to the situation at the time a national 
representative offered this account:  
 
The rebel attack focused everyone before departure. (…) It meant that the 
troops were being deployed in a different operational theatre. There was a 
need for better intelligence, but at the time that was impossible. Nobody had it. 
Nobody knew what was happening in the country that we were getting ready to 
deploy to. But nobody’s hands were shaking. The operation was deployed with 
only ten days delay, which was later caught up. Of course it meant some 
adjustments. For example, the airport we were meant to fly in to had just been 
bombed (Interview, national representative to the EU, 09/06/2009). 
 
A staff member from EUFOR Chad/CAR had this account:  
 
We didn’t know what was going to happen. As all the supplies were being 
driven through Cameroon, we didn’t even know if they would make it to Chad. 
It is a long way. Had the trucks been attacked, the soldiers would not have 
been deployed (Interview, representative from EUFOR Chad/CAR, 
17/02/2009).    
 
The rebel attack on Ndjamena, which was a manifestation of domestic 
opposition from the rebels to the operation, only shortly delayed the EUFOR 
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Chad/CAR deployment.
33
 As the domestic opposition was based on a 
perceived threat to the rebels from the Debys French ally, the EU could 
appease it by making clearer to the domestic parties to the conflict its 
operational objectives and its intended neutrality in the internal Chadian 
power-struggle. To this end, it launched an information campaign, which 
successfully managed to soothe the opposition from the rebels. Once the 
operation was underway it met little sustained violent opposition from 
domestic and regional actors. However, this can in part be attributed to the fact 
that by then the Sudanese government, the Chadian authorities and the rebels 
had between them made sure that the operation would not interfere where it 
was not wanted. State-level authorities in Sudan and Chad had effectively 
decided what the EU could and could not do militarily in the region. In effect, 
the proxy war between Sudan and Chad deteriorated, while EUFOR 
Chad/CAR was deployed (Arteaga, 2008; Fletcher, 2008; Seibert, 2008). This 
is why the operation was only a partial success in its external goal attainment.  
 
At the sub-state level local authorities also repeatedly hindered EUFOR 
actions, for example, the governor of Abeche forbade EUFOR personnel to 
patrol the town at night. The Abeche authorities also rejected EUFORs offer 
to increase its patrolling after the shooting of an ICRC employee in Abeche in 
July 2008. In both instances EUFOR adjusted its actions to suit the domestic 
authorities (Oxfam, 2008).  
 
                                                 
33 Further delays in the deployment to Full Operating Capability were due to the lack of 
internal EU support. 
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The EU soldiers were well received by the civilian population. In particular, 
the refugees and IDPs living in the area where EUFOR patrolled felt safer due 
to their presence (Oxfam, 2008). There was little understanding among the 
domestic population, however, as to how EUFOR was different from the 
French Epervier force, which was stationed in the country to provide bilateral 
military support to the Chad authorities (Ehrhart, 2008).  
 
The international level 
EUFOR Chad/CARs main international partner was the United Nations 
Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). This is a 
multidimensional mission launched in September 2007 to address the security 
situation and alleviate the looming refugee crisis in the region. MINURCAT 
had three planned security components: (1) a civilian UN element of 300 
international police officers (intended to help train the Chad police); (2) a 
contingent of 850 Chadian police officers (to be trained to assume the 
responsibility of security in the refugee camps); and (3) the 3,400 strong 
EUFOR Chad/CAR, which provided the military component of MINURCAT 
(later to be relieved by a UN force) (Ehrhart, 2008; UN, 2009a). Originally, the 
military component was to be provided by the UN, but President Deby opposed 
this. To appease this domestic opposition, France proposed an EU operation in 
its place. The Chadian authorities were persuaded and EUFOR Chad/CAR was 
launched as the military support element to MINURCAT (Mattelaer, 2009).  
 
EUFORs success would to some extent come to depend on MINURCAT. The 
two other components of MINURCAT, which EUFOR was effectively there to 
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support, were both continuously delayed. One year into the MINURCAT 
mission only 70 Chadian police commanders and 230 police officers out of the 
planned 850 had been trained. None had entered the camps. In effect, they were 
not providing any security for refugees and IDP from the rampant banditry, 
criminality and forced troop recruitment, which were taking place in the 
camps. The MINURCAT delays left EUFOR in a difficult situation, because 
according to its military mandate, it could only react to situations where 
civilians were directly at risk. The troops were not mandated to undertake the 
investigations, arrests or prosecutions needed to combat the culture of 
criminality and impunity festering in the camps. In fact, they were not allowed 
to enter the camps. When EUFOR did try to assert itself in policing functions, 
the Chadian authorities immediately objected and EUFOR obeyed. 
Consequently, the first weapons search conducted by UN-trained Chadian 
police in a refugee camp, a key objective of the whole MINURCAT mission, 
took place only six weeks before the EUFOR mandate expired in March 2009 
(Oxfam, 2008; Mattelaer, 2008). MINURCATs failures in this way directly 
limited EUFORs success in terms of its external goal attainment.   
 
Upon EUFORs withdrawal observers feared that it would leave behind a 
security vacuum. Only six months into the operation, it had become clear that 
the planned military component of MINURCAT would be deployed (Ehrhart, 
2008; Oxfam, 2008; Mattelaer, 2008). UNSG Ban Ki-Moon had invited an 
extension of the EUFOR operation, in case MINURCAT could not be deployed 
on time, but the EU had rejected this option (Ehrhart, 2008). Instead the EU 
pledged that 2,000 of its troops would temporarily stay on as part of the UN 
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operation to facilitate a smooth and successful handover (Pop, 2009). In the 
end, the handover to MINURCAT went relatively well, as one interviewee 
explained:  
 
It was a good handover. There is no vacuum. Of course the EU and the UN 
have different standards. But the main problems have been logistics. But some 
of the European troops stayed. For example the French contingent remained in 
the country with a different badge. This helped the transition (Interview, 
representative from the Council of the EU, 08/06/2009).  
 
EUFOR Chad/CAR had a good working relationship with the UN both at the 
political-strategic and the military-strategic levels. The operation was planned 
in cooperation with the UN. Once they were both deployed, EUFOR and 
MINURCAT worked well together also at the operational and tactical levels 
and the handover between the two operations went relatively smoothly 
(Interview, representative from the Council of the EU official, 08/06/2009; 
Interview, national representative to the EU, 14/05/2009).  
 
Overall, EUFOR Chad/CAR had limited external support. At the domestic and 
regional levels key political and security actors were not always supportive of 
the operation. At the international level the UNs failure to deploy and 
implement its own mission and cooperate with the EU operation negatively 
affected EUFORs success. Coupled with the lack of sufficient EU support this 
led to the partial success of the EUFOR Chad/CAR operation. This case once 
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again illustrates how domestic, regional and international support is necessary, 
although not sufficient, for an operation of this nature to succeed.   
 
Conclusion and key findings 
This chapter examined the external conditions for success in ESDP military 
conflict management operations. The three hypotheses concerning the external 
conditions for success suggested that if an operation cannot secure sufficient 
domestic, regional and international support, it cannot succeed. The analytical 
findings above support all three hypotheses. It is clear that domestic, regional 
and international support is necessary for an ESDP military conflict 
management operation to be able to succeed. The analysis also found that all 
three external conditions are necessary, but none are sufficient for an operation 
of this nature to succeed. The external conditions are interlinked both with each 
other and with the internal conditions for success.  
 
This chapter can conclude that it is the specific ESDP military conflict 
management operation, rather than the EU as a whole, which must be 
supported for the operation to succeed. Wider support for the EU, as was the 
case domestically in Macedonia, is a conducive, but not a necessary condition 
for success. With regard to the level of the necessary external support for an 
operation to succeed, this varies in different cases. The case study suggests that 
the more external support an operation has the better able it will be to succeed. 
What constitutes sufficient support at each level depends on the nature of the 
operation itself and the internal and external context in which it is undertaken. 
The five cases demonstrate that a degree of external support is necessary at 
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each of these three levels for any ESDP military conflict management 
operation to be able to succeed. At all three levels the minimum degree of 
support necessary for an operation to succeed is the absence of obstruction. 
Obstruction is active and sustained opposition from key security actors 
involved in the conflict to an extent, which makes a successful operation 
unattainable. Obstruction can be present both before the operation is launched 
and once the EU troops are deployed in the field. How much opposition an 
operation can overcome, depends on how much EU support (commitment and 
capabilities) the operation has secured. In the Artemis case, for example, the 
EU supported the operation to such an extent that it could defeat localised 
armed opposition, but only for a limited time and in a limited area of 
operations. EUFOR DR Congo also illustrates that an operation can overcome 
political opposition in the field, but it shows that how much opposition the EU 
is willing to take on is sometimes limited. An operation can succeed without 
active domestic or regional support, if the EU is willing and able to make up 
for the low level of external support by a higher level of internal support. If it is 
not, then the operation cannot succeed.   
 
It is clear from the empirical data that opposition in deed rather than in word 
poses more of a threat to a successful operation. Political opposition to the 
operation (as was the case in EUFOR DR Congo) or to the EU more generally 
(which has periodically been the case in BiH) does not necessarily hinder a 
successful operation, whereas when such opposition is backed by a significant 
and sustained military threat (like from across the border in Sudan in EUFOR 
Chad/CAR) this limits the likelihood of success and EU will to overcome the 
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opposition. The extent to which it limits success depends on the EU support 
that an operation has to overcome such opposition.  
 
At the domestic level support from key political and security actors towards the 
operation (its troops and its mission) facilitates success. At this level the nature 
of the conflict also affects whether an ESDP military conflict management 
operation is able to succeed. The findings in this chapter suggest that an 
operation is more likely to succeed in a permissive environment where the 
operation has the consent and enjoys the support of the domestic actors than in 
a non-permissive environment where it does not. An operation can overcome 
some domestic opposition, like in the Artemis and EUFOR DRC, but this can 
still limit the operations chances of success especially from an external 
perspective. The extent to which it does depends on whether the task at hand 
can be handled with the tools that the operation has at its disposal, which in 
turn depends on the EU support that the operation has secured. At the regional 
level the degree of support from key regional actors toward the operation also 
affects success. Here again success is dependent on the absence of negative 
regional interference to the extent that it becomes obstruction. At this level 
operational support from regional actors can also be necessary for success, as it 
was in all the African cases. At the international level too support from key 
actors involved in the conflict and its management on the ground and in the 
international security arena affect an operations success. This study found that 
the EU can help secure external support or overcome opposition at all three 
external levels. Vice versa, the comparative case study can conclude that 
domestic, regional and international support can make up for some deficits in 
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EU support. For example, operational support from third countries like in the 
case of EUFOR Chad/CAR, where Russia supplied the four helicopters and 
staff that the EU itself could not provide made up for a gap in EU capabilities 
allocated to the operation.   
 
In conclusion, the key finding of part two of this thesis is that for an ESDP 
military conflict management operation to be successful it must have sufficient 
support. Such support must be present internally within the EU and externally 
beyond the EU. Internally this includes support from the member states and 
institutions of the EU and externally support must be present at the domestic, 
regional and international levels. At each of these levels the actions of the key 
actors involved in the conflict and its management affect the ESDP military 
conflict management operations ability to succeed. The analysis also found 
that neither support nor obstruction is a constant. Actors at none of these levels 
are necessarily immune to pressure and persuasion. Contextual conditions can 
be affected by the EU itself through its relationship and leverage with the key 
actors involved (internally and externally).  
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Chapter eight: Conclusion 
From 2003 to 2009, the EU launched five ESDP military conflict management 
operations. Concordia, Althea, Artemis, EUFOR DR Congo and EUFOR 
Chad/CAR were launched to help manage conflicts in Macedonia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the tri-border area 
between Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic. This thesis set out to 
examine their success and to analyse the conditions under which ESDP 
military conflict management operations can be successful.  
 
The nature of the research question necessitated an examination of success in 
ESDP military conflict management operations, before the thesis could go on 
to identify and analyse the conditions for such success. Therefore, the first part 
of the thesis focused on the notion of success. It theoretically defined success 
and empirically evaluated it in the five ESDP military conflict management 
operations. The second part of the thesis subsequently examined the conditions 
for success. It deduced a set of research hypotheses from the existing literature 
on ESDP, international peacekeeping and conflict management. It then tested 
these hypotheses with regard to the conditions for success in the five ESDP 
military conflict management operations. In this way, the thesis defined, 
evaluated and explained success in ESDP military conflict management 
operations both theoretically and empirically. 
 
Defining success 
The review of the ESDP literature revealed that a shared theoretically grounded 
understanding of how to define and evaluate success in ESDP military conflict 
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management operations did not yet exist. In fact, there has been little 
conceptual discussion of success at all in the scholarly ESDP debate. The wider 
literature on international peacekeeping, military intervention and conflict 
management did also not provide an appropriate conceptualisation of success 
applicable to ESDP military conflict management operations. This literature 
suggested that the operations could be evaluated either (a) on their own merits 
alone or (b) according to higher values of peace and justice. The former 
perspective is referred to in this thesis as an internal perspective on success and 
the latter as an external perspective on success. This thesis argued that neither 
of these approaches offers a suitable definition or an appropriate framework for 
understanding and evaluating success in ESDP military conflict management 
operations. Instead it suggested that the definition and the evaluation of success 
in this new sphere of the ESDP must take into account aspects of both internal 
and external success.  
 
The thesis warned against an emerging trend in the ESDP literature, where EU 
military conflict management operations are evaluated as if they take place in a 
vacuum. Too little attention is paid to the fact that these operations have always 
been part of a wider international effort to manage the conflicts in question. It 
is important that the evaluation of success reflects this reality and examines 
how well the EU force played this part. The evaluation of success must, thus, 
take into account the external as well as internal context in which the 
operations are undertaken. Moreover, the evaluation of ESDP military conflict 
management operations, as it is presently conducted, focuses on the outcome of 
operations only and neglects to assess the appropriateness of their 
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implementation. The thesis argued that it is important not only to evaluate what 
an operation has achieved but also how it has achieved it. Consequently, 
success in ESDP military conflict management operations was defined in the 
following way:  
 
An operation is a success when its purpose has been achieved and 
implemented in an appropriate manner from both an internal and an 
external perspective. 
 
To evaluate success accordingly this thesis argues that this definition can be 
broken down into four success criteria: (1) internal goal attainment, (2) internal 
appropriateness, (3) external goal attainment and (4) external appropriateness. 
The internal goal attainment criterion evaluates whether an operation 
successfully fulfilled its mandate. The internal appropriateness criterion 
assesses the implementation of the operation from an internal perspective with 
regard to its timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The external goal 
attainment criterion examines the contribution that the operation made to the 
overall management of the violent conflict, in which it engaged; that is, its 
contribution to preventing the continuation, diffusion, escalation and 
intensification of violence. Finally, the external appropriateness criterion 
evaluates the implementation of each operation according to the Just War 
principles governing the appropriate use of force. That is the appropriate 
discrimination between combatants and non-combatants and proportionality in 
the use of force.  
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This definition and the criteria for success were developed to allow for an 
assessment of success in ESDP military conflict management operations, 
which takes into account both an internal perspective and an external 
perspective on success. The criteria and the corresponding indicators for 
success are illustrated in figure 8.1. 
 
Figure 8.1: Success in ESDP military conflict management operations 
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Applying this theoretical framework to the comparative analysis of the five 
ESDP military conflict management operations to date, the thesis undertook a 
systematic evaluation not only of success and the conditions under which it can 
be achieved, but also of the theoretical framework itself. The empirical analysis 
concluded that Operation Concordia was largely successful. Its purpose was 
achieved and the operation was implemented in an appropriate manner overall. 
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organised crime in Macedonia. This compromised the internal appropriateness 
of the operation. In Operation Artemis too the conduct of individual EU 
officers involved in the mistreatment of a Congolese civilian subtracted from 
the internal appropriateness of the operation. Because in this incident the use of 
force was neither discriminatory nor proportionate, it also compromised the 
external appropriateness of the operation. The operation was limited with 
regard to its contribution to the overall management of the conflict as well 
(external goal attainment). Artemis was only a complete success with regard to 
its internal goal achievement. Operation Althea has been a significant success 
so far. EUFOR has to date achieved its short-term operational objectives 
(internal goal attainment) and contributed significantly to the management of 
the security aspects of the conflict (external goal attainment). The 
implementation of the operation has been appropriate from both an internal and 
an external perspective. EUFOR DR Congo was only a partial success. 
Although it successfully supported the MONUC mission in Kinshasa during 
the 2006 elections (internal goal attainment), the operation contributed little to 
the management of violent conflict in the DRC (external goal attainment). In 
terms of its appropriateness the operation was an external success because it 
did not apply force, but its internal appropriateness was limited by the delays to 
its deployment. EUFOR Chad/CAR was a partial success. It achieved its 
mandated purpose (internal goal attainment), but it took six months before the 
operation was fully deployed (internal appropriateness). The operation was 
externally appropriate, but it only made a limited contribution to the 
management of the conflict (external appropriateness). A break-down of the 
success of each of the operations is illustrated in table 8.2.   
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Table 8.2: Success in ESDP military conflict management operations: 2003-09 
 Internal goal 
attainment 
Internal 
appropriateness
External goal 
attainment 
External 
appropriateness
Operation 
Concordia 
 
Success Partial success Success Success  
Operation 
Artemis 
 
Success Partial success Partial success  Partial success 
Operation 
Althea 
Preliminary 
success 
Preliminary 
success 
Preliminary 
success 
Preliminary 
success 
EUFOR DR 
Congo 
 
Success Partial success Partial success Success 
EUFOR 
Chad/CAR 
 
Success Partial success Partial success Success 
 
The different degrees of success in these operations illustrate why it is 
important to include both goal attainment and appropriateness criteria for 
success and to evaluate them from both internal and external perspectives. It 
also demonstrates why it is crucial for the purpose of this thesis to evaluate 
success comparatively and to undertake this comparison in a structured and 
focused way. The empirical analysis of success illustrated not only the 
analytical value of the new definition and criteria for success, but also the 
usefulness of the selected methodology and analytical approach to the 
evaluation of success in ESDP military conflict management operations.  
 
Explaining success 
Having defined and evaluated success the thesis turned its attention to the 
conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations. This 
part of the analysis sought to explain when operations of this nature can be 
successful. To this end, the thesis deduced four research hypotheses concerning 
 277
the necessary conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management 
operations from the existing literature on ESDP, international peacekeeping 
and conflict management. The four hypotheses were based on the theoretical 
assumption that ESDP military conflict management operations are 
conditioned by the specific context in which they occur. The thesis suggested 
that there are two different dimensions to this context: (1) the internal 
dimension and (2) the external dimension. The internal dimension is the EU-
specific context, in which an operation is undertaken. This is made up of EU 
member states and EU institutions. The external dimension is the conflict-
specific context, in which an operation is implemented. This includes the 
domestic, regional and international actors actively involved in the conflict and 
its management. The overall theoretical expectation deduced from the existing 
literature suggested that if an ESDP military conflict management operation 
cannot secure sufficient support, it cannot succeed. The four hypotheses 
suggested that for an operation to succeed, it is necessary that it secures 
sufficient support both within the EU from the actors involved in the operation 
and outside the EU from the actors involved in the violent conflict and its 
management. Because of the multiplicity of actors involved in the operations, 
the conflicts and their management, the thesis developed a levels-of-analysis 
framework to structure the investigation of the conditions for success. The 
levels of analysis and the key actors at each level are illustrated in tables 8.3 
and 8.4 below.   
 
Table 8.3: The internal level of analysis 
Levels of analysis Key actors 
EU level EU member states and  
EU institutions 
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Table 8.4: The external levels of analysis 
Levels of analysis Key actors 
Domestic level Domestic actors: state/army and 
irregular armed groups  
Regional level Regional actors: states/armies, 
irregular armed groups and regional 
security organisations  
International level International actors: states and 
international security organisations  
 
Applying this framework the analysis tested the empirical relevance of the 
research hypotheses in a comparative case study of the conditions for success 
in ESDP military conflict management operations from 2003 to 2009. The key 
finding of this part of the thesis is that for an ESDP military conflict 
management operation to be successful it must secure sufficient support. Such 
support must be secured both internally within the EU and externally outside 
the EU. The analysis also found that the each of the two might complement and 
to some extent compensate for low levels of support from the other. Internally, 
support must be secured from the member states and institutions of the EU; and 
externally, support must be secured from domestic, regional and international 
actors. At each of the analytical levels, the actions of the key security actors 
involved in the operation, the conflict and its management affect the ESDP 
military conflict management operations ability to succeed.  
 
The thesis found that neither support nor opposition to an operation is constant. 
Actors at none of these levels are necessarily immune to pressure and 
persuasion. Contextual conditions can be affected by the EU itself through its 
relationship and leverage with the relevant actors involved (internally and 
externally). This means that an operation can succeed in situations where 
support only becomes available gradually over time, as EU or domestic, 
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regional and international actors are persuaded to support the operation or as 
opposition to it is overcome. The thesis also found that operations can succeed 
in situations where there is only passive external support, if there is not 
sustained opposition to the operation beyond the level that the operation can 
successfully handle with the means it has at its disposal. These means are 
determined by the level of EU support, especially from the EU member states, 
which is the sine qua non condition for success in ESDP military conflict 
management operations.    
 
Predicting success 
The central finding of this thesis is that if an ESDP military conflict 
management operation can secure sufficient support, it can succeed. The 
analysis found that for an operation to succeed, it is necessary that it has 
sufficient support from the member states and institutions of the EU and from 
the domestic, regional and international actors actively involved in the conflict 
and its management. For sufficient support to be secured; and in effect, for an 
operation to be able to succeed, all the key actors involved must have both the 
commitment and the capabilities to support the operation sufficiently. Actors at 
the different levels can compensate for limited support at other levels, as long 
as the support for the operation overall enables it to achieve its purpose in an 
appropriate manner from both an internal and an external perspective. To this 
end, the EU level of support is vital.  
 
From these findings the thesis can conclude that there are four necessary 
conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations: (1) 
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EU support, (2) domestic support, (3) regional support and (4) international 
support for the operation. The findings in this thesis suggest that if an ESDP 
military conflict management operation cannot secure sufficient support at the 
EU level as well as at the domestic, regional and international levels the 
operation cannot fully succeed. Based on these findings this thesis can predict 
that in scenarios where an ESDP military conflict management operation 
cannot secure sufficient support at all four levels it will not be able to succeed. 
The key findings are illustrated in table 8.5. 
 
Table 8.5: Conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management  
Conditions for success
 
Key findings 
EU support If an ESDP military conflict management 
operation cannot secure sufficient EU support, it 
will not succeed. 
Domestic support If an ESDP military conflict management 
operation cannot secure sufficient domestic 
support, it will not succeed. 
Regional support 
 
If an ESDP military conflict management 
operation cannot secure sufficient regional 
support, it will not succeed. 
International support If an ESDP military conflict management 
operation cannot secure sufficient international 
support, it will not succeed. 
 
Conclusion: Conditions for success – important to whom and for what?  
Violent conflict and military conflict management are both complex 
phenomena. Consequently, success in military conflict management operations 
is a complex issue to define, evaluate, explain and predict. Because of this 
complexity it is crucial that evaluations of success in military conflict 
management operations are based on a theoretically grounded understanding of 
success and a sound analytical framework for its evaluation. This is particularly 
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important if scholars seek to compare the success of several operations and to 
draw lessons from completed operations to future operations and to the study 
of military conflict management more generally.  
 
Paris (2000) and Bures (2007) have called for more theoretically oriented 
research in the study of international peacekeeping, which is one type of 
military conflict management. This thesis concurs with the need for more 
theoretically grounded research in this realm. It contends that conceptual 
refinement concerning how to define, evaluate, explain and predict success in 
military conflict management is a vital part of such theory development. 
Failure to appropriately address these issues can lead to analytical 
misunderstanding, misguided policy prescription and in the worst case to less 
than successful military conflict management operations. Naturally, the 
intervening organisation has an interest in succeeding in these operations, but it 
is important to recall that failure in military conflict management may also 
have serious implications for the soldiers who implement the operations, and 
for those who live (and die) in the conflicts, they seek to manage. This is why 
systematic scrutiny of success in military conflict management is important  
not only in theory, but also in practice.  
 
The thesis hopes to encourage a wider debate on the notion of success in 
military conflict management. To this end, it has discussed how to define, 
evaluate, explain and predict success in ESDP military conflict management 
operations. Its findings are relevant not only for scholars of the EU, but also for 
the study of military conflict management more generally. The thesis hopes to 
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add a new dimension to the scholarly debate on the EU as a military conflict 
manager in the international security arena, which in turn can facilitate further 
comparative study of the success of different international conflict managers. 
As it is still too early to undertake a long-term assessment of these operations, 
the analytical focus in this thesis is on the short-term success of ESDP military 
conflict management operations. As hardly any work had been done on the 
conditions for success in ESDP military conflict management operations and 
precisely because the EU is new to military conflict management operations, it 
is important to start taking stock of its success even at this early stage. A 
logical and important follow-up to this research in due course would be a 
longer-term evaluation of success in ESDP military conflict management 
operations. This thesis can, therefore, not claim to be the end point of the 
comprehensive study of success in ESDP military conflict management, but 
hopes to be the beginning. 
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Appendix 1: Institutional structures of the ESDP  
 
Institutional structure for ESDP military conflict management  
 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL
General Affairs and External 
Relations Council
High Representative for 
CFSP Javier Solana 
(Wolff and Rodt, 2008, p. 141) 
 
 
 
Example of command structure for ESDP military operation 
 
 
 
(Hadden, 2009, p.82) 
Operational commander 
(Operational HQ) 
_____________ 
 
Force Commander 
(Force HQ) 
Component command: 
Land 
________ 
 
Forces 
Component command:  
Air 
________ 
 
Forces 
Component command: 
Maritime 
________ 
 
Forces 
Political and Security 
Committee 
Committee on  
Civilian Crisis 
Management
Military Committee 
COREPER 
Political Committee
EUMM
EU Special Representatives
Joint Situation Centre
Policy 
Unit
Military Staff
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Appendix 2: Map of the Western Balkans 
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Appendix 3: Map of the Democratic Republic of Congo  
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Appendix 4: Maps of Sudan, Chad and CAR 
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